Turkey and the PKK: Saving the Peace Process Europe Report N°234 | 6 November 2014 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. A Fraught Process ............................................................................................................. 4 A. An Avalanche of Initiatives ........................................................................................ 4 B. Seeking a Legal Framework ....................................................................................... 7 C. Slippery Timelines ..................................................................................................... 9 D. Beyond Charismatic Leaders ..................................................................................... 10 E. Matching Up End Goals ............................................................................................. 12 F. Moving from Conflict to Politics ................................................................................ 13 III. Elements of a Peace Deal .................................................................................................. 17 A. Transitional Justice ................................................................................................... 17 1. Bringing PKK members back home ..................................................................... 17 2. Balancing peace and justice ................................................................................. 20 B. Disarmament ............................................................................................................. 22 C. Decentralisation ......................................................................................................... 24 D. Öcalan’s Status ........................................................................................................... 27 E. Third-party Assistance ............................................................................................... 28 IV. A Hard But Open Road Ahead ......................................................................................... 30 A. Building Confidence ................................................................................................... 30 B. Winning Public Support ............................................................................................ 31 C. Change in the PKK ..................................................................................................... 32 D. Regional Complications ............................................................................................. 33 E. Sustaining the Ceasefire ............................................................................................ 36 V. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 40 APPENDICES A. Map of Turkey .................................................................................................................. 41 B. Glossary ........................................................................................................................... 42 C. About the International Crisis Group .............................................................................. 43 D. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Europe and Central Asia since 2011 .................. 44 E. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ........................................................................................ 46 International Crisis Group Europe Report N°234 6 November 2014 Executive Summary The peace process to end the 30-year-old insurgency of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) against Turkey’s government is at a turning point. It will either collapse as the sides squander years of work, or it will accelerate as they commit to real convergences. Both act as if they can still play for time – the government to win one more election, the PKK to further build up quasi-state structures in the country’s predominantly- Kurdish south east. But despite a worrying upsurge in hostilities, they currently face few insuperable obstacles at home and have two strong leaders who can still see the process through. Without first achieving peace, they cannot cooperate in fighting their common enemy, the jihadi threat, particularly from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Increasing ceasefire violations, urban unrest and Islamist extremism spill- ing over into Turkey from regional conflicts underline the cost of delays. Both sides must put aside external pretexts and domestic inertia to compromise on the chief prob- lem, the Turkey-PKK conflict inside Turkey. Importantly, the two sides, having realised that neither can beat the other out- right, say they want to end the armed conflict. The government has now matched the PKK’s ceasefire with a serious legal framework that makes real progress possible. But both sides still exchange harsh rhetoric, which they must end to build up trust. They must do more to define common end goals and show real public commitment to what will be difficult compromises. The current peace process also needs a more comprehensive agenda, a more urgent timeframe, better social engagement, mutually agreed ground rules and monitoring criteria. It is evolving as sides respond to chang- ing practical considerations, making the process less a long-term strategy than a series of ad hoc initiatives. Although they have not publicly outlined this in detail, full negotiations will mean Turkey and the PKK eventually have to agree on a conditional amnesty, laws to smooth transitional justice and a truth commission. For Turkey, this will require more openness to offering redress for the state’s past wrongdoings and reparations for victims, as well as a readiness to accept scenarios in which – if and when peace is irrevocably established – PKK figures can join legal Kurdish parties in Turkey and jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan might one day be freed. For the PKK, it means accepting responsibility for its own abuses, ending and denouncing all violence and illegal activities, declaring an end goal of full disarmament of its elements within Turkey’s borders, giving up all attempts to create parallel formations in the south east, and demonstrating readiness to include Turkey’s different Kurdish factions, particularly those that do not agree with the PKK, as stakeholders in the process. Even in the absence of clear commitments or matching end goals, the process it- self has proved to be useful for the entire country and should not be jeopardised to score short-term political points with hardline Turkish and Kurdish constituencies. Most importantly, despite several breaches, the PKK’s unilateral ceasefire since March 2013 has largely held, drastically reducing casualties and contributing to building con- fidence. Neither side wants to see the process collapse. The government did not have to deal with soldiers’ funerals during this year’s municipal and presidential elections, and needs the relative calm to continue at least until parliamentary polls in mid-2015. Turkey and the PKK: Saving the Peace Process Crisis Group Europe Report N°234, 6 November 2014 Page ii Meanwhile, the PKK has been able to build up its strength in south-eastern towns and acquire unprecedented international and domestic legitimacy. The involvement of PKK-affiliated groups in defending Kurds in Syria and Iraq against jihadis makes full PKK disarmament and demobilisation only realistic within Turkey’s borders. Moreover, if Turkey and the PKK roll out successful confidence- building measures, the presence of pro-PKK groups along its Syrian border could actually help Turkey against jihadi or other hostile advances and expand its zone of influence in its neighbourhood. Conversely, if Turkey wants to strengthen its domes- tic position against a future risk of regional states aiding and abetting armed PKK elements operating on its territory, it has an interest in reaching an agreement with its Kurdish-speaking population as soon as possible. Both Turkish officials and Kurd- ish politicians privately say they prefer each other to the Islamic State. But it is im- possible to imagine cooperation outside Turkey – to reinforce Kurdish areas of Syria or Iraq, for instance – while the two sides are basically at war at home. As spillover from Middle East conflicts open up dangerous old ethnic, sectarian and political fault lines in Turkey, the government and the PKK must seek a common end goal that goes beyond a mere maintenance of a peace process. The government must create the legal and political conditions, process and context that will build con- fidence. But the PKK also needs to convince Turkish, Kurdish and international opin- ion that it can be a democratic actor, ready to disarm and transform into a political group. If it desires peace, the Kurdish national movement in Turkey cannot continue to be both an armed opposition force and a candidate for governmental responsibil- ity, and must be clear on what kind of decentralisation