Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs The Jakarta Embassy Bombing Jemaah Islamiyah’s Return? Felix Heiduk / Kay Möller SWP Comments The September 9 bomb attack in front of the Australian embassy in Jakarta signals a comeback of the Southeast Asian terror network, Jemaah Islamiyah, that had suffered setbacks in its struggle with Indonesian security forces in 2003 and that some had already pronounced dead. Much as with the March 2004 Madrid train bombings, the timing of the assault prior to Indonesia’s presidential and Australia’s parliamentary elections betrays an intention to influence democratic processes. In more general terms, both Indonesia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been affected by investigative and cooperative deficits that threaten to weaken regional cohesion and to turn Southeast Asia into an object of contention among neighbouring great powers. On the morning of 9 September 2004, a car those who, following the arrest of more bomb exploded outside the Australian em- than 200 JI members in 2003—among bassy in Jakarta. Nine Indonesian citizens whom was the leading cadre, Riduan were killed and 182 injured. Except for the Isamuddin (Hambali), in August in Thai- outer fence, the embassy building itself land—, had concluded that the group remained undamaged. On 10 September, was fragmenting. Whereas American and the Southeast Asian terror network, Jemaah Australian intelligence services had for Islamiyah (“Islamist Group,” JI), an organi- some time issued warnings about possible sation that cooperates with Al-Qaeda, further attacks in Indonesia, they had accepted the responsibility for the (suicide) focussed on “soft” targets such as hotels. attack on an internet website. JI called on The explosive employed on September 9 all Australians to leave Indonesia. The Can- was identical with the one used during the berra government was warned to withdraw October 2002 assault on a discotheque in its remaining 850 soldiers from Iraq or to Bali and the August 2003 blast outside the expect more assaults. JI concluded by com- Jakarta Marriott Hotel that left 202 and 12 mitting itself to a “holy war for the liber- persons dead, respectively. According to ation of the land of the Muslims.” Indonesian and Australian intelligence, This first bomb attack in Indonesia in JI’s explosives expert, Azahari Husin, and more than a year came as a shock to all another Malaysian citizen were involved SWP Comments 26 September 2004 1 in both cases as well as the recent assault. turned into a centre of international ter- To the United States, Southeast Asian has rorism. been a “second front in the international JI’s “spiritual” leader is believed to be antiterrorist struggle since January 2002. the Islamic scholar, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, In 2003, the region provided the setting who is presently jailed in Jakarta and due for 37 percent of all major terrorist attacks to be charged for supporting terrorist launched worldwide, and it has served as activities. Ba’asyir is one of a very small a safe haven for about 15 percent of number of Indonesian clerics who have Al-Qaeda’s membership, according to a propagated “holy war” in their religious November 2003 Congressional Research schools. According to one source, the Service report. September 9 attack was meant to bring about his release from prison. It was with this background of global What is Jemaah Islamiyah? developments that Southeast Asian ter- Contrasting with local terror organisations rorism turned transregional during the in individual Southeast Asian countries, early 1990s. At that point, sporadic cross- JI is a regional network with about 3,000 border contacts among radical groups members, the basic orientation of which is intensified both within and beyond the provided by ideology rather than concrete region. In the mid-1990s, many JI members social interests. The group’s ultimate objec- were trained in Egypt, Yemen, and Pakistan tive is the creation of an Islamic state con- in both ideology and combat. The Decem- sisting of Malaysia, Indonesia, the southern ber 2003 arrest of 13 militants in Karachi, Philippines, as well as possibly Brunei, Pakistan, signalled an interest in identify- Singapore, and southern Thailand. All ing “safer” locations for recruitment and members of the operative leadership were training. Between 1996 and 2000, JI, to- trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s or gether with the Moro Islamic Liberation early 1990s with financial support from Front (MILF), ran a training camp in the Saudi Arabia. It was also during this time southern Philippines. Among the trainees that the organisation established contact were members of Indonesian terror organi- with Al-Qaeda that have occasionally been sations from places such as South Sulawesi used for a logistical and sometimes tactical and West Java. Following the 2003 setbacks, cooperation, although JI has been careful some terrorists withdrew to these areas to to preserve its independence on strategic take part in ethno-religious fighting. At the decision making. same time, the main faction was believed to In spite of this independence, Southeast prepare for attacks on “soft” targets such as Asia remains an important bridgehead for tourists at a region-wide level. Al-Qaeda, too. In this context, economic The attack of September 9 demonstrated considerations have outweighed the inter- that the group, rather than splitting, has est in recruitment or local operations. As (re-) activated a territorial command a hotspot of transnational crime, the structure and has been able to redeploy region has served as a source of funding for in spite of the security forces’ successes. Al-Qaeda’s own criminal activities. During The assault on the Australian embassy also the 1980s, Southeast Asia had been little shows that speculations regarding tactical more than an area for regroupment to bin modifications such as a concentration on Ladin’s group without playing a major sniper attacks have been flawed. Organised operative role in Islamic terrorist strategy. in small cells, JI’s local units would seem It was only when many originally moderate to be relatively autonomous with regards to Muslims in the region became the target of the choice of their targets and means. an ideological campaign funded, among others, by Saudi Arabia, that the region was SWP Comments 26 September 2004 2 The Timing competence as well as a general lack of co- Almost exactly three years after 11 Sep- operation among the Indonesian security tember 2001, about two years after the Bali forces have been hampering investigation attack, and one year after the explosion efforts. These domestic problems have also outside the Marriott Hotel, the timing of impeded the transregional cooperation the embassy assault was highly symbolic. sought by ASEAN members since the Bali Also of tactical importance was that it came bombing. eleven days before Indonesia’s presidential The situation has been further compli- election and one month prior to Australia’s cated by the Indonesian military’s attempt parliamentary elections. In Australia, to portray itself as the key actor in the anti- public support of the Iraq deployment had terrorist struggle. On the one hand, a already begun to wane prior to September comeback by the armed forces in domestic 9. In Indonesia, incumbent president Mega- politics would endanger the country’s wati Sukarnoputri had frequently been fragile democratisation process. On the accused of a less than committed struggle other hand, it is doubtful whether military against terrorism. Her designated successor, action against terrorism can bring about Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is a former sustainable success. Rather than eradicat- general and coordinating minister for ing Islamist terror, such a strategy, much security—credentials that may have in- as in Thailand and the Philippines, risks fluenced the outcome of the election to driving ever more young Muslims into the some extent. terrorists’ fold. Not only Australia but several ASEAN members have criticised Jakarta’s lacking readiness to exchange relevant informa- Southeast Asia at the Crossroads tion. It was therefore an irony of history Within ASEAN, antiterrorist cooperation that general staff officers from ASEAN coun- thus far has been limited to declarations tries had inconclusively discussed an Indo- and training activities sponsored by third nesian proposal to create a joint antiterror- parties. Almost every member of the as- ist taskforce only two days prior to Septem- sociation has territorial disputes with its ber 9. neighbours and has been cultivating Thus far, Indonesia’s reservations have latent historical grievances. A deepening been mostly domestically motivated: with a of the regional integration process has population less than supportive of an anti- been prevented by a general insistence on Islamist struggle, no presidential candidate mutual non-interference. For want of readily embraced the issue. At the same autonomous alternatives, most member time, the country’s courts have not always states have decided to strengthen the anti- shown a high degree of determination in terrorist cooperation with a US that, under persecuting suspected terrorists. Whereas the Bush administration, has intensified its as many as thirty-three JI members were efforts to rebuild the American influence convicted in the wake of the Bali bombing, in Southeast Asia. If both Malaysia and some of the sentences were extremely mild, Indonesia have opposed US proposals for as Indonesia’s August 2004 antiterror laws joint antiterrorist patrols in the strategi- had been pronounced unconstitutional by a cally important Straits of Malacca, and if court and could not be applied to the case. Indonesia has recently made proposals of Therefore the suspected participation in its own to improve the regional coopera- the Bali case of some jailed JI members tion, these are little more than symbolical could not be further investigated, and acts, given the national and transnational Ba’asyir’s group will have to be charged deficits mentioned above.