Monitoring in the Dark An evaluation of the International Labour Organization’s Better Factories Cambodia monitoring and reporting program February 2013 International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic Stanford Law School & Worker Rights Consortium http://humanrightsclinic.law.stanford.edu/project/monitoring-in-the-dark/ Monitoring in the Dark An evaluation of the International Labour Organization’s Better Factories Cambodia monitoring and reporting program © 2013 International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic, Mills Legal Clinic, Stanford Law School and Worker Rights Consortium All rights reserved. Photographs by Lucia Ballard, Daniel Cassman, Stephan Sonnenberg, and Heather Stilwell. TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................................................................... i Executive Summary .................................................................................................................................................................. ii Methodology ............................................................................................................................................................................ viii Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 The Cambodian Context ......................................................................................................... 4 Better Factories for Whom? .................................................................................................................................................. 7 Declining Real Wages ................................................................................................................................................................ 7 Excessive Overtime .................................................................................................................................................................. 10 Violations of Freedom of Association .............................................................................................................................. 13 Lack of Authentic Collective Bargaining ....................................................................................................................... 17 Subcontracting and Prison Labor ..................................................................................................................................... 20 Occupational Safety and Health Violations .................................................................................................................. 22 Child Labor .................................................................................................................................................................................. 25 Better Factories Cambodia ................................................................................................... 29 BFC’s Original and Current Monitoring Model ........................................................................................................... 30 BFC after 2005: The End of Preferential Trade and Uncertainty about BFC’s Future .............................. 34 BFC Today: Black Box Monitoring and Reporting .................................................................. 38 How Black Box Monitoring Harms BFC ......................................................................................................................... 43 Concerns about the Efficacy of BFC’s Monitoring ...................................................................................................... 47 Lack of Clarity about BFC’s Role ........................................................................................................................................ 52 BFC’s Role as an Advocate .................................................................................................................................................... 54 Recommendations ................................................................................................................ 56 Monitoring Processes ............................................................................................................................................................ 57 Recommendation #1: Expand Outreach to Workers and Unions ....................................................................... 57 Recommendation #2: Reduce Opportunities for Factory Owners to Hide Violations ................................ 58 Recommendation #3: Respond to Worker Complaints of Rights Violations .................................................. 58 Recommendation #4: Focus Follow-Up Factory Visits on Remediation of Violations ............................... 61 Reporting Processes .............................................................................................................................................................. 63 Recommendation #5: Report Findings and Recommendations to Factory Workers and Worker Representatives ......................................................................................................................................................................... 64 Recommendation #6: Monitor and Report on Factory Remediation Plans ................................................... 65 Recommendation #7: Publish Public Factory Reports Detailing Remediation Efforts ............................. 65 Recommendation #8: Make Public Synthesis Reports More Relevant to Key Labor Issues .................... 68 Recommendation #9: Re-Introduce Factory Specific Information into Synthesis Reports ..................... 70 Remediation Processes ........................................................................................................................................................ 71 Recommendation #10: Engage with Factory Owners, Buyers, and Worker Representatives in the Remediation Process ............................................................................................................................................................... 71 Expected Results .................................................................................................................. 73 Appendices ........................................................................................................................... 77 TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS BFC Better Factories Cambodia CAP Corrective Action Plan CTA ILO-BFC Chief Technical Adviser FIP Factory Improvement Plan FDC Fixed Duration Contract GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GMAC Garment Manufacturers Association of Cambodia ILO International Labour Organization IMS Information Management System MFA Multifibre Agreement MoL Ministry of Labour PAC Project Advisory Committee Prakas Cambodian Ministerial Regulations RCG Royal Cambodian Government UCTA US-Cambodia Textile and Apparel Trade Agreement UDC Unlimited Duration Contracts WIC Workers Information Centre WRC Worker Rights Consortium WTO World Trade Organization Workers on lunch break Acknowledgements Lucia Ballard, Virginia Cardenas, Daniel Cassman, Jane Farrington, Jennifer Gibson, Kristina Green, Alexia Romero, Stephanie Tennant, Christina Yang, and Tan Zhi Feng, all graduate-level students in the Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (hereinafter, ‘the Stanford Clinic’), jointly undertook research and documentation to prepare and edit this report. Stephan Sonnenberg, Clinical Lecturer at the Clinic at Stanford Law School, oversaw all research, coordinated the project and rewrote and restructured partial drafts in writing this report. Benjamin Hensler and Bent Gehrt of the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) participated in the development and editing of the report. James Cavallaro, Professor of Law at Stanford and director of the Stanford Clinic, reviewed and edited the final version of the report. The report is the product of intensive collaboration between the Worker Rights Consortium and the International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School. The WRC, a leading advocate for labor rights in the global apparel industry, has investigated working conditions in factories in Cambodia and other major garment-producing countries on behalf of its more than 180 affiliated universities and colleges, including Stanford University, since its founding in 2000. The Stanford Clinic is one of several clinics in the Mills Legal Clinic at Stanford Law School. The clinic provides direct representation to victims, and partners with either communities that have suffered or face potential abuse, human rights advocacy organizations that integrate Stanford Law students into the work they do. The Stanford Clinic seeks to train Stanford Law students to be effective human rights advocates while simultaneously advancing the cause of human rights and global justice worldwide. The Stanford Clinic is responsible for the research on Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) and stakeholder perceptions of that program. WRC and the Stanford Clinic wish to thank a number of people who helped make this report possible. First and foremost the Clinic would like to thank BFC, and especially its Chief Technical Adviser Jill Tucker, who was refreshingly forthcoming with the Clinic’s research team about her vision for the program as well as the challenges she faces in