[PEACEW RKS [ SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN POSTREVOLUTION LIBYA WHERE TO TURN? Fiona Mangan and Christina Murtaugh with support from Ferdaouis Bagga ABOUT THE REPORT This report maps the evolution of Libya’s weak security and justice sector from the Qaddafi era through the 2011 revolution to today. Supported by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Small Arms Survey, and drawn from interviews, focus groups, and a nationwide household survey, the report analyzes the realities of the security and justice sector and their impact on ordinary Libyans. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Fiona Mangan is a senior program officer with USIP’s Governance Law and Society Center and facilitator for the International Network to Promote the Rule of Law. Her work focuses on prison reform, organized crime, and justice and security issues, primarily in Libya. She previ- ously worked at the Stimson Center, the Irish Department of Justice, Independent Diplomat in New York, Lawyers Without Borders in Liberia, and the International Stability Operations Association in Washington. Mangan has also served as an international election observer for the Carter Center in South Sudan and for Progressio in Somaliland. Christina Murtaugh is a senior program officer at USIP’s Rule of Law Center. Her focus is on the Justice and Security Dialogue Program; the International Network to Promote the Rule of Law, a community of practice initi- ated by the Rule of Law Center in 2007; and field-based empirical research on rule of law in Libya. Cover photo by Fiona Mangan, taken in Tripoli, Libya. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Ave., NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org Peaceworks No. 100. First published 2014. ISBN: 978-1-60127-236-2 © 2014 by the United States Institute of Peace CONTENTS PEACEWORKS • SEPTEMBER 2014 • NO. 100 Introduction ... 5 Qaddafi Era ... 7 Revolution and Transition ... 12 After the Revolution ... 27 Conclusion ... 34 Recommendations ... 35 Appendix 1. Case Studies ... 36 Appendix 2. Objectives, Methodology, and Research Challenges ... 63 [The lack of streamlined government policies to address insecurity and the continued dysfunction of the justice system further undermine citizen confidence and have resulted in an increased reliance on quasi- or nonstate security and justice providers largely based on social connections.] SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN POSTREVOLUTION LIBYA Summary ■ Three years after the revolution, rule of law in Libya remains elusive. ■ During Qaddafi’s forty-two-year rule, the primary forms of state security and justice— police and army, regular courts and prosecutors—were deliberately and systematically weakened as real power was diverted to the regime. ■ In the wake of the revolution, people rejected formal systems and turned instead to their communities, finding security in revolutionary ketibas and justice through tribal leaders, wise men, and religious leaders. ■ The current web of security is a mix of old and new, creating confusion and feeding feelings of uncertainty. ■ Initially Libya’s saviors, the revolutionary thuwar are now held largely in disfavor. The plan to integrate them into the state security system has had limited success. ■ The presence of weapons, the vast majority of which are beyond state control, and frequent unpredictable acts of violence compound the lack of security. ■ The justice system has not been able to resume normal levels of functionality. Nonstate dispute mechanisms have emerged to fill the void, but rely more on the relative power of the disputing parties than on the law and have not proved effective. ■ Self-help and vigilante justice are thus on the rise but also fail to meet citizens’ needs. ■ Libyans continue to look to the state—through the police, the army, and the judiciary—to be the sole provider of security and justice. ■ Both the Libyan government and local communities need to reframe their reform efforts. Certain recommendations are key to that effort: a national vision, security for civilians and justice sector actors, dialogue to build trust, and engagement with rather than around formal institutions. USIP.ORG 3 SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN POSTREVOLUTION LIBYA Introduction Since the 2011 revolution that toppled dictator Muammar Qaddafi, Libya has struggled to es- tablish effective rule of law. Three years later, its justice system is nearly stalled, and a confused array of security providers scramble to exert and maintain influence gained by the gun. Libya’s current troubles, however, flow from both history and its difficult transition. The country’s formal justice and security structures and traditional networks were severely damaged by years of auto- cratic rule, intentionally corrupting policies, and the creation of parallel structures to divert power away from core formal structures and undermine rule of law. The 2011 revolution was truly a people’s revolution—the population rising to liberate Libya and make way for a complex politi- cal transition. However, it also placed power and weapons beyond state control—shifting from a highly militarized state to a highly armed society. In the three years since the revolution, reform efforts and development programs have attempted to improve rule of law by strengthening state institutions, but have instead empowered new parallel structures within and outside the formal justice and security framework. The notion that the main security and justice providers—the po- lice and army, judges and prosecutors—are not legitimate enough to stand on their own, though correct, has resulted in the diversion of real power to a plurality of armed groups—some existing before the revolution and others formed during and since—that both contribute to and threaten human and state security. In parallel, the continued dysfunction and devaluation of the formal court system has pushed the population to favor informal justice or retribution. The motivations that spurred the development of parallel security and justice mechanisms under Qaddafi and since the revolution differ, of course. However, the result is the same: a hollow and weak police, army, and judiciary with neither the legitimacy nor the resources to provide secu- rity and justice to the people, and real power vested in mechanisms lacking proper accountability. This report is based on a nationwide survey, interviews, and focus groups with people of all walks of life in Libya. Data collection was carried out between January and November 2013, and follow-up interviews were conducted from January to May 2014 (for more detail, see appendix 2). Sources for the report, unless otherwise cited in the notes, are drawn from the survey, interviews, and focus groups. Evolution of a Weak Security and Justice Sector The institutional security and justice architecture in Libya was deliberately weakened during Qaddafi’s forty-two-year rule. Parallel structures within both the security and justice frameworks diverted power from core state institutions, limited oversight and accountability, and led to an overall perception that formal systems were illegitimate. Police were tasked with civilian security functions but were structurally disempowered and underresourced. Libyans feared and distrusted the police force on the basis of its association with the regime, but real control was in the hands of a tighter circle of internal security and secret police, which the regime used to manipulate the population and quash political dissent. The military was deprived of resources and training—a fear-driven regime response to a failed countercoup against Qaddafi in the 1970s. By the time the 2011 revolution unfolded, the military had been reduced to a mere shell. Normal court and justice system function was eroded by corruption, political influence, weak judicial education, and the creation of parallel People’s Courts staffed by regime loyalists. As the revolution unfolded, the already fragile Libyan security and justice system began to fracture along various lines of allegiance. Some police and military personnel turned their backs on the regime, joining revolutionaries on the front lines and turning over equipment and weap- USIP.ORG 5 PEACEWORKS 100 ons caches. Others fought with the regime. Many simply stopped working and stayed home. Court function and state provision of security and justice were both suspended. In the immediate wake of the revolution, the old regime structures were rejected from the bottom up. Libyans did not trust the formal security and justice framework, which lacked the capacity and the legitimacy to reassert control. In response to the security vacuum, new groups formed—many along what were initially local and revolutionary brigade lines. People were un- sure of whom to turn to and thus in moments of insecurity reached out to known figures in armed groups. Revolutionaries, or thuwar, were seen as trusted heroes. Droves of youth sought to be identified as such, joining ketiba brigades led by often well-meaning but inexperienced commanders, continuing their acts of bravery by taking on civilian security functions. The newly forming state sought to capitalize on the legitimacy of these new actors, bringing them under ministry control by awarding contracts and salaries to those who had fought. Because no courts were operational during and immediately after the revolution, communities