Being Your Self: Identity, Metaphysics, and the Search for Authenticity by Lauren Bialystok A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto © Copyright by Lauren Bialystok 2009 ABSTRACT Being Your Self: Identity, Metaphysics, and the Search for Authenticity Lauren Bialystok Doctor of Philosophy 2009 Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto It has been widely held in our culture for centuries that one ought to “be oneself,” an imperative often referred to as authenticity. The meaning of authenticity, however, remains contested among philosophers and largely shapeless in most people’s minds. In order to make sense of this compelling idea, one must reconcile authenticity with the metaphysics of selfhood and identity. In all of its applications, ‘authenticity’ refers to a convergence between how something presents itself and what it actually is. Yet the marriage of authenticity, with its essentialist structure, and personal identity, with its built-in temporal openness, is prima facie dubious. Authenticity appeals to something true and unchanging, but a person’s identity evolves throughout her life. Furthermore, the ideal of “being oneself” requires that it also be possible to be “not oneself,” but it is difficult to explain how any individual could be other than who she is. I argue that previous theories of authenticity have not adequately negotiated these structural requirements. Heidegger provides an account of authenticity as a formal existential possibility for Dasein. Because of its restriction to ontological phenomena, his analysis fails to show what authenticity actually means for Dasein and how its authentic existence is connected to its identity. Sartre likewise describes authenticity as an ideal ontological state, but his belief in radical freedom translates into a denial of the metaphysics of identity that could explain the content of authenticity. Despite being the locus of the most influential twentieth century ii accounts, existentialism cannot capture authenticity because of its inability to investigate who one is and how certain choices are more or less essential to our selves. I pursue such an investigation by distinguishing between authenticity and related notions such as originality, sincerity, wholeheartedness, and narrative unity. I argue that authenticity must account for change in personal identity as well as the social and interpretive dimensions of selfhood without forfeiting the criterion that there is something true about who we are. In my view of authenticity as reflective consistency I argue that we can be ourselves by acting in accordance with our necessary dispositions in a certain situation. iii ACKOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis would never have come to fruition without the help of many people. First, my supervisor, Mark Kingwell, has been a tireless supporter and editor of my work since I first approached him with an inchoate idea for a dissertation over four years ago. His creative insights, helpful counsel, lightning-quick response to email, and constant encouragement have made this process not only possible, but enjoyable. My readers, Lambert Zuidervaart and Rebecca Comay, brought their formidable knowledge and critical thought to bear on my work, pointing out ways that I could improve while always cheering me on. Without Lambert’s skilful introductory course on Being and Time, I might never have had the confidence to pursue a thesis dealing with existentialism. I was fortunate to present sections of my work at various conferences, and would like to thank the graduate students at Harvard, MIT, and the University of Western Ontario, and members of the Canadian Philosophical Association and the Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy for their questions and feedback. Many friends and colleagues at the University of Toronto provided insightful comments on my work and enriched my philosophy education immeasurably: Farshid Baghai, Kirstin Borgerson, Danielle Bromwich, Lorraine Bruce, Rachel Bryant, Annette Dufner, Kevin Eldred, Kelin Emmett, Michael Garnett, Chad Horne, Marta Jimenez, Doug Mackay, Joseph Millum, Vida Panitch, Bronwyn Singleton, Brooks Sommerville, Timothy Stock, Chloe Taylor, Patrick Turmel, Marika Warren, and others. I would also like to thank several professors who were not on my thesis committee but supported my work and provided valuable help: Bob Gibbs, Jennifer Hawkins, Tom Hurka, and Amy Mullin. I also benefitted from participation at the University of Toronto’s Centre for Ethics, and would like to thank the other graduate associates for their feedback, suggestions, and stimulating discussion. I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support of my doctoral work. My debt to my family is incalculable. My parents, Drs. Ellen and Frank Bialystok, and my sister, Dr. Sandra Bialystok, who completed her dissertation while I was writing my own, blazed the trail and nurtured me with a rich intellectual environment and seasoned advice throughout this process. I have always been motivated and inspired by their example. Finally, this thesis is dedicated to my husband, Misha Abarbanel, who supported me not only in the obvious ways but also by simply being authentic. My love for him would have been essential on any version of our selves. iv CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1 I. Becoming Oneself from Socrates to Sartre 2 II. The Politics and Culture of Authenticity 9 CHAPTER 1: THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHENTICITY 17 I. The Good Turtle Soup or Merely the Mock? 18 II. Personal and Impersonal Authenticity 23 III. Essentialism and a Preliminary Word on Existentialism 28 IV. Clearing the Ground 31 CHAPTER 2: AUTHENTICITY IN BEING AND TIME 34 I. Dasein and Being 36 II. Phenomenology, Ontology, and Truth 38 III. Too Near, Yet Too Far 41 IV. “To Be or Not to Be Itself” 45 V. “Out of Itself into Itself” 49 VI. The Meta-Modes of Authenticity and Inauthenticity 57 VII. “Holding Death for True” 59 VIII. Angst, Anticipation, and Authenticity 66 IX. The Summons to One’s Own Self 70 X. “Making up for Not Choosing” 74 XI. The Circle of Authenticity and Fundamental Ontology 80 XII. Heidegger’s Limits 85 CHAPTER 3: SARTRE’S CONCEPTION OF AUTHENTICITY 87 I. The Role of Authenticity in Sartre 90 II. Bad Faith as Inauthenticity 94 III. Fleeing Ambiguity: Beauvoir on Bad Faith 106 IV. Bad Faith as Inconsistency 108 V. Good Faith 113 VI. Authenticity as the Abdication of Faith 121 VII. This Jew Which Is Not One 129 VIII. The “Extreme Difficulty of Achieving Authenticity” 135 CHAPTER 4: THE HUMANIST CHALLENGE 139 I. Identity and Totality 140 II. “Fearsome Authenticity” 146 III. Reading ‘Man’ 150 v IV. Intersubjective Authenticity 155 i. Retrieving Mitsein 155 ii. Beyond Domination and Submission 160 V. Ethics and Authenticity 162 i. Cosmopolitan Dasein 163 ii. Freedom as the First Value 170 VI. Taylor’s Horizons of Significance 178 CHAPTER 5: ACT AND CHARACTER 186 I. Coffee, Tea, or Me? 186 II. Authenticity and Desire Fulfillment 188 III. A Specification of Desire Fulfillment: Frankfurt’s Wholeheartedness 191 IV. Temporal Bias or Neutrality 199 V. Narrative Unity 204 VI. Tangled up in Blue 207 VII. Character and Personality 210 CHAPTER 6: SINCERITY AND SOCIETY 218 I. Divergent Roads 219 II. Madness, Psychosis, and Intoxication 223 III. Not False to Any Man 226 IV. Authenticity without Sincerity, Sincerity without Authenticity 232 V. Role-Playing and Shtick 236 VI. Performativity, or the Absence of Identity 241 VII. Gay by Nature, Authentic by Choice 244 VIII. Narrowing in on the True Self 251 CHAPTER 7: AUTHENTICITY AS REFLECTIVE CONSISTENCY 253 I. The Reflective Consistency Account of Authenticity 253 II. Using the Past to Understand the Present 258 III. Objections to the Account 261 IV. Act Naturally 271 V. Conflicts within the Self 274 VI. Consequences of the Account 277 VII. The Value of Authenticity 283 EPILOGUE: EVEN BETTER THAN THE REAL THING 292 BIBLIOGRAPHY 297 vi INTRODUCTION It has been widely held in our culture for several centuries that each person is an individual endowed with unique characteristics and possibilities. To be human is not to follow a formula of human-ness, nor to plod through life as an undifferentiated member of the species; rather, to lead a human life – at least a fulfilling one – is usually thought to require honouring what it means to be human for me as a once-occurring person. The Western conception of selfhood to which we have become accustomed thus corresponds to an ethical ideal of how to live one’s life. Despite the centuries-long debate over how we ought to live, one conclusion has remained almost constant: one ought, if nothing else, to be oneself. One ought, in other words, to be authentic. The value of authenticity is so easily accepted as to be invisible: whether the context is personal identity, cuisine, ethnic artifacts, or works of art, authenticity is one of those rare qualities that are considered good without qualification. Conversely, inauthentic things or people are almost universally discredited as “fake,” “unoriginal” or “shams.” While these aesthetic and moral judgments occur frequently in both academic and non-academic discourse, however, we have no robust definition of authenticity to justify these assessments. What it means for a person to actually “be authentic” is left suspiciously vague, even as we insist again and again on the importance of authentic living. My project is to subject the possibility of personal authenticity to a careful philosophical analysis and conclude with a constructive account of its actual meaning. I am interested in both the metaphysical structure of authenticity and its putative value. The structure is problematic because it requires objective measures of reality that are incongruous with our normal beliefs 1 2 about selfhood. Without a firm explanation of how authenticity applies to personal identity and how it is to be distinguished from inauthenticity, both the meaning and value of this notion are philosophically suspect.