UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO The Metaphysics of Morality: A Dispositionalist Account A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by William Luke Robinson Committee in charge: Professor David O. Brink, Chair Professor Richard J. Arneson Professor Anthony Edwards Professor Alan C. Houston Professor Samuel C. Rickless 2005 Copyright William Luke Robinson, 2005 All rights reserved To my dad iv It is evident that we are at a primitive stage of moral development. Even the most civilized human beings have only a haphazard understanding of how to live, how to treat others, how to organize their societies. The idea that the basic principles of morality are known, and that the problems all come in their interpretation and application, is one of the most fantastic conceits to which our conceited species has been drawn. (The idea that if we cannot easily know it, there is no truth here is no less conceited.) Not all of our ignorance in these areas is ethical, but a lot of it is. And the idea of the possibility of moral progress is an essential condition of moral progress. None of it is inevitable. Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere If nothing further were at stake, I should not be particularly concerned about whether we believe in a ruly world or in an unruly one, for, not prizing the purity of our affirmations, I am not afraid that we might hold false beliefs. The problem is that our beliefs about the structure of the world go hand-in-hand with the methodologies we adopt to study it. The worry is not so much that we will adopt wrong images with which to represent the world, but rather that we will choose wrong tools with which to change it. We yearn for a better, cleaner, more orderly world than one that, to all appearances, we inhabit. But it will not do to base our methods on our wishes. We had better choose the most probable option and whenever possible hedge our bets. Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World v TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page................................................................................................................................ iii Dedication ...................................................................................................................................... iv Epigraphs......................................................................................................................................... v Table of Contents.......................................................................................................................... vi Vita ................................................................................................................................................viii Acknowledgements....................................................................................................................... ix Abstract............................................................................................................................................ x Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: Moral Generalism ....................................................................................................10 1. Moral Judgments and Moral Facts.............................................................................11 2. Moral Principles............................................................................................................17 3. Moral Generalism and Moral Thought, Practice, and Theory...............................23 4. From Moral Generalism to Moral Dispositionalism...............................................31 Chapter 2: Conflicts of Obligation ...........................................................................................33 1. Fixing Ideas ...................................................................................................................37 2. Conditional Obligatoriness .........................................................................................40 3. The Tendency to be Obligatory Overall...................................................................44 4. Conflicts of Obligation: A Dispositionalist Account.............................................50 5. Prima Facie Obligations and “Moral Obligations” .................................................57 Chapter 3: Moral Holism ...........................................................................................................66 1. Moral Holism................................................................................................................67 2. Moral Atomism.............................................................................................................78 3. The Additive Assumption and Moral Holism .........................................................88 4. Value Holism ................................................................................................................94 Chapter 4: A Defense of Moral Holism.................................................................................100 1. The Argument from Examples ................................................................................102 2. Holism and Universalizability...................................................................................110 3. The Aim of Ethical Theory.......................................................................................111 vi 4. Holism and Ontological Atomism...........................................................................117 5. Moral Holism and Moral Theory.............................................................................121 Chapter 5: Moral Dispositionalism.........................................................................................129 1. Moral Holism and Moral Generalism: General Moral Facts..............................131 2. Moral Holism and Moral Generalism: Right-making Factors............................138 3. Moral Holism and Moral Particularism...................................................................142 4. Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism.........................151 References ...................................................................................................................................162 vii VITA 1992 B.A. summa cum laude in History, Auburn University 1996 J.D. cum laude, University of Pennsylvania Law School 1996-1998 Attorney, Philadelphia, PA 1998-2005 Teaching Assistant, University of California, San Diego 2001 M.A. in Philosophy, University of California, San Diego 2005 Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of California, San Diego PUBLICATIONS “Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism,” Mind (forthcoming) viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The text of Chapter 3, Section 1, in part, and the text of Chapter 5, in part, have been submitted for publication (as a single paper). I am the sole author. ix ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION The Metaphysics of Morality: A Dispositionalist Account by William Luke Robinson Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy University of California, San Diego, 2005 Professor David O. Brink, Chair Each of the following theses is independently plausible: Principle: Morality is principled: right-making factors or moral reasons entail corresponding moral principles. Conflict: Conflicts of moral obligation are possible and metaphysically unproblematic (even if they can be quite difficult—or even impossible—to resolve). Holism: Whether a given factor contributes to the rightness or wrongness of an action may depend on factors other than itself; hence, what is a right-making factor or moral reason to in one case may not be one in another, or may even be a wrong-making factor or moral reason not to given suitable circumstances. Nevertheless, neither Conflict nor Holism has fared particularly well in ethical theory, perhaps because neither is obviously consistent with Principle. Moreover, on one influential account of moral principles, Conflict and Holism would seem to be inconsistent with Principle. On this account, moral principles state what Ross calls “prima facie obligations”. But if, as Ross appears to hold, prima facie obligations are not genuine obligations and genuine obligations cannot conflict, then Conflict is inconsistent with Principle. And if, as many hold, prima facie obligations correspond to factors that are x always right-making factors or moral reasons to , then Holism is inconsistent with Principle. An adequate moral metaphysic would reconcile these three theses: it would both show them to be mutually consistent and explain them. An adequate moral metaphysic would also explain why moral principles are capable of playing the prominent and important roles they play in moral thought, practice, and theory. In this dissertation, I develop a moral metaphysic that takes moral dispositions or powers to be the fundamental units of moral explanation—that is, a moral-theoretic dispositionalism. On this view, right-making factors just are factors that have the power to make actions (prima facie) obligatory, and moral principles ascribe moral dispositions to sorts or kinds of actions, states of affairs, beings, institutions, and the like. This view explains why moral principles can play the roles they do in moral thought, practice, and theory. It shows Principle, Conflict, and Holism to be mutually consistent. And it explains each of them.