NEO-ARISTOTELIAN-WITTGENSTEINIAN ONTOLOGY: THE LOGICAL FORM OF THE PROPOSITION, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATION, AND CATEGORIAL THOUGHT by Alexander James A dissertation submitted to Johns HopKins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland March, 2015 © 2015 Alexander James All Rights Reserved Abstract If we regard the investigation into “grammar” and “ordinary language” in the Wittgensteinian tradition as concerned, not with sentences, but with propositions (as this notion is roughly understood in the historically foundational work of the analytic tradition), and if we eschew the suggestion that Wittgenstein has a “theory of meaning”, and regard him, instead, as understanding meaning in a non-reductive way, the result would be a meta-philosophical frameworK that allows us to see this tradition as continuous (at a meta-philosophical level) with certain Socratic and Aristotelian paradigms of inquiry in ancient philosophy. Once this linK is established, the Wittgensteinian tradition can then be seen, implicitly, to contain the foundations for a neo-Aristotelian-Wittgensteinian-analytic ontology. I, explicitly, define and develop this ontology. Some of the conclusions, which emerge from this neo-Aristotelian- Wittgensteinian ontological frameworK, are as follows: (i) There is a fundamental distinction between the human world and the natural world. (ii) The human being, and his irreducible powers of reason and action, belong to the human world, whereas the physiology of the human being belongs to the natural world. (iii) The natural world (which includes the sui generis animal, merely biological and merely physical domains, respectively) is not unified by any positive characteristic, but is bound together only by its privative-contrast with the human world: thus, the natural world cannot be defined as the “realm of law”. (iv) Both Cartesian dualism and post-Cartesian materialistic-naturalism, despite their ontical disagreements, ii ascribe to one and the same understanding of the of organization and character of the basic categorial domains of reality. (v) So-called “philosophical problems” concerning something’s “place in” the “natural world”, e.g., the problem of “free-will” or problem of “consciousness” or the problem of “life”, are by-passed and overcome, but not by showing that these problems arise from confusions concerning “uses of words”, but by showing that these problems, together with their characteristic “solutions”, are themselves a function of this false ontology. Once this ontology is replaced with a “neo-Aristotelian-Wittgensteinian” one, such problems do not arise. Committee Members: Professor Michael Williams, Professor Meredith Williams, Professor Richard Bett, Professor Leonardo Lisi, Professor Paola Marrati iii Preface and Acknowledgements The Wittgensteinian tradition has succeeded in working out a relatively clear understanding of what a Wittgensteinian philosophy of mind and what a Wittgensteinian epistemology would be. What this tradition lacKs is a clearly defined understanding of what a Wittgensteinian ontology would be, i.e., an ontology that would reflect the thought of the later Wittgenstein. In this dissertation, I aim to initiate measures to address that gap in our understanding. With the addition of a Wittgensteinian ontology, our understanding of the philosophy of mind and epistemology would only become more coherent and systematically unified. Moreover, an understanding of all three is needed, I think, for understanding Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy in the right light. Is the fact that we do not currently possess a Wittgensteinian ontology a sign that traditional ontology is somehow foreign to the very character of Wittgenstein’s thought, such that the idea of such a thing would be a contradiction? Or, is it rather due to our not having clearly perceived the route by which we should go about bringing it to light? I suggest the latter explanation. Wittgenstein’s work represents the greatest philosophical achievement of the 20th century, and we need an ontology that reflects this achievement. With the articulation of such an ontology, we will also attain a clearer understanding of the relation between Wittgenstein’s work and the philosophical tradition: Wittgenstein does not maKe a radical breaK with the “philosophical tradition”, understood in some static manner: rather, Wittgenstein’s iv work deepens and enriches our understanding of some of the philosophical tradition’s most traditional and historically original elements. There are numerous people who have helped me throughout this long philosophical journey. I want to thanK my friends, my colleagues, and my students for countless conversations regarding many of the themes that appear in this dissertation. I am grateful to Richard Bett for his feedbacK during the later stages of this project, and, most of all, for introducing me to Aristotle, without whom, I would not Know my way about, philosophically speaKing. I want to thanK Leonardo Lisi for conversations regarding Kierkegaard and his place in the history of philosophy. Sean Greenberg helped to bring my attention to the importance of the history of philosophy for our understanding of contemporary philosophical problems. I’m grateful to EcKart Förster for introducing me to Heidegger: reading Heidegger helped me to thinK about what it might mean to frame Wittgenstein’s later worK as a contribution to ontology. I want to thanK Maura Tumulty for numerous discussions regarding the work of Wittgenstein. I gained invaluable philosophical instruction at the University of Chicago, where I studied with James Conant, Jonathan Lear, Michael Forster, Robert Pippin, the late Leonard Linsky, the late Ted Cohen, the late John Haugeland, along with Stanley Cavell and Hilary Putnam during their visiting appointments. It was a privilege to be a part of the “Graduate Workshop on Wittgenstein” for the last two years I was an undergraduate; and also to participate in Leonard Linsky’s extra- v curricular reading group on On Certainty and Philosophical Investigations. During many of these meetings, it was often only the two of us. Both James Conant and Jonathan Lear have continued to provide me with feedbacK on my worK. Jonathan Lear read and provided comments on an earlier version of Chapter 4. Finally, I want to express my deepest gratitude to Meredith Williams and Michael Williams for their instruction, feedback and support over the years. Meredith Williams’s and Michael Williams’s philosophical worK allowed me to see that the substance of Wittgenstein’s thought went beyond “therapeutic diagnosis”, and primarily involved what is called “theoretical diagnosis”. Furthermore, both Meredith Williams and Michael Williams provided, in different areas of philosophy, theoretical diagnoses of classic philosophical problems in contemporary philosophical terms. This example led me to explore how Wittgenstein’s thought might implicitly contain a philosophical paradigm that could and should become standard in contemporary philosophy. Without the models of their worK to guide and inspire me, this dissertation would have never been possible; it was by engaging with their worK that I first began to understand what it means to articulate the achievements of Wittgenstein in a traditional form and then to do philosophy in a way that reflects these achievements. vi Table of Contents Abstract, ii Preface and AcKnowledgements, iv List of Figures, viii Introduction, p. 1 Chapter 1: Foundations, p. 21 Chapter 2: Neo-Aristotelian-Wittgensteinian Ontology, p. 190 Chapter 3: Four Contemporary Philosophers, p. 289 Chapter 4: The Socratic-Aristotelian Tradition, p. 317 Bibliography, p. 372 Biography, p. 383 vii List of Figures: Figure 1: p. 31 Figure 2: 191 Figure 3: 192 Figure 4: 193 Figure 5: 194 Figure 6: p. 342 Figure 7: p. 343 Figure 8: p. 345 viii The consequences---for metaphysics…of a decision on the question whether the categoremata are charged or uncharged, are widely ramified and virtually uninvestigated. (Fred Sommers) In an important sense, he [Wittgenstein] unwittingly revived (breathed fresh life into) the Aristotelian tradition. (P. M. S. HacKer) In order to Know an object, I must Know not its external but all its internal qualities. (Ludwig Wittgenstein) ix Introduction In the original conception of analytic philosophy, circa 1900, the proposition was given a central role both ontologically and meta-philosophically. Philosophy itself was understood as the analysis of elements of propositions as elements of propositions, in light of an understanding of the basic forms, notions and structures that govern those elements. However, Russell regarded the proposition as having a Fregean logical form, and the understanding of the character of human Knowledge was, in this historical period, in no small part, influenced by early modern/modern conceptions of the mind and by models of progress afforded by mathematics, logic and the natural sciences. In Chapter 1, “Foundations”, I argue that if we critically consider some of the best work in the Wittgensteinian tradition over the last 60 years, what we shall see is that, taKen together, this tradition would have little reason to object to the understanding of the proposition and of analysis in the founding work of the analytic tradition. For, philosophy is, in fact, well characterized in an early-analytic manner as the analysis of elements of propositions as elements of propositions, in light of an understanding of the basic