Epicureanism Thomas A. Blackson Only a small percentage of Epicurus’ writings have survived,1 partly because his philosophy became unpopular once the Hellenistic reaction to the classical tradition gave way to the resurgence of non-sceptical forms of Platonism and the subsequent rise of Christianity. This makes it difficult to know in much detail what Epicurus thought about evil, but there is reason to think that he made an important advance over his predecessors. To understand this advance, it is helpful to begin by clearing away certain interpretations. The first is that Epicurus understood evil as a theological problem. There is no good reason to think that he understood evil in this way. The concept of free will seems to enter the philosophical 1 Epicurus (341-271 BCE) set up his school (the Garden) in Athens in about 306 BCE. His literary output was enormous. Diogenes Laertius lists the forty-one titles of Epicurus’ “best” books (Lives and Opinions of the Philosophers X.27). None of this work has survived. What is now known about Epicurus and his philosophy depends primarily on three letters Diogenes preserves in Book X of his Lives and Opinions: Letter to Herodotus (which outlines the Epicurean philosophy of nature), Letter to Pythocles (which discusses natural phenomena in the sky), and Letter to Menoeceus (which outlines the Epicurean position on happiness). Epicureanism 2 tradition after Epicurus, during the time of late Stoicism.2 Furthermore, even if he did possess the concept, as some scholars can appear to suppose,3 there is no good reason to think that he understood evil as a theological problem whose solution consists in the recognition of free will. It seems clear that Epicurus did not believe in a providentially ordered world4 and hence that he did not believe in a god whose existence evil could call into question.5 Epicurus did not understand evil as a theological problem, but he did explain the existence of some evil in terms of certain beliefs about theological matters. He thought that some evil is the result of common, but false beliefs about the divine. He thought that these beliefs are a prominent source of unhappiness, and that human beings are particularly prone to such 2 The classic discussion is now M. Frede’s A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought (2011). 3 In the introduction to his book On the Nature of Things, M. F. Smith writes that “[a]n extremely important point, which emerges clearly from Lucretius’ account, is that the supposition of the swerve was made not only to explain how compound bodies can be formed, but also to account for free will, which Epicurus firmly believed in, but which the physical determinism of Democritus seem to have excluded” (2001: xxvi). 4 Cf. DRN [De Rerum Natura] II.167-81, V.156-234. 5 Lactantius (an early Christian writer, c. 240-320 CE) attributes to Epicurus an argument that appears to be part of a discussion of evil as a theological problem (Inwood and Gerson 1997: 94 [IG I-109]), but there is little reason to think that Epicurus actually gave this particular argument. For discussion, see O’Keefe 2010: 47-8. Epicureanism 3 beliefs and to superstition generally. It is in this connection that Epicurus made an important contribution to the understanding of evil. Epicurus was interested in the practical problem of living well, and his discussion of evil is part of his solution to this problem. He rejected the dominant line of thought from the classical tradition of Plato and Aristotle. Epicurus moved away from rationalism and toward empiricism. From within this new perspective, Epicurus came to a significantly different set of conclusions about human beings, their place in reality, and the good life. Epicurus thought that the life of enlightened moderation is the good life, and he thought that “contemplation” is not essential to happiness. Epicurus’ move toward empiricism was part of a significant change of perspective in the history of philosophy. To appreciate the full extent of his contribution to this change of perspective, and the significance of his advance over his predecessors in the understanding of evil and its causes, it is necessary to clear away one more interpretation. Epicurus did not conceive of evil either as a theological problem or as a natural consequence of the existence and exercise of the will. It is true that the Epicurean Lucretius6 discusses libera voluntas in On the Nature of Things (De Rerum Natura). It is true that, in translation, Lucretius is commonly portrayed as believing in free will. It is also true that Epicurus is commonly thought to be the source for this discussion in Lucretius. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that Epicurus understood evil as a practical problem to be solved by the introduction of a way for human beings to control their wills. 6 Lucretius (c. 94 - c. 55 BCE) was a Roman poet. His poem De Rerum Natura is a source for Epicurean beliefs. For Lucretius’ life, about which little is known, see Smith 2001: vii-x. Epicureanism 4 Although the term “free will” is sometimes used to express an ordinary part of the way human beings typically understand themselves and their behaviour,7it is more properly used to express a theoretical concept, like the concept of phlogiston, as Gilbert Ryle says in The Concept of Mind.8 The concept of free will originated as part of a theory to explain a familiar but deeply perplexing notion that presumably is part of the way human beings have always understood themselves: that they are capable of action. The range of human behaviour seems to include things that they themselves do. In this behaviour, human beings are not forced by anybody or anything. Rather, in such cases, a human being somehow does what he does in virtue of something in his “mind”. The concept of free will entered the ancient philosophical tradition in an explanation of what this thing is. 7 Given this use of the term, the translation of libera voluntas as “free will” tempts the reader to think that all the great philosophers from the past thought that in the mind of every human being there is a will and that Lucretius is part of a tradition of philosophical enquiry into the will and its freedom. In his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for “Free Will” (2010), Timothy O’ Connor can seem to suggest this understanding of the philosophical tradition. He begins his discussion of “free will” as follows. “‘Free Will’ is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Which sort is the free will sort is what all the fuss is about. (And what a fuss it has been: philosophers have debated this question for over two millennia, and just about every major philosopher has had something to say about it)”. 8 Ryle 1947: 62. See also Frede 2011: 2. Epicureanism 5 In the philosophical tradition that precedes Epicurus, the concept of free will is not present. Aristotle, for instance, in his philosophy of mind, has boulēsis play a fundamental role, but he does not conceive of boulēsis as a will.9 For Aristotle, as for Plato, boulēsis is the desire that belongs to reason.10 The view is that some desires belong to reason, either because a desire for the real good is fixed in reason, or because the epistemic process of determining what the real good is belongs to reason. In the latter case, accepting a belief about what the real good is constitutes a desire for what the real good is believed to be. In the former, the desire for the real good is a part of reason, and the problem is to figure out what this good is. Reason, however, according to Aristotle, is not the only source of motivation in human beings. Human psychology does not consist in reason alone. There are other parts of the soul, for example, the appetite. This part of the soul has its own distinctive form of desire. Furthermore, it is supposed to be possible for desires in the different parts to conflict. According to Aristotle, it is possible for a human being to have conflicting motivations, one from reason and one from appetite, and to act on the basis of the appetitive desire, and so against “choice and thought”.11 This psychological state is often described, misleadingly, as “weakness of the will.” This description is misleading because Aristotle did not conceive of boulēsis as a will. According to Aristotle, some things human beings do, and for which they are responsible, do not involve boulēsis. A human being may eat because he is hungry, but he need not be thinking about whether eating is 9 For discussion, see Frede 2011: 19-30. 10 On the Soul I.3.414b, Nicomachean Ethics III.2.1111b. 11 Nicomachean Ethics VII.4.1148a9-10. Epicureanism 6 a good idea. His action can stem from an appetitive desire, not a desire of reason. Even so, his eating would clearly be something that he himself does, and not something anything or anybody forces him to do. Furthermore, from Aristotle’s point of view, action in terms of boulēsis has its ground in the attachment human beings have to the good. This assumption, which he shares with Plato and the Stoics, is that just as reason in human beings naturally seeks the truth, so also it naturally seeks the good. The form this assumption takes is not entirely clear.