Center for Cryptologic History Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT) During the Cold War This publication presents a historical perspective for informational and educational purposes, is the result of independent research, and does not necessarily reflect a position of NSA/CSS or any other U.S. government entity. This publication is distributed freee by the National Security Agency. If you would like additional copies, please email [email protected] or write to: Center for Cryptologic History National Security Agency 9800 Savage Road, Suite 6886 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755 Cover: Graphic by Savan Becker Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT) During the Cold War Richard L. Bernard National Security Agency Center for Cryptologic History 2016 Contents Preface ....................................................................4 Background and Introduction .........................................5 Context of the Early Cold War Missile and Space Intelligence ...6 Post-World War II Analytic Challenges for Intelligence Analysts ..............................................7 Technical Problems Presented by Telemetry Signals Information ..................................8 U.S.–Soviet Strategic Arms Limitations Treaties ..................9 Directions for NSA to Manage DoD ELINT and TELINT ..........10 TELINT Planning, Operations, and Management at NSA .......12 The Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (DEF/SMAC) National Telemetry Processing Center Telemetry Analysis and Reporting Collection and Processing Development and Examples ....... 14 Telemetry Data Collection System (HARDBALL) Telemetry Data Processing and Analysis (RISSMAN) Smithsonian Air and Space Museum TELINT Exhibit Specialized Telemetry Signal Data Collection Assets .......... 24 STONEHOUSE Deep Space Data Telemetry Collection Facility Shipborne Data Collection—ARIS Ships and USNS Observation Island Airborne Telemetry and Optical Collection—EA-3B (SEABRINE) Transportable Ground-Based Telemetry Collection (LEFTOUT) Observations and Conclusions ......................................28 Acronyms and Project Names ...................................... 29 References ............................................................. 30 Author’s Biography ................................................... 31 Telemetry Intelligence During The Cold War Preface This document was developed with a key pur- cepting Signals from Space” exhibit at the Smith- pose of providing information for the docents at the sonian. The full displays for HARDBALL and Smithsonian Air and Space Museum (in the Space RISSMAN are at the NCM facility, along with an Gallery at the Washington, DC, facility) and the EA-3B aircraft. National Cryptologic Museum (NCM) at NSA at Most of the information in the sections on pages Fort Meade, Maryland. The display of one rack of 6–9 was originally prepared by Mr. James V. Boone equipment from the HARDBALL telemetry collec- and Mr. Edward A. Hart, former NSA technical tion system at the ANDERS station and one rack of managers and now retired NSA senior executives. equipment from RISSMAN are part of the “Inter- 4 Background and Introduction Telemetry from foreign missiles, satellites, and space probes was often collected from overhead intelligence resources, ground-based locations, airborne platforms, and seaborne intelligence collection platforms. Graphic by Savan Becker Background and Introduction Office (NRO) to develop sophisticated signal col- Telemetry intelligence (TELINT) (later to be lection equipment that could collect and process called FISINT) was a critical source of performance foreign telemetry signals and keep pace with the information on foreign missiles and space vehicles ever-changing technology of those signals. while they were being developed and tested, as well As described later in this brochure, the HARD- as a source of telemetry from military aircraft dur- BALL telemetry data collection system was one of ing their development. TELINT could also provide the major systems developed and installed for oper- much operational information on foreign satellites ational use in the late 1960s. This system design was and space vehicles. The National Security Agency optimized and located on Shemya Island, Alaska, (NSA) became responsible for U.S. TELINT under to collect data from Soviet intercontinental ballistic a Department of Defense (DoD) directive in 1959 missiles (ICBMs) that impacted in the Soviet Kam- as part of NSA’s electronic intelligence (ELINT) chatka peninsula test range impact area. HARD- responsibilities. TELINT prior to 1959 was being BALL could also collect data from Soviet military conducted by all of the DoD military departments. satellites that sent data to Soviet telemetry receiving All during the Cold War years, NSA contin- locations in the far eastern land area of the Soviet ued to sponsor or participate with the DoD mili- Union. tary departments and the National Reconnaissance 5 Telemetry Intelligence During The Cold War Context of the Early Cold War Just a bit later, he said: Missile and Space Intelligence From what I have seen of our Russian World War II was brought to a formal end just friends and allies during the war, I am con- as an increasing variety of new technologies was vinced that there is nothing for which they evolving into an entirely new class of weapon sys- have less respect than weakness, especially tems. The American development and use of the military weakness. For that reason the old atomic bomb, delivered by a conventional aircraft, doctrine of balance of power is unsound. is the most prominent example; however, Germany We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work had effectively used guided cruise missiles (the V-1 on narrow margins, offering temptations to series) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (the a trial of strength.1 V-2 series) in significant numbers. Fortunately for His observations became a new strategic doc- the Allies, Germany had only conventional high- trine, to avoid narrow margins of power, which was explosive warheads on its missiles. Neither the soon implemented. Soviet Union nor the United States paused in their weapon system developments during the Cold War. The tension was real, not imagined, and the pace Winston Churchill summarized the world situa- of advanced weapon systems development increased. tion in his now-famous speech given at Westmin- Thomas Reed, secretary of the U.S. Air Force at that ster College in Fulton, MO, on 5 March 1946. He time, has written a book on weapons2 that provides titled his speech “The Sinews of Peace,” although his personal view of the Cold War and the associ- today it is usually called “The Iron Curtain Speech.” ated arms race. It contains information about the Only about six months after the formal conclusion atomic and hydrogen bomb developments, ICBM of World War II, it was clear that the Soviet Union developments, and related intelligence systems and had a very serious agenda of world domination. In activities. a portion of that speech, Churchill put it this way: On the weapons delivery side of the weapons I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires development activity: war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power • The Soviet Union successfully tested its first 3 and doctrines. But what we have to consider ICBM, the R-7, on 21 August 1957. here today while time remains, is the per- • The Soviet Union launched the world’s first manent prevention of war and the establish- artificial satellite, Sputnik, on 4 October 1957 ment of conditions of freedom and democ- using a modified R-7 as the booster. racy as rapidly as possible in all countries. • The United States successfully conducted its Our difficulties and dangers will not be first full-range (5,500 nautical miles) ICBM removed by closing our eyes to them. They test, with the series B ATLAS, on 28 Novem- 4 will not be removed by mere waiting to see ber 1958. what happens; nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement.... 6 Post-World War II Analytic Challenges Post-World War II Analytic Challenges weapons were deployed, operational readiness and for Intelligence Analysts the detailed functionality of the command and con- trol systems became essential intelligence targets. New technologies and applications always pres- ent both challenges and opportunities to the weap- Sometimes it was not easy to even determine on system developers and to those in the intelligence the location or timing of a test flight. The huge community who must determine, from the outside, landmass of the Soviet Union presented challenges. not only general developments, but also detailed There were many test ranges and impact areas. Most technical information. Our intelligence community of these key areas were inaccessible to our existing had many new challenges. intelligence systems. As a result, many new collec- tion and sensor systems were developed and oper- U.S. Cold War missile systems intelligence ana- ated. There were many types of both platforms and lysts faced an array of questions: sensors, including radar, infrared, optical, and, of • What type of propulsion systems are being course, TELINT. Military units from all services used? were involved, as were all segments of the intelli- • What is their power? gence community and many of our allies. • What is their fuel composition? • How reliable are the boosters? No single “technical” (e.g., TELINT, ELINT) • How much weight can they lift? sensor system could provide the data required to • What is the range