MUHİTTİN ATAMAN urkey’s democracy has historically suffered from con- ATAMAN MUHİTTİN tinuous coup attempts which aimed directly to over- throw the elected governments of the time. At least four successful coups have occurred in a period of 50 years Tand in July 15 2016 the latest attempt was executed. However, un- like the previous coups, the plotters failed to achieve their goals on the night of July 15, resulting in a triumph for Turkish unity and JULY 15 democracy. As such, the July 15 coup attempt can be considered as an example per se of people power which is worth studying. COUP ATTEMPT July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey: Context, Causes and Consequences presents different perspectives focusing on political, economic, so- ciological and psychological aspects of the factors leading up to, IN TURKEY the events during and aftermath of this historic date. Academicians and journalists have aimed to examine in detail the coup attempt CONTEXT, CAUSES AND and to present an accurate account of July 15. History and cur- rent events are analyzed through an academic perspective, creating CONSEQUENCES a fuller picture to better understand this most recent attempt to compromise the will of the Turkish people. MUHITTIN ATAMAN l ATILLA YAYLA l ŞENER AKTÜRK l NEBI MIŞ l SADIK ÜNAY ŞERIF DILEK l FARHAN MUJAHID CHAK l GLORIA SHKURTI l GAMAL NASSAR JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY: CONTEXT, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES AND CAUSES CONTEXT, TURKEY: IN ATTEMPT COUP 15 JULY 9 789752 459182 JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY CONTEXT, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY CONTEXT, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES MUHİTTİN ATAMAN (ED.) SETA MUHİTTİN ATAMAN After graduating from Ankara University (Department of International Relations, at the Faculty of Political Science) in 1992, Dr. Ataman completed his Masters Degree at University of Central Oklahoma and his Doctorate at University of Kentucky. He taught Middle Eastern Politics at Abant İzzet Baysal University, Department of International Relations, from 1993-2014. He worked as the General Secretary of Inter-University Board of Turkey and Advisor to the President of the Higher Educational Council (YÖK) between 2012-2014. Dr. Ataman worked as Deputy General Coordinator and Direc- tor of Education Department at SETA Foundation between 2014 and 2017. He is the editor-in-chief of one of the leading academic journals in Turkey, Insight Turkey and professor of International Relations at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University. His aca- demic studies mainly concentrate on Turkish foreign policy and the Middle Eastern politics, the Gulf politics in particular. His articles are published in leading academic journal such as Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Middle Eastern Studies, Insight Turkey and Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations. SETA Publications 23 First Published in 2017 by SETA ISBN: 978-975-2459-18-2 © 2017 SET Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, without permission in writing from the publishers. Cover : Erkan Söğüt Layout: Hasan Suat Olgun Printed in Turkey, İstanbul by Turkuvaz Haberleşme ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., November 2016 SETA Publications Nenehatun Cd. No: 66 GOP Çankaya 06700 Ankara Turkey Tel: +90 312 551 21 00 | Fax: +90 312 551 21 90 www.setav.org | [email protected] TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION MUHİTTİN ATAMAN 9 JULY 15: THE GLORIOUS RESISTANCE OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY ATİLLA YAYLA 19 TURKEY’S CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE REACTIONARY COUP: SEGREGATION, EMANCIPATION, AND THE WESTERN REACTION ŞENER AKTÜRK 67 MEASURING SOCIAL PERCEPTION OF THE JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT NEBİ MİŞ 103 JULY 15: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A FOILED COUP SADIK ÜNAY, ŞERİF DİLEK 147 CULTURE, SOCIAL CONTESTATION AND TURKEY’S FAILED COUP: THE RIVALRY OF SOCIAL IMAGINARIES FARHAN MUJAHID CHAK 185 COUP D’ÉTAT RECORD OF THE WEST AND THE WESTERN REACTION TO THE JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT MUHİTTİN ATAMAN, GLORIA SHKURTI 219 COUP IN TURKEY AND EGYPT: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS GAMAL NASSAR 251 This book is dedicated to the Turkish people, especially to all the 249 martyrs of July 15 who resisted against the coup attempt to protect the national will and heroically sacrificed their lives for their country. INTRODUCTION Muhittin Ataman* The Republican Turkey, declared in 1923 under one-party rule, opted to transform its political system into a multi-party one as a reac- tion to the emerging bilateral world in the wake of the Second World War. Since then, Turkey has experienced several direct and indirect mil- itary coups and ruptures in its democratization process. The military, which declared itself to be the principal protector of the secular repub- lic, did not allow many popular politicians to rule the country, despite the support they had. Therefore, the military backed by other bureau- cratic institutions created a tutelage by which they controled almost every aspect of political life. Moreover, whenever the military came to power they pursued policies in line with those of theWest and institu- tions such as NATO and the EU. As a consequence, it is widely be- lieved that the West has been a crucial force behind the numerous forms of military coups that have taken place in Turkey. The Turkish military intervened in politics on the pretext of a per- ceived deviation from the main principles of the secular Republic. Its first intervention into politics occurred in 1960; at that time, the coup plotters hanged the prime minister and two ministers after a fictitious judicial process. This military coup was followed by two others in 1971 and 1980, which curtailed political participation and the democratiza- tion process. Thousands of civilians lost their lives during political in- stability and the military campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1997, * Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Turkey 10 / INTRODUCTION the military indirectly intervened in political life for the fourth time, forcing the conservative government of Necmettin Erbakan to resign. When the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to pow- er in 2002, it promised to normalize the country by initiating a process of democratization, demilitarization and civilianization. The AK Party governments took significant steps in this regard which allowed the arena of civil society to expand and increased diversity in social and political life. Thus, it gradually inhibited the power of the military and other bureaucratic structures which in response tried to shut down the ruling party through various channels, in order to curtail the restruc- turing of the country. Starting in 2013, there have been several differ- ent attempts to overthrow the AK Party government. The Gezi Park protests in June 2013 were an attempt to change the government through social unrest; while the events on December 17 and 25 were overt judicial interventions to force the democratically elected govern- ment to halt its reform and development programs. July 15, 2016, different in many aspects from previous coups, was the latest attempt to overthrow the legitimate government of Turkey and to reverse the changes it had implemented. When compared with previous coups, July 15 differentiates in terms of the rationale, agents, tools and results. First of all, the reason behind the above mentioned coups (i.e. 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997) was always related with the “protection of the secular principles” of the Turkish Republic. The mil- itary, a self-declared guardian of these principles, intervened in the po- litical affairs of the state arguing that due to the Islamist perspectives of the politicians in power the secular principles were being violated. Nev- ertheless, this was not the rationale behind the July 15 coup attempt. While the coup plotters tried to use such a discourse –as can be seen in the coup statement broadcasted under duress on national television– JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY / 11 the real reason behind the coup attempt was to replace the AK Party with an alternative political grouping. Overthrowing the government would allow the coup plotters and the mastermind behind them to gain power and replace the democratically elected government. Secondly, the agents that undertook the coup attempt of July 15 were different from those of previous coups. While only the military was openly responsible and active in these events, in the July 15 coup attempt the military was not the main agent. More specifically, the coup attempt was masterminded by Fetullah Gülen, the leader of the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETÖ), and it was brought to life by his sup- porters inside the military and a number of other governmental institu- tions. It can be argued that the civilian element of the coup plotters was a novelty in the history of Turkish coups. Moreover the tools used and the targets of the plotters were also divergent when compared with the earlier coups which only targeted the politicians. The coup plotters of July 15 not only targeted the politicians and the governmental institu- tions, they did not even spare the life of the innocent civilians who took to the streets to protect the democratically elected government. Last but not least, unlike the other coups, the July 15 coup was not successful. As will be discussed below and through the chapters of this book, the reasons behind the failure of the July 15 coup attempt are twofold: 1. The strengthening of the Turkish democracy, especially the consolidation of the democratic institutions, 2. The democratic awareness and the unification of the Turkish citizens under the same flag, leaving aside their differences. In brief, the coup attempt on July 15, 2016 was the most dramatic link in the chain of anti-democratic and illegitimate interventions that 12 / INTRODUCTION Turkey has experienced.