Ole Thomassen Hjortland University of Bergen Sydneshaugen 12–13 Department of Philosophy Postboks 7805, 5020 Bergen, Norway Phone: +47 950 56 082 Skype: olehjortland Email: [email protected] url: https://www.uib.no/en/persons/Ole.Thomassen.Hjortland Born: September 23, 1982—Bergen, Norway Nationality: Norwegian Current position 2014-present Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen Areas of specialization Formal logic, Philosophy of logic, Philosophy of language Areas of competence Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mathematics Appointments held 2013-2014 Assistant Professor, LMU Munich 2011-2013 Postdoctoral Research Fellow, MCMP, LMU Munich 2009-2011 Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Arché Research Centre, University of St Andrews Education 2009 Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of St Andrews 2006 M.Litt. in Philosophy, University of St Andrews 2004 B.A. in Philosophy, University of Bergen 1 Publications Books 2015 Hjortland, O. (ed.), (2015), The Foundations of Logical Consequence (with C. Caret), Oxford: OUP. Journal articles and chapters (Peer reviewed) forthcoming Martin, B. & Hjortland, O. T. (2021). “Evidence in logic”. Routledge Handbook of the Phi- losophy of Evidence. Editors Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn. 2020 Martin, B. & Hjortland, O. T. (2020). “Logical Predictivism”. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1-/34. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-020-09566-5. 2019 Hjortland, O., (2019), “Disagreement about logic”, Inquiry, 1–23, online first https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1651084. Hjortland, O. T. (2019). “What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?”. The Australasian Journal of Logic, 16(7), 250–282. 2018 Hjortland, O., (2018), “Inferentialism, Structure, and Conservativeness” (with S. Standefer), in From Rules to Meanings: New essays on inferentialism, eds. O. Beran et al., Routledge. 2017 Hjortland, O. T. (2017). “Theories of truth and the maxim of minimal mutilation”. Synthese, 1-32. Online first: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1612-8. Hjortland, O., (2017), “Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic”, Philosophical Studies, 174(3): 631–658. 2015 Hjortland, O., (2015), “Logical Consequence: Its nature, structure, and application” (with Colin Caret), in The Foundations of Logical Consequence, eds. C. Caret & O. Hjortland, Oxford: OUP. Hjortland, O. (2015), Review of Varieties of Logic by S. Shapiro, Philosophical Quarterly. doi: 10.1093/pq/pqv095. Online first. 2014 Hjortland, O., (2014), “Speech acts, categoricity, and the meanings of logical connectives”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 55: 445–467. Hjortland, O., (2014), “Verbal Disputes in Logic: Against minimalism for logical connec- tives”, Logique et Analyse, 227: 463–486. Hjortland, O., (2014), “Dynamic consequence for soft information” (with O. Roy), Journal of logic and computation, 26(6): 1843–1864. Hjortland, O. (ed.), (2014), Special issue on formal epistemology, Erkenntnis, 79(6): 1089– 268 (with B. Fitelson, V. Crupi, F. Steinberger). 2013 Hjortland, O., (2013) “Logical Pluralism, Meaning Variance, and Verbal Disputes”, Aus- tralasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2): 355–373. 2012 Hjortland, O., (2012), “Harmony and the Context of Deducibility”, in Insolubles and Conse- quences: Essays in honour of Stephen Read, eds. C. Dutilh Novaes and O. Hjortland, London: College Publications. Hjortland, O. (ed.), (2012), Insolubles and Consequences: Essays in honour of Stephen Read, (with C. Dutilh Novaes), London: College Publications. 2009 Hjortland, O., (2009), “Inferentialism and the Categoricity Problem: Reply to Raatikainen” (with J. Murzi), Analysis, 69(3): 480–488. 2 Talks Invited talks 2020 “Logical pluralism without collapse”, Workshop on pluralism and logical consequence, LOGOS, University of Barcelona. “Logical pluralism without collapse”, Arché Research Centre, University of St Andrews. “Logical pluralism and abductivism in logic”, CLLAM, Stockholm University. “Adversarial Arguments”, Canadian Society for Epistemology, Symposium on The Dialog- ical Roots of Deduction. 2019 “Evidence in logic: Two case studies”, Workshop on anti-exceptionalism about logic, CUNY, New York (with Ben Martin). “Explanations in logic and anti-exceptionalism”, CUNY, New York (with Ben Martin). “Explanations in logic and anti-exceptionalism”, UConn, Connecticut (with Ben Martin). “Explanations in logic and anti-exceptionalism”, Workshop on anti-exceptionalism, He- brew University of Jerusalem (with Ben Martin). “Varieties of anti-exceptionalism”, Workshop on anti-exceptionalism and pluralism, Uni- versity of Pavia (with Ben Martin). 2018 “Disagreement about logic”, Disagreement within philosophy, University of Bonn, Bonn. “Indispensability of logic”, UNILOG’2018, Vichy. “Engineering Logical Concepts”, 2nd Buenos Aires–MCMP workshop, Formal Methods in Philosophy: Truth, Paradox, and Mathematics, LMU Munich, Munich. “Indispensability of logic”, 2nd Veritas Philosophy Conference, Yonsei University, Seoul. “Engineering Logical Concepts”, Workshop on engineering logical concepts, University of Oslo, Oslo. 2017 “The Indispensability of logic”, Bergen-MCMP workshop, Theory-Choice in Logic, LMU Munich, Munich. “The Indispensability of logic”, Nonclassical Logic workshop, University of Cagliari, Cagliari. “Theories of Truth and the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation”, Logic and Metaphyics work- shop, Kyoto University, Kyoto. “Theories of Truth and the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation”, Critical Views On Logic,Uni- versity of Oslo, Oslo. “Engineering Logical Concepts”, Alternative Logics and Natural Language, Hebrew Uni- versity of Jerusalem, Jerusalem. “Theories of Truth and the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation”, Buenos Aires-MCMP Workshop on the Logic of Truth, LMU Munich. “Pluralism and Anti-Exceptionalism”, Pluralisms Conference, Bonn University, Bonn. “Opinions and Rationality”, Seminar series ‘What is an opinion?’, Faculty of Social Sci- ences, University of Bergen, Bergen. 2016 “What counts as evidence for a logical theory?”, Munich Center for Mathematical Philos- ophy, LMU Munich. “The Indispensability of logic”, Fifth Young Researchers Days in Logic, Philosophy and History of Science, Académie Royale, Brussels. “What counts as evidence for a logical theory’?’, 1st Anti-Exceptionalism Workshop, Uni- versity of Bergen. 2015 3 “Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic”, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich. “Does the inferentialist need categoricity?”, Arché Conference on Inferentialism, Univer- sity of St Andrews. “Logical pluralism and epistemic pluralism”, GAP, Osnabrück. “Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic”, IUC, Dubrovnik. “Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic”, CSMN, University of Oslo. “Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic”, University of St Andrews. “Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic”, University of Aberdeen. 2014 “Logical Pluralism as Epistemic Pluralism”, University of Neuchâtel. “Axiomatizing Theories of Truth in Sequent Calculus”, IHPST, Université Paris1. 2013 “An n-Sided Sequent Calculus for Theories of Truth”, University of Groningen. “Dynamic Consequence for Soft Information”, (with O. Roy), University of Groningen. “Proof Theoretic Harmony in the Substructural Era”, University of Tübingen. “Proof Theoretic Harmony in the Substructural Era”, University of Gothenburg. “Bridge over Troubled Waters: The normative role of logic”, University of Umeå. “Half as Lovely, Twice as True: Theories of truth and paradox”, University of Umeå. “Proof Theoretic Harmony with Higher Order Rules”, University of Salzburg. “Tutorial: Nonclassical Logics”, University of Salzburg. “An n-Sided Sequent Calculus for Theories of Truth”, University of Bonn. “Against minimalism for logical connectives”, University of St Andrews. “Truth, Paracompleteness, and Substructural Logic”, University of Buenos Aires. “Primitivism about Validity”, University of Kent. “Truth, Paracompleteness, and Substructural Logic”, University of Oxford. 2012 “Primitivism about Validity”, Czech Academy of Sciences. “Dynamic Consequence for Soft Information”, University of Prague. “Probabilism for validity”, University of St Andrews. “Truth, Paracompleteness, and Substructural Logic”, University of Konstanz. 2011 “Assertion and Denial in Classical and Intuitionistic Logic”, Trinity College Dublin. “The Empirical Presuppositions of Logical Inferentialism”, University of Groningen. “Normalization and Harmony: To Lie Like A Bullet”, University of Aberdeen. “Normalization and Harmony: To Lie Like A Bullet”, University of St Andrews. “Paradox and Contraction: Half as Lovely, Twice as True”, University of St Andrews. “Speech acts and the meaning of logical connectives”, Trinity College Dublin. “Generalised Elimination Harmony and Sequent Calculus Solutions”, IUC Dubrovnik. 2009 “Logic Naturalised”, Trinity College Dublin. “What does it mean to say that logic is revisable?”, University of Dundee. 2008 “The Semantic Role of Proof-Conditions”, University of Melbourne. Other talks 2012 “Truth, Paracompleteness, and Substructural Logic”, GAP.8, University of Konstanz. 4 “Dynamic Consequence for Soft Information”, 8th Scandinavian Logic Symposium, Roskilde University. “Truth, Paracompleteness, and Substructural Logic”, Trends in Logic, Ruhr-University Bochum. “Truth, Paracompleteness, and Substructural Logic”, LOGICA’12, Hejnice. 2011 “Proof-Theoretic Semantics in the Substructural Era”, European Congress of Analytic Phi- losophy (EPAC7), University of Milan. “Proof-Theoretic Semantics in the Substructural Era”. Congress for Logic, Methdology, and Philosophy of Science (CLMPS’11), University of Nancy.