,;;,T/DPI,;;,T/DPI uRALuRAL HISTORYHISTORY {02){02) .-&~.-&%i-'. C732C732 YYale-UNale-UN OralOral HistoryHistory AlfredoAlfredo CristianCristianii JamesJames Sutterlin,Sutterlin, IntervieweInterviewerr JulyJuly 25,25, 19919977 SanSan Salvador,Salvador, ElEl SalvadoSalvadorr I Yale-UN Ora] History I Alfredo CristianiCristiani lamesJames Sutterlin, InterviewerInterviewer July 25, 19971997 11 San Salvador, ElEI SalvadorSalvador Index: Central AmericaAmerica 11 Arias Plan 2,3 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 31 Christian Democrats ]IJ1 11 Constitutional Reform Agreement 32 Contadora Initiative 2-3 Cyprus negotiations 13 11 ElEI Salvador Agreements 5,8, 12, 16,2~27-28,3016,2~27-28,30 Elections 14,17,22 11 Impol1ance of Cuba 5 Land transfer 19,27 Negotiations/peacekeeping 1-9,13-14,1-9,13-14,19,21,29-33]9,21,29-33 11 Soviet Involvement 5-6 U.S. Involvement 6-7,9-]],326-7,9-11,32 Esquipulas Agreement 3 Esquipulas II 3-4 11 Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) 2-4,7-12,2-4,7-12,17,21-24,31-32,]7,21-24,31-32, Reintegration 18 U.S. Involvement 7,11, 13-14 11 Government's Peace Commissions (COPAZ) 20 Human rights 12,21-23 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 28-29 11 InterpaI1idariaInterpal1idaria 11 Land Mines 29-31 Negotiation Commission 8-10 11 Negotiations/peacekeeping 1-4,6-10, 14-15,20,22,27,29-33 Sandinista Army 5 Truth Commission 21,23,25 11 Twelve-year War 3-5 US.U.S. Agency for International Development 26 US.U.S. Congress 21,32 11 US.U.S. State Depat1mentDepal1ment 9 UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) 331-32]-32 UN Development Program (UNDP) 29 UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) 21-22,26-27 11 UN Security Council 8 11 World Bank 28-29 11 11 11 • 1 YALE-UN ORAL HISTORYHISTORY Alfredo CristianCristianii • James Sutterlin, IntervieweInterviewerr July 25, 19919977 • San Salvador, ElEl SalvadoSalvadorr • James Sutterlin: This isis a Yale Program interviewinterview withwith fannerfanner PresidentPresident AlfredoAlfredo thth • Cristiani in San Salvador, El Salvador, on JulyJuly 2525 ,, 1997,1997, thethe interviewerinterviewerisis Sutterlin.Sutterlin. I Dr. Cristiani, in begilming thisthis interviewinterview II willwill justjust mentionmention that,that, asas farfar asas II understand it, the United Nations role inin El Salvador, inin particular,particular, waswas concentratedconcentrated inin 11 four different areas. (1) in mediation, (2)(2) inin verification includingincluding peacekeeping,peacekeeping, (3)(3) inin democratization, and finally (4) inin economic development. TheThe questionsquestions thatthat II willwill bebe • posing, the focus of our discussion, II think,think, will bebe onon thosethose fourfour subjects.subjects. II wantedwanted toto • mention, at the begilming, back inin 1994 you had aa veryvery extensiveextensive interviewinterview withwith TommyTommy 11 Sue Montgomery. I don't know ifif you rememberremember thatthat oror not,not, aa woman.woman. 11 Alfredo Cristiani: In '947'947 11 11 JS: In '94. Very extensive. An excellent interview.interview. So,So, inin somesome cases,cases, wewe maymay bebe repeating things that you dealt with at thatthat point. II willwill trytry notnot to.to. II havehave thethe interviewinterview I and it's very interesting. The other thingthing II wanted toto mentionmention atat thethe begimling,begimling, isis thatthat I PerezP6rez de CuellarCu611ar has just completed his memoirs. TheyThey willwill bebe published nextnext month.month. II helped to write them. Going throughthrough some of thesethese questions,questions, II maymay quotequote toto youyou - occasionally from what PerezP6rez de CuellarCu611ar had toto saysay onon thethe samesame subject,subject, toto stimulatestimulate youryour - - perhaps, your differences. I would likelike toto saysay thatthat Mr.Mr. PerezP6rez dede CuellarCu611ar speaksspeaks veryvery - 1 - 2 • highly of your role. In fact he says that the peace process could not have succeeded in El • Salvador without Cristiani. So, with that in the background let me begin by posing a kind • ofhistorical question. That is, as you think ofthe peace process, the negotiating process that you were so deeply involved in, do you see that historically as a continuation ofthe • earlier contacts that were initiated when Mr. Duarte was president with the FMLN or do • you see it as stemming primarily from the Contadora initiative and the Arias plan? How • do you see the genesis, so to speak, of the negotiations here? • AC: I think everything has a little bearing, at least, in the negotiating process. • However, my feeling is that the FMLN never had a sincere intention of negotiating politically until after the 1989 offensive. Prior to that it was simply playing politics. •11 President Duarte never offered a process in itself. He simply called for direct contacts in a more or less - it really wasn't even a plalmed process - it was just whenever he thought 11 that he could meet with them to try to talk for a one day period that he would do so. This 11 is not trying to curtail his willingness to reach a political agreement. It was simply a way that he went about trying to get the FMLN involved in political negotiations. When 11 offered the negotiating process as a way out, we had, prior to that, while we were 11 president-elect, had discussed, I would say in quite detail with Father Ellacuria the idea 11 about this process we would offer. Just for the sake oftrying to be able to grasp a - I would say a sense of where the FMLN would be in their answer to such an offer - Father 11 Ellacuria made one or two trips to Nicaragua and met with the Commandante, the five 11 leaders of the different groups involved in the FMLN. He came back both times very frustrated with the result of those meetings, saying that he did not see a real willingness of 11 frustrated with the result ofthose meetings, saying that he did not see a real willingness of - 2 • 3 the FMLN. Obviously, politically they couldn't back out of it.it. ButBut theythey werewere stillstill bettingbetting • on popular insurrection, at that time. This must have been between MarchMarch andand JuneJune ofof • 1989. Nevetiheless, we offered the peace process and asas everybody thought,thought, thethe FMLNFMLN said yes. There were two meetings. One inin September inin Mexico, whichwhich waswas thethe first,first, • and the second in October inin Costa Rica. Two weeksweeks laterlater theythey werewere launchinglaunching thethe • biggest offensive ofthe twelve-yeartwelve-year war and itit waswas very obviousobvious thatthat theythey reallyreally hadhad nono • intention of reaching any agreement. What theythey werewere lookinglooking forfor waswas aa militarymilitary takeovertakeover of power. So, I think that even thoughthough therethere maybe waswas aa linklink inin ourour negotiationsnegotiations andand thethe • Arias Plan, it wasn't until after thatthat offensive thatthat thethe FMLN,FMLN, II think,think, reallyreally gavegave itit aa • thought about being serious inin lookinglooking forfor political agreement.agreement. II wouldwould thinkthink. ContadoraContadora had a lot of bearing, but I thinkthink thatthat Contadora waswas thethe startingstarting pointpoint ofof Esquipulas,Esquipulas, inin aa •11 sense. Making Esquipulas a more autonomous efforteffort whenwhen speakingspeaking aboutabout thethe CentralCentral American region. Contadora had cOlmtries outside ofof thethe regionregion ofofinvolved.involved. II thinkthink thatthat 11 Esquipulas II created a political pressure forfor democratization, forfor thethe endend ofof armedarmed 11 conflict. As you probably know, thethe FMLN wanted toto staystay awayaway fromfrom EsquipulasEsquipulas IIII asas much as possible, saying thatthat itit was not a sinceresincere andand worthyworthy effort.effort. TheyThey alwaysalways trytry toto 11 discredit the Esquipulas II effort. But II thinkthink thatthat itit diddid generate,generate, regionallyregionally speaking,speaking, 11 enough pressure for the negotiations to be successful.successful. EspeciallyEspecially afterafter thethe offensive,offensive, Ortega could no longer deny his involvementinvolvement withwith thethe SalvadorianSalvadorian warwar andand himhim backingbacking 11 out of it within the Esquipulas IIII frameworkframework putput moremore pressurepressure onon thethe FMLN.FMLN. ­11 JS: Yes. That was my next question.question. WhatWhat waswas thethe extentextent ofof influenceinfluence youyou feelfeel thatthat external actors had, that is,is, inin particular, thethe eventsevents inin NicaraguaNicaragua butbut alsoalso thethe almostalmost 3 ­~ 3 • 4 simultaneous events inin Eastem Europe, thethe Berlin Wall coming down? Do you feel thatthat • thesethese had an effect inin termsterms of thethe negotiations? And ifif so, how much? • AC: Obviously, theythey did have - when thethe Communist ideologyideology crumbled - they were •11 leftleft without an offer, because thatthat isis exactly what theythey were offering, thethe Salvadorians. So without being able toto say "We are fighting for you because we want toto give you thisthis 11 way of livingliving inin El Salvador," theythey had no way toto get support from thethe Salvadorian 11 people because everybody was aware thatthat itit had failed alloverall over thethe world and thatthat communism was crumbling down. So thatthat does have an effect inin making themthem looklook for a 11 political solution. The events inin Nicaragua - yes and no. I still believe thatthat even iftheifthe 11 war would have continued intointo Mrs. Chamorro's term,term, which fortunately