MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD • Event: Christina Rocca Type of Event: Interview Date: January 29, 2004.... _ Special Access Issues: I Additional notes: ..----------- ..... Prepared by: Scott Allan Reviewed by: Len Hawley Team Number: Three (Counterterrorism Policy) Location: Main State Participants- Commission: Scott Allan and Len Hawley State: Jami Borek Interviewee Background Rocca spent 15 years at the CIA where she worked in the Directorate of Operations. In this capacity, she did not handle South Asia matters. In 1997, she then went to work Congressman and then Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) as a foreign policy aide focusing on the Middle East and South Asia. On May 31, 2001 Rocca left Brownback's staff to become Assistant Secretary of State • for South Asia and continues to hold that position today. Congressional Perspectives: Rocca began by describing her observations while working for Senator Brownback. Before the 1998 nuke test, she mentioned how Islamabad was heavily sanctioned for its procurement of nuclear materials. They were not much interaction because of the sanctions, but the usa was trying to work on educational reform and democratization to the extent the sanctions permitted. She characterized the USGapproach to Pakistan before the 1998 tests as "passive". Before the nuke tests, the major sanctions in effect were Pressler and Symington and after the tests, the Glenn amendment was added. Rocca added that after the nuke tests, there were so many sanctions in place "that we couldn't even sell them wheat." The "draconian" Glenn amendment, she said, had "drastic implications for not only foreign policy but for commerce" and had no waiver capability for Clinton Administration. Because of the harsh Glenn sanctions, Congress decided to waive some sanctions to permit some flexibility. One bill, known as Brownback I, allowed for the provision of humanitarian type aid or sales to India and Pakistan. • She recalled that after the 1998 embassy bombings that Pakistan was cooperating to some extent on terrorism and Congress wanted to permit the Clinton Administration some • flexibility with Pakistan. She also believes a second bill, Brownback II, passed in October of 1999 which gave the Administration a waiver capability. But, she recalls that the some of Capital hill did not think the Clinton administration was using the new waiver capability to its full capacity. In connection with the October 1999 Pakistani coup, Section 508 sanctions came in against Islamabad. In the spring of 2001, before joining State, Rocca recalls, traveling to Pakistan where she met with Karzai and enquired as to what Congress could do to assist a possible government in exile. She said in 2000 and early 2001 certain members of Congress and their staffers informally debated whether providing money to the Northern Alliance, but decided fairly quickly not to assist that group's leader_._ Masoud. She said the feeling that was that Masoud was a horrible person involved in drug trafficking and human rights violation. The belief that Masoud would not be capable of governing the country. Before 9-11, she said Senator Brownback was very concerned about the presence of terrorist in Afghanistan and called it a "playground for terrorists." Pakistan During Rocca's first month at State she was getting acclimatized to the Bureau, but stressed she was involved in policy making discussions and decisions. While USG focus • on Pakistan (and South Asia) was not what it was on September 1th, it was an area of attention. She noted a number of high level visits from Pakistani officials during the summer of 200 1. The same is true for our focus on India. During the summer of 200 1, the priorities for Pakistan were, in order of descending importance, AfghanistanlTaliban, non-proliferation, Indo-Pak tensions and finally democratization. She described the Clinton Pakistani policy as one which was driven by the non- proliferation and terrorism issues, but that relations were sour. When Rocca took office, her tasking was to "create a new dynamic in OUf relations with both India and Pakistan." This general decision, she believes was made in April of2001 and before she arrived. We wanted movement on the non-proliferation issue with both of them and Powell wanted to improve relations with Pakistan. However those handling the non-proliferation and democratization portfolios were as not as supportive but noted that SCT did resist her strategy. As a result, Rocca sought to lift some of the nuclear sanctions (i.e. the Glenn amendment) in order to improve our ability to communicate and work with Islamabad. However, these sanctions were not lifted until after 9-1 I. She noted that had the nuclear sanctions been lifted before 9-11, there would still be a number of other sanctions in place which would continue to limit our relations (i.e. Section 508 sanctions punishing Islamabad for the 1999 coup). After 9-11 Congress gave • 2 the Bush Administration a waiver for Section 508 sanctions. She claims that while the sanctions were lifted after 9-11, the State Department had been working during that summer to lift the sanctions. As mentioned earlier, she indicated the Executive branch • had the discretion to lift the sanctions so she would preparing a large volume of paper on this to topic to present to the White House during the summer of 200 1. She said either the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary had signed an action memo supporting the lifting of sanctions. From there she was preparing a number of justifications to support this move when taken to the President. 1 Therefore State felt it should foster the internal argument on ~----------------~Taliban support and stressed to visiting diplomats that Afghanistan could really hinder:/ the new Atmosphere State was trying to create. Eventually, Rocca hoped during the ...... summer of 2001, the US could work with the Pakistanis on developing an alternative to the Taliban. Rocca recalls traveling to Pakistan in early August and stressed that Musharrafrevisit his Afghan policy. While Musharrafresponded positively during this trip and ",:,asopen to establishing commonality on this issue. But when the Pakistani foreign Secretary traveled to Washington later that month, little progress was made before?: 11. She commented that the "or else" language included in the July 2001 demarche issued by Amb. Milam to the Taliban had not been decided by 9-11. She saidhowever, that it was a sign that the US was considering drastic action. / • Regime Change and Covert Action Against the Taliban: Assistant Secretary Rocca said that in June 1999, she felt t~a:t it was given that the US was not ready to take overt military action ageist the Tali!?an. The US was not, she believed, ready to call for an Afghan regime change, though there were discussions about it. This had nothing to do with covert action . Rocca summarized the process implementinga Presidential waiver for lifting sanctions. first, the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of State Department ..support the lifting of sanctionsaccompanied with justifications. Then the recommendation plus State Department justification is.p-resented to the President who will then agree to consult with Congress, which is actually conducted bythe State Department.' Once the Department has consulted with the Hill, then State must confirm theirconsultations with the Hill and reaffirm why the sanctions should be lifted. If the President still agrees he will sign off on the lifting of sanctions. Borek remarked that while legally an Executive can.move forward and lift sanctions in the face of Congressional opposition. However, this, she said, does notoccur in practice as the Executive does not want to face hard opposition especiallywhen Congress ,has' the power to pass follow up legislation restricting the Executive, which includes re-imposingsanctions, Rocca agreed with Borek that giving the Executive branch the waiver control.was Congress' way of forcing the White House to take the criticizing for initialing something that con~r';ss did~prV;ant 10 take pressure on. ' • ,··/r 3 .. ' 9/11 Classified Information • 9/11 Classified Information Rocca did not recall much discussion on aid to the Northern Alliance that summer. But there was discussion about providing them with humanitarian assistance as well as lethal assistance. But aiding them with lethal aid would be a problem because of its connection with drug trafficking, human rights not to mention their image on Capital hill. In June, the premise was no lethal assistance to the Northern Alliance, but by the end of the summer there was more conversation about aiding the group. Late in the summer of 200 1, she recalls small interagency meetings on the three prong NSC approach to dealing with the Taliban. The three tenets were: 1) Seek a deal with the Taliban and build our capacity for increasing pressure on the movement, if this does not work 2) Increase pressure on the Taliban, and if the Taliban are unresponsive 3) Oust the Taliban leadership. The meetings discussed how each of these could be practically implemented and would eventually be passed up to the Deputies for approval. Rocca said she was not involved in the discussions on overthrow. But she said that we would not have been able to overthrow the Taliban without having Pakistan onboard. This would have required serious incentives to the Taliban; what the incentives were had not been reached. Also, she could not say who would be able to fill the void should the Taliban be removed. Rocca said that she did not know what could have filled the void because the usa never got the chance to pursue and because we never had a Pakistan that was willing to cooperate on this. • She said that in early September, there was serious "yakking about planning" for more aggressive options towards the Taliban.