Initial Conditions as Exogenous Factors in Spatial Explanation Clint Ballinger Department of Geography and Hughes Hall University of Cambridge Dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Supervisor: Dr. Robert Bennett May 2008 Summary of the Dissertation This dissertation shows how initial conditions play a special role in the explanation of contingent and irregular outcomes, including, in the form of geographic context, the special case of uneven development in the social sciences. The dissertation develops a general theory of this role, recognizes its empirical limitations in the social sciences, and considers how it might be applied to the question of uneven development. The primary purpose of the dissertation is to identify and correct theoretical problems in the study of uneven development; it is not intended to be an empirical study. Chapter 1 introduces the basic problem, and discusses why it has become especially salient in debates concerning uneven development. Chapter 2 develops an argument for the importance of initial conditions in the philosophy of science, developed specifically in the context of the Bhaskar/Cartwright ‘open systems’ (and by extension, ‘exogenous factor’) emphasis on the ubiquity of contingency in the universe and rejection of explanation based on laws of nature (regularity accounts) of causation. Chapter 3 makes three claims concerning the concept of contingency, especially as related to the study of society: 1) that there are eight distinct uses of the word contingency, and its many meanings are detrimental to clarity of discussion and thought in history and the social sciences; 2) that it is possible to impose some order on these different uses through developing a classification of contingency into three types based on assumptions concerning possible worlds and determinism; 3) that one of the classes is a special use of the word without relevance to the social sciences, while the two remaining classes are nothing more than a variety of the ‘no hidden factors’ argument in the debate on indeterminism and determinism (and thus related to the concept of spacetime trajectories caused by initial conditions and the interference of these in the form of ‘exogenous factors’ with ‘open systems’). Chapter 4. The concept of explanation based on initial conditions together with laws of nature is widely associated with determinism. In the social sciences determinism has frequently been rejected due to the moral dilemmas it is perceived as presenting. Chapter 4 considers problems with this view. Chapter 5 considers attitudes among geographers, economists, and historians towards using geographic factors as initial conditions in explanation and how they might acceptably be used, in particular their role in ‘anchoring’ aspatial theories of social processes to real-world distributions. Chapter 6 considers the relationship of the statistical methods common in development studies with the trend towards integrating geographical factors into econometric development studies. It introduces the statistical argument on ‘apparent populations’ that arrives at conclusions concerning determinism consistent with Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation. The need for the visual interpretation of data with descriptive statistics and maps and their utility in the study of uneven development is discussed with a number of examples. Chapter 7 applies these concepts to the ‘institutions versus geography’ debate in development studies, using Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson’s 2002 ‘reversal of fortune’ argument as a primary example. Chapter 8 considers possible directions for future work, both theoretical and empirical. Chapter 9 concludes with a discussion of additional possible objections to the use of initial conditions as exogenous factors in explanation. ii This dissertation is the result of my own unaided work and presents as original nothing which is the result of work undertaken in collaboration with others. The dissertation does not exceed 80,000 words. Clint Ballinger May, 2008 iii Acknowledgements In Cambridge, I want to thank Professor Bob Bennett for supporting my research no matter what direction it took me. And thanks to Juliano Iyoda and Paul Hunter (and Ricardo Mendes in the first year) for making it fun, and their help and advice. Most of all I wish to thank my family: To Mom and Jim, who have done so much to make this possible, and to Dad, who would have loved to see this. To T.J., my grandparents, aunts and uncles, and all the rest – they all in one way or another have taught me patience, curiosity, and humor (special thanks to Holly and Quentin for the many nice stays in London, especially during the viva, and to my grandmother Mavis Glover, who taught me the value of curiosity and inventiveness). And last but not least, I want to thank you, Danica, for your patience and help. Even when it seemed like I would never finish, you were always there for me. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables ................................................................................................................................vii List of Figures..............................................................................................................................viii Prefatory Comments.............................................................................................................x CHAPTER 1 Introduction..................................................................................................1 1.1 The Neglected Role of Initial Conditions .................................................................................1 1.2 Initial Conditions in the Social Realm ......................................................................................3 1.2.1 Initial conditions in recent studies of uneven development .............................................. 4 1.3 Initial Conditions as Geographic Factors: Why they have Reappeared in Development Studies ........................................................................................................................................................7 1.4 Outline of the Rest of the Dissertation.................................................................................... 11 CHAPTER 2 Initial Conditions, Spatial Irregularities, and ‘Open Systems’..............13 2.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................. 13 2.2 The Open Systems Dilemma .................................................................................................. 15 2.3 Cartwright’s ‘St. Stephen’s Square’ Example ........................................................................ 16 2.4 ‘Explaining the Wind’: Initial Conditions and Irregularities in the Universe .........................19 2.5 Initial Conditions and ‘Systems’............................................................................................. 22 2.6 Why Initial Conditions Are So Often Ignored. ....................................................................... 26 2.7 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 28 CHAPTER 3 Classifying Contingency: Diachronic, Synchronic, and Deterministic Contingency........................................................................................................................30 3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................. 30 3.2 The Many Meanings of Contingency...................................................................................... 32 3.3 Three Classes of Contingency: Diachronic, Synchronic, and Deterministic .......................... 38 3.3.1 Diachronic contingency .................................................................................................. 38 3.3.2 Synchronic contingency.................................................................................................. 38 2.3.3 Deterministic contingency .............................................................................................. 40 3.4 Sorting the Uses of Contingency into the Three Classes ........................................................ 42 3.5 Discussion and Conclusion: The Three Classes of Contingency - Which is ‘Best’?.............. 45 3.5.1 Contingency and human action....................................................................................... 50 3.5.2 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 52 CHAPTER 4 Determinism and the Antiquated Deontology of the Social Sciences ....53 4.1 Introduction............................................................................................................................. 53 4.2 The Deontological - Consequentialist Debate in Philosophy and the Moral Rejection of Determinism in the Social Sciences.............................................................................................. 56 4.2.1 The early twentieth century rejection of determinism in the social sciences .................. 57 4.2.2 1950s to the present: Determinism as dead letter............................................................ 58 v 4.2.3 The mid-century reinvigoration of ethics........................................................................ 60 4.3 Discussion and Conclusion: Modern Consequentialism