SUBSTANCE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF MINDS IN DESCARTES AND LOCKE By EUGENIO E. ZALDIVAR A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 2012 1 © 2012 Eugenio E. Zaldivar 2 To Victoria and Maya, who make coming home better than anything else 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I thank the members of my supervisory committee and the Department of Philosophy for their guidance, instruction and support throughout my years of study. I thank my friends and family for their encouragement and patience, especially Ron Claypool for his comments and insight. Finally, I thank the chair of my committee, Stewart Duncan, for his incredible support and hard work which made this dissertation possible; his mentoring and advice have raised the level of my work to heights I could not attain alone. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................. 4 ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... 7 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 8 1.1 Introductory Remarks .......................................................................................... 8 1.2 Descartes ............................................................................................................ 9 1.3 Locke ................................................................................................................ 11 1.4 Summary Notes ................................................................................................ 13 2 THE ARGUMENT FOR REAL DISTINCTION ........................................................ 14 2.1 Introductory Remarks ........................................................................................ 14 2.2 Descartes’ Consistency .................................................................................... 15 2.3 Dualism and what the Epistemological Argument is not. .................................. 18 2.4 The Epistemological Argument ......................................................................... 20 2.5 Substances Are Identical With Their Principle Attributes .................................. 31 2.6 How do Principal Attributes Relate to Each Other? .......................................... 39 2.7 A Single Argument ............................................................................................ 47 2.8 Summary Notes ................................................................................................ 51 3 TRIALISM ............................................................................................................... 53 3.1 Introductory Remarks ........................................................................................ 53 3.2 Pluralism ........................................................................................................... 56 3.3 Hylomorphism ................................................................................................... 58 3.4 Mixed Modes .................................................................................................... 72 3.5 Summary Notes ................................................................................................ 85 4 DESCARTES’ SUBSTANCE AND CONTEMPORARY OBJECTIONS .................. 86 4.1 Introductory Remarks ........................................................................................ 86 4.2 Hobbes ............................................................................................................. 87 4.3 Gassendi ........................................................................................................... 96 4.4 Locke .............................................................................................................. 105 4.5 Summary Notes .............................................................................................. 113 5 MYSTERIOUS SUBSTRATA AND COMPLETE INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCES .... 114 5.1 Introductory Remarks ...................................................................................... 114 5.2 Substratum and Substance ............................................................................. 115 5 5.3 Bennett: The Embarrassment of Mysterious Substrata ................................... 130 5.4 McCann: The “No theory” Theory ................................................................... 135 5.5 Ayers: A Material Substance ........................................................................... 141 5.6 Summary Notes .............................................................................................. 158 6 THE LINK BETWEEN IDENTITY AND SUBSTANCE .......................................... 160 6.1 Introductory Remarks ...................................................................................... 160 6.2 A Link Between 2.23 and 2.27 ........................................................................ 161 6.3 Persons Are Modes ........................................................................................ 167 6.4 How Are Persons Related to Substance? ....................................................... 171 6.5 Are Persons Also Substance Sorts? ............................................................... 178 6.6 Thing-like Entities............................................................................................ 181 6.7 Summary Notes .............................................................................................. 187 7 PROPERTY DUALISM, SPIRITS AND SUPERADDED THOUGHT .................... 190 7.1 Introductory Remarks ...................................................................................... 190 7.2 Consistency Throughout 2.23 ......................................................................... 190 7.3 Was Locke a Dualist? ..................................................................................... 197 7.4 Superaddition .................................................................................................. 214 7.5 Simple Superaddition ...................................................................................... 223 7.6 Naturalistic Superaddition ............................................................................... 228 7.7 Summary Notes .............................................................................................. 231 8 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 235 LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 238 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .......................................................................................... 245 6 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy SUBSTANCE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF MINDS IN DESCARTES AND LOCKE By Eugenio E. Zaldivar December 2012 Chair: Stewart Duncan Major: Philosophy In this work I present an analysis of Rene Descartes’ and John Locke’s theories of substance and their ontology of minds. I first take a close look at each philosopher’s general theory of substance and then consider various interpretations of each theory. The picture that emerges of Descartes’ view is one in which he is absolutely confident in our ability to comprehend the nature of substance and to forge an understanding of our own minds based on that knowledge. He further concludes that there are only two kinds of substance and that minds are unmistakably immaterial substances. Locke’s understanding of substance is more cautious and grounded in our inescapable epistemic limits. His considered view of a mind is that it is, strictly speaking, a combination of a bare substratum and mental qualities. More specifically, a mind is a perfection that emerges from the proper arrangement of physical qualities. 7 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Introductory Remarks In this work I will present an analysis of Rene Descartes’ and John Locke’s theories of substance and their ontology of minds. I shall proceed by first taking a close look at each philosopher’s general theory of substance. In doing so, I will consider various interpretations of important aspects of each theory and either suggest alternative interpretations or provide novel arguments in defense of traditional positions. A natural question to ask at this point is “Why focus on Descartes and Locke?” Why work on both of them? This is a fair question. Descartes and Locke are often held up as the flag bearers of Rationalism and Empiricism. Indeed they are in many ways the central figures of these respective schools of thought. Subsequent philosophers such as Spinoza, Malebranche, Berkeley and Reid often felt the need to respond to Descartes and Locke. The latter group informing our understanding of, and even defining, the work of the former pair. In contemporary instruction and discussion the later Rationalists and Empiricists are often taught as evolutionary projects grounded in paradigms established by Descartes and Locke. Interestingly, Descartes and Locke are also often cast as philosophical antagonists; it is perhaps too easy to split them into opposed, or at least divergent, camps. Descartes the rationalist