Chapter 7 ‘In the Dark’ Nocturnal Visualities and Concealment at Night In the preceding chapter, discussions of knowing, simulating and transforming the British landscape focused primarily upon observations made during day-light hours. However, as the war progressed, and the Luftwaffe began to shift their efforts towards a night-time bombing campaign, it was realised within civil camouflage that the transition to nocturnal forms of concealment should be made in order to protect industrial buildings. This evolution, though, would present somewhat unique and previously un- encountered challenges. Indeed, it was accentuated that the visual and perceptual conditions of the night would require the evaluation and re-thinking of existing knowledge of the ‘bomber body’, and in line with this, the appraisal of ‘active’ approaches to camouflage. An important aspect of this shift was to acknowledge that, although, on the one hand, the night significantly diminished the capacity to visually appreciate and engage with the landscape, on the other, there continued to be ‘fleeting’ moments when the landscape would become visually present, enabling topographical landforms to still be interpreted and analysed from the air (albeit in different ways to day-time observations). In these visual and atmospheric conditions, the role of the camoufleur, therefore, was to produce methods of concealment which exploited and manipulated this visual environment defined by a more unsettled and unstable threshold between presence and absence. In the first half of this chapter, I explore the transition towards nocturnal camouflage, commencing with some of the early engagements with the night-time landscape by civil camoufleurs. As part of this, I illustrate how they initially sought to make use of an array of lighting technologies in order to ‘baffle’, ‘dazzle’ and ‘deceive’ the nocturnal bomber body and how these ideas came into conflict with dominant popular and political imaginings of the ‘Blackout’ as a space of shelter and refuge. Following on from this, I highlight how a more sustained engagement with the night necessitated a re- connection with existing knowledge on the practices and visualities of the bomber body, with renewed investigations revealing the tactics being deployed by the Luftwaffe at 290 night as well as the specific techniques of the nocturnal aerial observer; subsequently, this revised knowledge would feed back into camouflage practice. In light of this, I examine how a reworked set of ‘aerial grammar’ was articulated about the visual conspicuousness of the landscape at night through the conducting of aerial survey flights during the winter of 1941/1942. The second half of the chapter, then, considers the ways in which these findings culminated in the modification of the viewing room and the techniques of simulation adopted within this space. Finally, the chapter discusses the reviewing of existing techniques of camouflage as well as the production of new methods, concluding with an assessment of the effectiveness of the various ideas and schemes proposed. 7.1: Early Attempts at Nocturnal Camouflage On the night of the 20th/21st May 1939, an Armstrong Whitworth Whitley bomber crew from No.10 Squadron, accompanied by a Mr Huddy (acting as a civilian observer for the A.R.P.D.) as well as Wing Commanders G.H. Mills and J.G.Hawtrey,1 were making observations around the Humber Estuary. The conditions were noted to be ‘dark with no moon’ with visibility varying from one mile to a thousand yards and low cloud and haze restricting the observations to 3000ft and under.2 The objective of the survey flight was to consider the effectiveness of Blackout regulations in the City of Hull and the large town of Scunthorpe, 16 miles to the South West. At Scunthorpe, it was recorded that: ‘the blackout…was complete, and…was only located at 0110 hours with the assistance of the marker beacon situated. The only light observed was a steady yellow light situated about 200 yards S.S.E. of the marker beacon’.3 For Hull, a much more conflicting assessment was given; in one report, it was remarked that at: ‘the beginning of the period the outlines of the City…were made discernible by the dim lighting of the streets, but later the blackout proved most effective and if it had not been for the marker beacons the city could not have been located’.4 1 Hawtrey would later be appointed to serve on the C.A.P. in November 1939. 2 TNA, HO186/208: Report on Humber Blackout Tests, Night of 20th/21st May 1939. 3 TNA, HO186/208: Report on Humber Blackout Tests, Night of 20th/21st May 1939. 291 In the view of Hawtrey and Mills, however: ‘the black-out of Hull itself was, we thought, poor and was certainly no better than Southampton in May 1938, and definitely worse than Leicester in January 1938. This we understand was because participation was purely voluntary. Most of the light probably came from private houses’.5 While these observations testify to an interest in the visual effectiveness of the ‘Blackout’, the survey flight was serving a dual purpose. As part of the flight, these observers were to assess one of the earliest forms of camouflage for nocturnal conditions, an experimental technique called ‘baffle lighting’. ‘Baffle lighting’ was a camouflage technique which entailed the use of artificial illumination to confuse the enemy bomber body as their location through the blurring of the distinctions between heavily and sparsely populated areas; electric light sources would be deployed around predominantly rural areas, ‘so as to make it appear lighted to the same extent as the built-up area with their exempted lighting lit’, thereby facilitating disorientation.6 Through this ‘merging’ effect, it was contended, ‘it might be possible, from the lighting point of view, not to require exempted lighting such as that at railway yards, ship-yards, blast furnaces, etc., to be turned out on a Red Warning’.7 As a result, it was maintained that industrial production could potentially continue during times of “air-raid action”.8 In the Humber test of May 1939, 4,000 hurricane lamps had been scattered around the estuary at regular intervals of ½ mile. From the aerial survey report of Mills and Hawtrey, it was clear that such a technique was considered to have great potential for mystifying enemy aircrews; 4 TNA, HO186/208: Report on Humber Blackout Tests, Night of 20th/21st May 1939. 5 TNA, HO186/208: Report on Humber Black-out, Wng Cmdr G.H. Mills, and Wng Cmdr J.G. Hawtrey, dated 14th June 1939. 6 TNA, HO186/975: CAM (P&O) Paper 3: Interim Report of the Camouflage (Policy and Organisation) Committee, dated 5th Apr 1940. 7 TNA, HO186/208: Interim Report of the Camouflage (Policy and Organisation) Committee, dated 5th Apr 1940. Under A.R.P., there were 3 warning grades. A ‘Yellow Warning’ indicated to the local populace that enemy aircraft were over Britain, a ‘Purple Warning’ suggested that the aircraft were coming in the direction of that particular location, and a ‘Red Warning’ signified that the attack was going to take place imminently upon that location. 8 TNA, HO186/975: CAM (P&O) Paper 3: Interim Report of the Camouflage (Policy and Organisation) Committee, dated 5th Apr 1940. 292 ‘we thought that the baffle lighting experiment was very encouraging indeed, and when the black-out really got started, we found it practically impossible to distinguish between chinks of light coming even from such a large place as Beverley, and the hurricane lamps themselves… the impression that the baffle lighting gave us was that of flying permanently over a large town which had not been successfully blacked out. A most confusing situation was produced by the impression that the town moved along with the aeroplane as it flew, as there were always about four lights showing down each lane of lights in every direction’.9 At the same time, it was acknowledged that further refinements of the technique would be required; ‘the hurricane lamps were visible from 3000ft but in the opinion of the observers they would have been invisible from 6000ft. They were not bright enough. It is possible that they were too evenly spaced and should NOT be layed [sic] out in straight lines. They might have proved more effective if an occasional clump of lights had been arranged’.10 With this in mind, it was proposed that ‘baffle lighting should be tested again as early as possible in…enforced [rather than voluntary] blackout conditions… [and] with lamps with cheap reflectors to increase their visibility [to 6,000ft]’, thereby proving the real value of this technique of deception.11 Following the experiment, a review of baffle lighting was undertaken by the Home Defence Committee, with the object being to employ the technique on a national level. In the process of these discussions, however, several issues were raised. Firstly, the expense of adopting the scheme on a large scale was considered to be problematic; ‘not only would the initial cost of the lamps assume considerable proportions, but…heavy charges would be incurred in maintenance and in respect of the personnel 9 TNA, HO186/208: Report on Humber Black-out, Wng Cmdr G.H. Mills, and Wng Cmdr J.G. Hawtrey, dated 14th June 1939. 10 TNA, HO186/208: Report on Humber Blackout Tests, Night of 20th/21st May 1939. 11 TNA, HO186/208: Report on Humber Black-out, Wng Cmdr G.H. Mills, and Wng Cmdr J.G. Hawtrey, dated 14th June 1939. 293 who would necessarily have to be employed to attend to the lamps and to see that the lights were kept burning’.12 Certainly, in the Humber trials: ‘the preparation of a satisfactory scheme for the experiment involved much work and a large number of volunteer helpers had to be employed to place the lamps in position and to see that they were not interfered with by unauthorised persons’.13 Following on from this was the perceived reaction to the presence of ‘unshielded’ lighting in imposed blackout conditions by the general public.