Kremlin Watch Report 22.04.2017 How do European democracies react to Russian aggression? Review of shifts in strategic & policy documents of EU28 following Russian aggression against Ukraine This study was supported by the European People's Party Group in the European Parliament. Jakub Janda Kremlin Watch is a strategic program of the Head of the Kremlin Watch Programme TheEuropean European Values Values Think Think-Tank,-Tank which is a non aims- to Ilyas Sharibzhanov exposegovernmental and confront policy instruments institute defending of Russian influence and disinformationliberal operations democracy. focused Kremlin Watch Analyst against liberal-democratic system. Elena Terzi Kremlin Watch Analyst Markéta Krejčí Kremlin Watch Analyst Jakub Fiser Kremlin Watch Member Kremlin Watch Report 22.04.2017 How do European democracies react to Russian aggression? 1. Introduction The purpose of this review is to map out the EU member states' positions on Russia based on the latest national strategies, reports and official statements on foreign and security policy. Prior studies in this area have highlighted differences between member states that both inform and hinder the development of a common EU policy on Russia. Understanding the background and nature of each state's bilateral relationship with Russia, as well as its contribution to the EU-level policymaking, may help predict and inform important foreign policy developments that are underway. However, each country case is so complex that such a review cannot hope to produce simple conclusions and clear answers to burning questions such as "to what extent does Russia exert an influence on the EU member states' foreign policy?" or "will a multilateral approach to securing common interests prevail over bilateralism and pursuit of immediate economic gain", or even "how much of a threat does Russia present to the EU today?". So what we chose to do instead is formulate several hypotheses and check them against individual countries' experiences, bringing an additional layer of detail into the discussion. Each country file was compiled according to a similar structure and drawing from comparable sources. The section Relationship Parameters highlights several dimensions that determine the member states' different approaches to Russia: history, geography and culture (a range of experiences that vary in nature and importance); energy, trade and investment; military and security; normative dimension of foreign policy (relative importance of the European orientation, commitment to multilateralism, international law, human rights and democracy promotion, etc.); public opinion and internal political situation. As did prior such mapping exercises, this review highlights the balancing act between the pragmatic pursuit of immediate national interest and a more long-term, comprehensive and multilateral approach synergetic with a sound and coherent EU policy. One of the preliminary observations of the study is that in recent years, interests of member states that had traditionally been far apart, have been converging, mostly due to unilateral actions from Russia's side. New challenges have emerged in the past years, especially in relation to conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine, that have shifted approaches to Russia within the EU. This review tracks the change by comparing official statements and expert assessments made throughout the last ten years. The Expert Assessment section draws from several sources such as ECFR's Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations (2007)1, Views from the capitals on Russia policy (2014-2016)2 and Foreign Policy Scorecards (2013- 2016)3; book “National Perspectives on Russia: European Foreign Policy in the Making?” (2013)4; EU- 1 http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/a_power_audit_of_eu_russia_relations 2 http://www.ecfr.eu/debate/russia_in_2030_the_view_from_europe, http://www.ecfr.eu/debate/what_next_for_eu_ russia_policy, http://www.ecfr.eu/debate/how_should_europe_respond_to_russia 3 http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2016/countries/ 4 M. David, J. Gower and H. Haukkala, ‘National Perspectives on Russia: European Foreign Policy in the Making?’, Routledge 2013. 1 Kremlin Watch Report 22.04.2017 How do European democracies react to Russian aggression? 28 Watch Issue 11 on the Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia (2015)5, and a journalistic investigation by Ukrainian newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli on individual member states' responses to the Ukraine crisis (2015)6. The most novel contribution of this study is found in the Policy Documents section which quotes the latest publicly available official positions of each member state. For this section, we studied each member state's foreign policy strategies or priorities, annual reports of foreign ministries and latest statements by the heads of state or foreign ministers on the one hand, and their security strategies and counter-intelligence / constitution protection / security service reports on the other. Some of the documents were only available in the state language and translations presented here are unofficial. The review is in process of being completed, and the next step after compiling each country file will be to reassess the original hypotheses in the view of this new information. 5 http://eu-28watch.org/issues/issue-no-11/ 6 http://gazeta.zn.ua/international/pohischenie-evropy-1-_.html 2 Kremlin Watch Report 22.04.2017 How do European democracies react to Russian aggression? 2. Conclusions Russian aggression against Ukraine has led to EU28 sanctions, while Kremlin aggressive policies such as militarily threatening specific EU countries, or using hostile influence tools such as disinformation, and support of European extremists & radical leaders has alienated many European countries. Today, we can see: o six countries which have held concerned views of Russian foreign policy and now are at the forefront of the European response to its aggression (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, United Kingdom, Denmark) o five countries have significantly shifted their policies and concerns after the Russian aggression against Ukraine (Finland, Sweden, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Germany). o three countries are below-radar supporters of countering Russian aggression (Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria) o three states have virtually no relevant relations with Russia (Portugal, Malta, Ireland) o six countries are trying to stay away from the issues (Austria, Belgium, France, Luxemburg, Spain, Slovenia) o two governments are using the Russia-card for domestic reasons (Slovakia, Hungary) o and three states still act Kremlin-friendly (Greece, Italy, Cyprus 13 EU countries are highly concerned with the Russian disinformation threat, and are therefore participating in at least one of the three allied projects (EEAS East STRATCOM, NATO STRACOM COE, Finnish COE on Countering Hybrid Threats). The game-changer in this situation will be the next German government coalition which can shift European efforts to counter and mitigate the Russian aggression in both ways – it can either appease the Kremlin and effectively kill the EU28 response (potentially, if a “red” coalition is in place), or follow-up on the principled position held by the Chancellor Angela Merkel to devise a full-government policy on every level of the Kremlin aggression (from Ukraine to disinformation threats) and become the full-time prime defender of the liberal international order. The group of 14 countries clearly concerned with Russian aggression is missing a leader. The United Kingdom is on its way out, Germany still does not feel as an openly hawkish defender of the principled response, and Poland is missing out on the chance to be a genuine, 3 Kremlin Watch Report 22.04.2017 How do European democracies react to Russian aggression? legitimate and a well-respected leader of this pack because of the unconstructive behaviour of its government. The position of the most reliable Kremlin friendly is now held by Italy, expressed for example by openly vetoing expansion of sanctions following Russia-sponsored atrocities in Syria. It might change after the French presidential elections, where Moscow might get a highly influential ally. I. Recommendations 1. The aggressiveness of the Russian Federation is based on internal factors, while the kleptocratic regime needs to feed domestic audience with perception of the external threat. For this reason, Kremlin-orchestrated hostilities will continue until it implodes. It is important to understand that this is not going to disappear overnight, nor by European politicians being nice to Vladimir Putin. 2. Most of diplomatic efforts of the concerned countries should focus on silently assisting Germany with adopting the position of the prime defender of the liberal international order. German military is already assuming that role; now it is time for concerned allies to support Germany in assuming more assertive role against the ones who openly and systematically attack the rule-based order. 3. Given the amount and intensity of Russia-sponsored atrocities and the almost non-existent shift in approach of Kremlin’ friendlies, it is reasonable not to expect positions of Greece, Italy and Cyprus to significantly move. There apparently is not much else Russia would have to do for them to change their long-term views. 4. European debate should focus on how Russia uses energy to increase dependence of individual countries on Moscow’s energies and to lure influential current or former politicians to lobby on its behalf. European intelligence agencies openly