Strife Journal, Issue 7 (May/ June 2017) Organised Crime and Terrorism: A Strife 4-Part Series The entries forming this series are all reprinted, in a lightly edited form, from the Strife blog (at strifeblog.org) where they were published in February 2016. All web references were last accessed on 27 February 2017, unless otherwise stated. Part I: Godfathers and Bombs: Organised Most importantly, they can play a leading role in Crime and Terrorist Tactics limiting potential violence: that is, they Andrea Varsori, Guest Editor, Strife structure a widespread, individual, anomic violence into something more organised, more The general understanding of how criminal ready to exploit economies of scale, and organisations work implies that the leaders of definitely more dangerous. At their best, mafias those groups are mostly discreet, business- can mimic the state or rule where the latter minded folks.1 After all, criminal organisations does not arrive, establishing their own practices have one, big task that influences their entire and rituals. Thus, an efficient criminal group agenda: they want to make money. They are learns to administer violence to impose a set of criminal because they use illicit means, like rules: it sets itself as judge, jury, and coercion or bribes, or because they deal in executioner; it masters violence, so that only the illegal goods, or both. According to this view, threat of action is enough to quell any most of the time profit is their major objective. opposition. Rivalries and fights may start when there are misgivings on who gains the most from a deal, To the wise godfather, then, terrorism is or when rivals start to use coercive means to arguably the nemesis. In its most brutal, gain control of greater shares of the market. spectacular form, which nowadays has taken Still, according to this view, the most reasonable the form of the threat of Daesh, it is a double- Dons know that indiscriminate violence is a edged knife for a criminal organisation. This tool to be used only in very peculiar occasions. knife, however, has the sharper edge facing its Normally, it is at best useless, or at worst own user. A criminal group stands to lose from outright dangerous. the use of terrorist tactics: terrorism forces the state to focus all attention on the authors, as it Nonetheless, violence is fundamental for mafias constitutes the ultimate danger to a state’s and gangs in most cases. Criminal organisations authority and legitimacy. Also, indiscriminate use it to extort money from legitimate firms; to violence often generates a huge backlash from safeguard the secrecy of important the civil society: thus, criminal organisations, information; to punish those who do not fall in which thrive and prosper in an underworld of line. They can also sell violence, to create secrecy and corruption, may be crushed by the ‘protection rings’2 or to assert monopolies. reaction to a terrorist event. 1 The outmost example of this perspective is the This does not mean that terror and crime can economic analysis of organized crime, whereas the never be partners. More often than not, criminal organisation is analysed as a particular type of terrorist organisations adopt ways and firm. See Gianluca Fiorentini & Sam Peltzman (eds.), The techniques from the criminal world. The most Economics of Organized Crime (Cambridge University Press, 3 1995), pp. 87-108. A view of criminal organisations as obvious application is for financing: terrorist risk-averse groups that prefer to hide or corrupt rather than fight is also used in political science. See Bemjamin Lessing, ‘Logics of Violence in Criminal War’, in Journal 3 For the broader issue of the financing of terrorist of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 59, No. 8 (2015), p. 1497. organizations, see Maya Ehrmann (ed.), ‘Financing 2 Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: the Business of Private Terror: A Strife 4-part Series’, in Strife Journal, Issue 5 Protection (Harvard University Press, 1993). (May/June 2015), pp. 29-39. 50 Strife Journal, Issue 7 (May/ June 2017) groups have long been dealing in extortion and Faith’. Their daily worries are mostly concerned blackmail (as for the IRA in Northern Ireland)4, with assuring that their network of businesses or in illicit trade (as for the FARC in Colombia,5 runs smoothly, that officials are sufficiently or the Taliban in Afghanistan)6, in order to get bribed or intimidated, and that all their the money to further their political activities. underlings actually remain loyal. However, even Seeing it happen the other way around, the most business-minded criminal bosses can however, is quite rarer. develop a sense of allegiance to their own community, be it ethnic or religious. In times of This series will focus on this latter type of the sectarian violence, these overlords may decide crime/terror nexus. Why should a criminal to act to defend their people. This decision may organisation use dangerous terrorist tactics? be completely at odds with the logic of the Which kind of objective is it pursuing? Is this criminal enterprise: it entails a potential an entirely new phenomenon? We will deal with backlash from the authorities and the larger these questions all along the three parts of our public. During sectarian conflicts, however, Series. First, Martin Stein will explore the their reputation is at stake: inaction may spark bombings of 1992-93 in Italy and their role in doubts about a boss’ ability to project his own the struggle between the Sicilian Mafia and the power, thus encouraging rivals to try to take Italian State; then, the Bombay bombings of over his networks. The boss’ community may March 1993 will be covered, and how one of also feel betrayed, and may begin to sabotage the most famous Indian dons, Dawood the boss’ illicit trade and favour someone else. Ibrahim, was part of the plot to hit India; There is no simple way to solve this problem. finally, Joe Atkins will review the cases of mass killings and ‘disappearances’ in Mexico, Dawood Ibrahim probably never had this kind exploring how terror is widely used as a tool to of thoughts before December 1992. At that assert control on a frightened population. The time, Ibrahim was one of the most powerful varied scope of these articles will highlight citizens of Mumbai, although he was no longer different aspects of the link between criminal a resident. He was born in the southern part of organisations and the use of terror. In Italy, the city in 1955, the eldest son in a low-income bombings were part of a precise strategy to family of ten. After dropping out of school, he intimidate the Italian state; in India, the attacks gradually resorted to extortions and robbing, were motivated by religious reasons and by eventually ending up smuggling goods in local Ibrahim’s intent to appear still as the protector markets. The major boost to his career arrived of Bombay Muslims; in Mexico, terror seems while in jail: there, in fact, he managed to earn to constitute a ‘normal’ part of ‘cartel justice’, the trust of Haji Mastan and Yusuf Patel, two thus delivering worrying parallels between of the most important smugglers of the city.7 ‘narco-warriors’ and fundamentalists. Having understood Dawood’s ambition, they entrusted him with their business before ~*~ retiring. By the time Dawood was free again, he had thus gained access to Mastan’s and Patel’s resources. Starting from there, he used both Part II: Letters from Dubai: ‘D-Company’ ruthless violence and cunning to profit from and the ’93 Mumbai terror attacks the weaknesses of the most important gang in Andrea Varsori, Guest Editor, Strife Mumbai, led by Pathans from Afghanistan. By 1982, he had managed to kill the new leader of Rags-to-riches criminal overlords do not this gang; however, the Mumbai police was normally lack ambition; yet, most of them do often able to prove his complicity in most of not aim to claim the title of ‘Protectors of the his gang’s crimes, and he was visiting prison quite often. On 4 May 1984, he jumped bail and 4 J. Burns, ‘Dealing in the Business of Fear’, in Financial fled to Dubai.8 Times (7 January 1992), p. 10. 5 Peter Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade (Rand Corp., 2011), pp. 15-18. 6 Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban: Insights 7 S. Hussain Zaidi, Black Friday: The True Story of the from the Afghan Field (Hurst Publishers, 2009), pp. 7-22, Bombay Bomb Blasts (Penguin Books, 2002), pp. 21-23. 150. 8 Ibid., p. 25. 51 Strife Journal, Issue 7 (May/ June 2017) In Dubai, then a major haven for smugglers, he surrounding the mosque.10 On 6 December managed to build a massive network of illegal 1992, a crowd of 150,000 Hindu nationalist and legal businesses. This network included militants summoned by the main leaders both Muslims and Hindus, as it had often been managed to overcome a weak police presence the case in earlier criminal gangs of Mumbai. and razed to the ground the Babri Masjid.11 What became known as ‘D-Company’ -- from the first letter of Dawood -- smuggled in gold, This was an insult for many Indian Muslims. silver, electronic goods, and textiles; it extorted The destruction of the mosque in Ayodhya was protection from businessmen and occasionally followed by six days of intense riots. In solved disputes between them.9 In Dubai, Mumbai, Muslim mobs started targeting Ibrahim built for himself a luxurious mansion, temples; the police, in a desperate attempt to where he organised lavish parties, inviting control the violence, fired on looters, while Mumbai’s most famous celebrities, cricketers, Hindus retaliated on mosques.12 This cycle of and politicians.