Dale R. Herspring. Russian Civil-Military Relations. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996. xxiv + 230 pp. $35.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-253-33225-7. Reviewed by David R. Stone Published on H-Russia (January, 1998) Dale Herspring, noted authority on Soviet- the Soviet army from top to bottom and ensuring bloc militaries, tries in Russian Civil-Military Re‐ military subservience. lations to lay the foundations for a new concep‐ Odom's model, on the other hand, denies this tion of the relation between the Russian army and opposition between party and army. The dividing state by undermining the old models that have line between them, he argues, is not clear. The dominated scholarly discourse on the Soviet mili‐ two groups were instead united by a joint adher‐ tary. Herspring's goal is to evaluate the three chief ence to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. interpretations of Soviet civil-military relations by Whether soldier or civilian, Bolshevik elites testing their explanatory power in three periods shared a common ideology that cut across the civ‐ of profound change: the 1920s, the Gorbachev il-military barrier. years, and the post-Soviet Russian army. By sur‐ Colton, fnally, draws a much more complex veying their insights, or lack thereof, Herspring picture of varying degrees of military autonomy hopes to clear the air for a new understanding of and participation in separate sectors of Soviet so‐ military politics. ciety. Put crudely, however, his argument holds The three models Herspring tests are those of that the party-state controlled its military by buy‐ Roman Kolkowicz, William Odom, and Timothy ing it off, providing the military with conscripts Colton. Briefly summarized, Kolkowicz empha‐ and large budgetary allocations while giving offi‐ sizes continual struggle between party and army cers both prestige and a comfortable standard of both over military policy and the military's auton‐ living. omy from political interference. Given this con‐ Herspring's central achievement is to demon‐ stant tension, Kolkowicz sees the central institu‐ strate conclusively that all three models, while tion of Soviet civil-military relations as the net‐ powerful and incisive at particular times over work of political officers and organs permeating particular issues, cannot be generalized to cover the entire history of the Soviet army without be‐ H-Net Reviews ing twisted beyond recognition. His point is a sim‐ about the way the interwar Soviet army worked. ple one, but bears emphasis. The Soviet army was In effect, while disavowing the models of Kolkow‐ constantly confronted by fundamental change. No icz, Odom, and Colton, Herspring employs an im‐ model, Herspring argues, can do full justice to plicit assumption of his own: namely, that the fun‐ such a complex story. All the same, in his conclu‐ damental fact about the early Red Army was the sion Herspring argues that there are recurring split between military specialists (tsarist officers themes in Soviet civil-military relations. In a nod in the service of the Soviet state) and Red com‐ to Odom, he does fnd that value consensus aids manders (Bolsheviks serving by necessity as mili‐ immeasurably in easing conflict and ensuring tary officers). smooth military politics. Additionally, he con‐ The question is whether such a division is the cludes, the most potent generator of conflict is correct paradigm for understanding the interwar change. Red Army. To take only the most prominent exam‐ In making his argument that no single theory ple, Mikhail Tukhachevskii was a tsarist officer, is adequate, Herspring structures his book around but became a prototypical Red Commander; the four issues and three periods of time. He frst foremost spokesman for military professionalism identifies and examines four salient questions for in Herspring's book is Trotsky, a professional rev‐ the early Red Army: doctrine, force structure (i.e. olutionary. In Herspring's coverage of doctrinal militia or regular army), national formations for debates Svechin, the exemplar of the military spe‐ ethnic minorities, and personnel policy. These is‐ cialist, argues "the front would have to be united sues all resurfaced in the late 1980s, and Her‐ with the rear" in any future war (p. 17). This pic‐ spring traces them through Gorbachev's term and ture of total mobilization of society, and even the into the post-Soviet period. phraseology, comes from Mikhail Frunze, Old Bol‐ For the 1920s, Herspring fnds no models shevik, professional revolutionary, and accidental completely satisfactory. Odom's ideological con‐ soldier. sensus is nowhere to be found in debates over Herspring's own discussion of the transition doctrine or force structure, though the increasing to a mixed system of regular units and territorial homogenization of the Soviet officer corps in the reserves concedes that "the battle lines were not late 1920s shows the mechanism by which con‐ clearly drawn" between party and army (p. 36), as sensus might form. Colton's emphasis on institu‐ even Lenin had reservations about the militia sys‐ tional participation has little relevance to the fuid tem pushed by some party activists. Herspring's and chaotic Soviet military in the Civil War and discussion of national formations (units made up after, and the poor material state of the Red Army of a particular non-Russian nationality employing makes it hopeless to see the military as bought off native officers and native language of command) by the Bolshevik regime. Of all models, Herspring posits that regular officers saw national units as finds Kolkowicz's best in its depiction of the bitter useless, while the Bolsheviks encouraged them as debates over doctrine. Even here, however, Her‐ a tool for nation-building (p. 37). Unfortunately, spring fnds that army and party could reach con‐ the only opposition to national units that Her‐ sensus on the need establish formations made up spring cites comes from the Kremlin, which op‐ of national minorities and a territorial militia to posed formations outside Russian units in the ear‐ economize on the expense of a standing army. ly days of the Civil War, and Stalin himself who In his discussion of the 1920s, Herspring's at‐ abolished them in 1938. tempt to critique existing theories suffers from The one place where Herspring unequivocal‐ not going far enough in questioning assumptions ly demonstrates a split between military special‐ 2 H-Net Reviews ists and Red commanders is exactly where we home. The call in non-Russian republics for na‐ would most expect it: the question of unity of tional units and service only within home territo‐ command. Would military specialists be able to ries came from the same source as the Russian function without commissars to guarantee loyal‐ call for a militia-based army. The proposed alter‐ ty? Naturally, military specialists desired autono‐ native of a professional army never managed to my just as the Red Army's political officers fought get around the issue of cost. The Soviet (and Impe‐ for their own prerogatives. Even here, the lines rial Russian) practice of paying conscripts the between specialist and communist are not clear: merest pittance, whatever its opportunity cost to Smilga and Trotsky, professional revolutionaries society and conscripts, was at least not a burden both, spoke out in favor of limited unity of com‐ on the state budget. With the Soviet economy dis‐ mand as early as 1918 (p. 62). integrating, a professional military was simply When Herspring moves to the Gorbachev and not a viable alternative. Gorbachev's attempt to post-Gorbachev period, he is on much frmer reorient Soviet society towards a state-based ground, both because of his own expertise and be‐ rather than a party-based system only made mat‐ cause the very openness Gorbachev promoted ters worse by removing one of the key props of makes the job of the scholar simpler. His chapter the army's stability. on doctrine is particularly insightful. It is quite Herspring's source base consists almost en‐ amusing to watch Soviet generals attempting to tirely of published materials, with a scattering of deal with Gorbachev's encroachment on their references to personal conversations. This has competencies with his proclamation of "reason‐ several consequences. First, as mentioned above, able sufficiency" as the standard for Soviet de‐ Herspring is prevented from talking much about fense. While the Soviet military was naturally the long period from the 1930s through the puzzled by what such a concept might precisely mid-1980s where published documentation is mean, the Soviet officer corps correctly perceived scarce. This is unfortunate, for Stalin's revolution- that whatever it meant, their budgets would be from-above had profound implications for civil- cut. Their attempts to avoid conceding "reason‐ military relations. Recent work by Roger Reese on able sufficiency" bespeak considerable creativity-- collectivization and Lennart Samuelson and this Marshal Sergei Akhromeev preferred to speak of author on industrialization demonstrates the "approximate military parity," echoed by theorist enormous strains the societal upheavals of Stalin‐ General Makhmut Gareev's "military parity," ism placed on the fabric of civil-military relations. while Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov used "defen‐ For the Gorbachev and post-Gorbachev period, sive sufficiency," briefly switching to "reliable suf‐ Herspring's focus on newspaper articles, essays ficiency." General Vladimir Lobov adopted "ade‐ from military journals, and public statements quate defense" as his term of choice. means that his account is replete with decrees, ex‐ Ironically, while generals and civilians debat‐ hortations, and policy declarations, but short on ed theory, the structure they discussed was crum‐ policy implementation. This is not necessarily a bling around them. Russians grew increasingly handicap; given the institutional disintegration of averse to serving in the Soviet military; they were the Russian military over the last decade, it is a surpassed in this only by non-Russians.