CAUGHT OFF GUARD The Link Between Our National Security and Our National Guard Lawrence J. Korb and Sean E. Duggan Center for American Progress May 2007 “What we’re working out of right now is a situation where we have absolutely piecemealed our force to death.” – Lt. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, Chief of the Army National Guard, November, 2006 “The dual status National Guard, with both a state and federal mission, lacks the necessary equipment and other resources necessary to fulfill the assigned tasks. A critical issue that may be lost in the discussion is the lack of resources for the Guard and the Reserve and diminution of readiness as they return to their states and local communities from Iraq and Afghanistan.” – Melvin Laird, former Secretary of Defense, May, 2007 w w w . americanprogress . o r g Center for American Progress Overview our years ago this month, President Bush declared the end of major combat opera- tions in Iraq. Today, the administration is completing its latest escalation by sending F an additional 30,000 troops into what the National Intelligence Estimate of Febru- ary 2007 describes as a civil war. However controversial this escalation may be, proponents and opponents of the war have reached a consensus on an equally important issue: nearly six years of war in Afghanistan and over four years in Iraq has pushed the total Army (Ac- tive, Guard, and Reserve) to the breaking point. The crisis in our nation’s active armed forces has received a great deal of attention, but the corresponding crisis in the Guard and Reserves, the reserve component of our military, has gone largely unnoticed. Yet to maintain the occupation in Iraq and our commitment to Afghanistan, the Pentagon has had to rely increasingly on reserve forces. In 2005 alone, 14 of the Guard’s 38 brigades (including nine of the Army National Guard’s 16 Enhanced brigades) were deployed either to Iraq or Afghanistan; seven Guard brigades served in Iraq and another two served in Afghanistan—for a total of more than 35,000 combat troops. In 2005, 46 percent (or about 60,000) of the troops in Iraq were from the reserve component.1 The Department of Defense has recently announced plans to deploy four more Guard brigades—more than 13,000 troops—to Iraq within the next year, shortening their time between deployments to meet the demands of the administration.2 Lt. General Steven Blum, the chief of the National Guard, summarized the situation when he said the Guard is “in an even more dire situation than the active Army, but both have the same symptoms; I just have a higher fever.”3 The current predicament of the Army National Guard reflects the changing role of the force itself—shifting the reserve component’s dual-purpose balance between domestic com- mitments and overseas imperatives decisively toward the latter as the Pentagon struggles to maintain high levels of ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The heavy reliance on the Army National Guard, its combat units (Enhanced Separate Brigades) in particular, for overseas operations represents a fundamental change from the Guard’s planned role as a strategic reserve force whose wartime function was to deploy in the later stages of a major conflict if needed. Ground troop levels in both theaters of war could not be sustained at the current rate with- out the numbers and skills provided by the men and women of the Army National Guard. Continued heavy use of Guard forces, however, has raised concerns about whether it can successfully perform both its domestic and international missions effectively. 1 w w w . americanprogress . o r g MAY 2 0 0 7 As the Guard increasingly assumes the role of the ac- ß Eleven have deployed to Iraq, three to Afghani- tive Army’s operational reserve, what consequences stan, and two to the Balkans. Currently two of will there be for domestic contingencies and home- the Enhanced Brigades are in Iraq and one is in land security? In a previous report, “Beyond the Call Afghanistan—a brigade combat team from the of Duty,” we discussed the use of active brigades Minnesota Guard has been in Iraq since March since September 11. This report will do the same 2006 and will not return home until this summer. for the 16 Enhanced Brigades of the Army National Guard. After clarifying the scope of the overuse of ß All told, more than 417,000 National Guard and the reserve component, we will analyze the conse- Reservists, or about 80 percent of the members quences for national security and homeland defense of the Guard and Reserve, have been deployed to and then outline recommendations to ensure that Iraq or Afghanistan, with an average of 18 months the Army’s strategy and future plans for the Guard per mobilization. Of these, more than 84,200, or enhance the security of the American people at 20 percent, have been deployed more than once.4 home and abroad. The president’s latest escalation has forced the Pen- Overused and Overstretched tagon to recall to active duty several thousand Guard and Reserve personnel that have already served in When the all-volunteer force was created, the Na- Iraq and Afghanistan. To do this, the Bush admin- tional Guard and Reserve were designed to act as istration announced in January that it was revis- a strategic reserve for the active component, which ing rules that limited call-ups of Guard members. would serve as the ready force. The reserve compo- The Pentagon’s previous policy limited involuntary nent was meant to act as a bridge to conscription mobilization of Guard members to no more than should a protracted conflict occur. With the Pentagon 24 months every five years. straining to keep force levels high in Iraq, the Guard and Reserve are being used as an operational reserve, Units that are scheduled to be deployed within the alternating deployments with the active force. The next year include: nation’s current reliance on the Guard to fight two major ground wars is unprecedented. Since 2001: ß The 39th Infantry Brigade from Arkansas, which returned from Iraq in March 2005 after a one- ß Every Enhanced Brigade has been deployed year tour in country and 18 months on active duty. overseas at least once and two have already been It is rescheduled to go to Iraq in December of deployed twice. this year, about two and a half years after return- The Reserve Component Enhanced Brigades he total Army consists of about 1.1 million he Army National Guard currently consists Tmen and women. About half of the people are Tof 34 brigades compared with 38 before the on active duty and the other half are in the selected beginning of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, reserve. The selected reserve or reserve component and will decline to 28 by 2012. Each (for the most consists of the Army National Guard and the Army part) is attached to a separate state of the union. Reserve. The authorized end strength of the Guard Sixteen are considered Enhanced Brigades that are is 350,000 and the reserves, 200,000. The Guard is supposedly fully manned and equipped and able to organized into separate combat units, (divisions, bri- deploy rapidly. gades) while the reserves are organized into combat support units (intelligence, civil affairs). 2 w w w . americanprogress . o r g MAY 2 0 0 7 ing. Of particular concern to Capt. Christopher years and one unit, the 76th Infantry Brigade from Heathscott, a spokesman for the Arkansas Nation- Indiana, received only two and a half years between al Guard, is that the reality of going to Iraq next deployments. Violating the rule has and will con- year could cause some Arkansas reservists not to tinue to have adverse effects on these units. re-enlist this year. “Over the next year roughly one-third of the soldiers in the 39th will have For example, lengthy and repeated deployments have their enlistment contracts expire or be eligible for taken a toll on the people in the Guard and Reserve. retirement,” Captain Heathscott said.5 Moreover, The National Military Family Association released a the brigade is short 600 rifles.6 survey on cycles of deployments that concluded: ß The 45th Infantry Brigade from Oklahoma, which “Army National Guard and Reserve families reported returned from a 12-month deployment to Afghani- the greatest stress concerning deployment length. stan in December of 2004. It is now slated to go Their service members typically experience family back to Iraq in January of 2008, about three years separations of close to 18 months.”10 after returning from Afghanistan—even though one- third of the unit lacks standard issue M-4 rifles.7 Because the families of the Army National Guard and Reserve are experiencing unexpectedly long pe- ß The 76th Infantry Brigade from Indiana, which riods of separation, future recruitment and retention returned from a year-long deployment to Afghani- are bound to suffer, as is the case with the 39th In- stan in August 2005. It is now scheduled to go fantry Brigade. As the Commission on the National to Iraq in January 2008, some 29 months after Guard and Reserve recently concluded: coming back from Afghanistan. Major General R. Martin Umbarger, head of the Indiana National “Overall, if the reserve component, including the Na- Guard, has recently commented that “what keeps tional Guard, continues its high operational tempo, me up at night is, I think I am able to surge . current indicators cast considerable doubt on the for the normal disaster, but if I needed to deploy future sustainability of recruiting and retention, even every bit of my soldiers and airmen, I know for a if financial incentives continue to increase.”11 fact I do not have enough equipment.”8 Moreover, these extended deployments that violate ß The 37th Infantry Brigade Combat Team from longstanding deployment policy also have a detri- Ohio, which returned from a six-month deploy- mental impact on military families as well as the ment to Kosovo in February 2005.