PERCEIVED SALAFI-JIHADI EXCEPTIONALISM AND ITS EFFECTS ON CVE (COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM) POLICY ____________________________________ A Thesis Presented to The Honors Tutorial College Ohio University _______________________________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Graduation from the Honors Tutorial College with the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Science ______________________________________ by Matthew N. Thomas April 2019 1 Table of Contents Title Page ……………………………………………………………………………………..…………………………………….1 Table of Contents …………………………………………………………………………………………………..…………..2 Chapter One: Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………..……………….3 Chapter Two: The Case for Islamic Exceptionalism ……………………………………………….………….35 Chapter Three: Case Study: The Islamic State ..…………………………………………………………..…...59 Chapter Four: Case Study: Northern Ireland ………………………………………….……………..……..….90 Chapter Five: Examination of Findings …………………………………………………….………..…………..109 Works Cited ……………………………………………………………………………………………..……………………130 Approval Page ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….136 2 Chapter 1: Introduction America’s ‘War on Terror’ has been a cornerstone of US foreign policy for nearly two decades now. Although what is commonly understood to be terrorism has been in existence long before the 9/11 attack, it is only after that event that there is a major shift in policy approaches to this phenomenon. This comes about for many reasons, but the most prominent catalyst for this change is how people understand and conceptualize the nature of these threats. The violent extremist organizations that have risen to the focus during the beginning of the century are those who claim to be motivated by Islamic beliefs, sparking a worldwide debate on the nature of not only these groups, but of Islam as well. The discussion on whether Islam was similar to other religions or stood in a category of its own circulated and remains as the foundation for how groups that claim that their operations and goals are inspired by Islam are understood. The idea that Islam is inherently different than other religions and because of this, is less likely to naturally arrive at the conditions for democracy within a state is called ‘Islamic exceptionalism.’ The groups that are perceived through this lens are almost exclusively Salafi-Jihadi in nature and are said to seek to promote what they claim is the only true form of Islam. This focus on the religious dimension of violent extremism is a newer phenomenon. As the idea of Islamic exceptionalism spread, counterterrorism policy grew to adapt to the changing circumstances and evolved into what is known today as CVE policy. This shift was necessitated by the increase of the interest in Salafi-Jihadi violent extremist organizations and 3 meant as a new response to what seemed like a new type of group. This intentional policy shift is a component of Salafi-Jihadi exceptionalism, the idea that these groups are inherently different than non-Salafi-Jihadi groups and therefore must be treated differently. But these groups are not different, they follow the same structures, pursue recruitment in similar ways, and have the same operational challenges as regular organizations as well as other violent extremist groups. The traction that the idea of Salafi-Jihadi exceptionalism had gained continues to grow as the focus on these groups deepen. To America, Salafi-Jihadi organizations represent the greatest threat to the homeland and so many resources have been devoted to ending these groups. The programs that are issued as a response are flawed and detrimental to advocating for peace. Even though it has been shown that violent extremist groups are most likely to end through integrations into the political practice rather than through sustained military campaigns,1 the US and Europe have primarily sought a military solution to the conflict. Why is this happening? What underlying assumptions about the nature of Salafi-Jihadi groups are preventing these actors from using proven tactics such as negotiation to seek the cessation of violence? The rhetoric centered around this issue further makes the idea of the ‘War on Terror’ seem like a narrative of the classical style war even though it isn’t one. The idea of war draws to mind an anticipation of military force by both parties and calls forth the idea of surrender as the likely and desirable endgame. Islamic exceptionalism, as evidenced by politician quotes, public policy briefs, and popular opinion polls, remains a popular discussion piece in the public sphere 1 Seth G Jones and Martin C Libicki, “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida” (RAND Corporation, 2008). 4 and undoubtedly impacts the ways people believe groups like the Islamic State should be treated. What is being observed is an intellectual block surrounding these issues of Salafi-Jihadi violent extremism. For some reason, policymakers can’t seem to find the right way to interact with these groups because they are believed to be an innately different threat than they have ever encountered. This perception had to come from somewhere and has to have some underlying reasons for nearly universal adoption. What are the reasons for believing that Salafi- Jihadi violent extremist groups are inherently different than other violent extremist organizations, and why does this perception mean that they must be interacted with in a different way in terms of policy decisions aimed at ultimately securing peace in the regions where they are active? Why have US policies towards violent extremism taken on new characteristics in the two decades since the iconic “War on Terror” was announced? Have these policy changes and decisions aided or hindered the ultimate goal or sustainable peace and why? In this thesis, I will discuss how the idea of Salafi-Jihadi exceptionalism has impacted policy decisions aimed at preventing and/or countering Salafi-Jihadi violent extremism through an analysis on how Islam is conceptualized worldwide, both by Muslims and non-Muslims, and an in-depth analysis of two case studies: the Islamic State and the Irish Republican Army. These cases were chosen because both groups express a commitment to religion and present a religious understanding to their violence, however the global reaction to both groups were vastly different. Because the conflict in Northern Ireland occurred before the language of modern CVE was developed, we can use this comparison to understand how counterterror 5 measures were undertaken without regards to the ideological absolutism that is applied to groups like the Islamic State. In my first chapter, I will provide information on how the idea of Salafi-Jihadism understands itself in relation to other interpretations of Islam, as well as underline the sociopolitical nature of group membership and how people come to make the choice to join a violent extremist organization and engage in violence. The second chapter outlines the argument for Islamic exceptionalism, including evidence of its prevalence in Western society, and seeks to disprove it using information from sources such as Islamic holy texts, public opinion data, and comprehensive analyses of the World Values Survey. My case study on the Islamic State spans the third chapter, which discusses the origin and organizational structures of the group and demonstrates how the lens of Salafi-Jihadi exceptionalism is applied in practice. This chapter also contains information on how US foreign policy has sought to interact with the group in a primarily militaristic way with very little willingness to seek other strategies. The fourth chapter is comprised of my second case study, which addresses multiple actors within the conflict in Northern Ireland but focuses primarily on the Irish Republican Army. This chapter acts as a mirror to the previous chapter and explains how the global attitude on a peace process involving all parties, including the IRA, facilitated a settlement that has lasted to this day. Finally, chapter five cements the detrimental effect the idea of Salafi-Jihadi exceptionalism has on efforts to seek peace in areas where these groups are present. It compares the two cases and brings in outside data to demonstrate that violent extremist groups come to an end more often through integration into the political process than through military defeat, and suggests that the Western conception of Salafi-Jihadi exceptionalism 6 presents them with an ideological block that makes pursuing negotiations and compromise seem unfeasible and abhorrent. Salafism and Jihad Salafi-Jihadism arises in and is a direct product of the modern world system. This time period is characterized by two basic things: the emergence of the modern state, and the establishment of a global economy.2 Without the conception of a modern state, Salafi-Jihadism as it is known today would not exist. It has arisen as a response to the state of world affairs and draws from the feeling that many people in Islamic societies are experiencing that they have been ‘left behind’ by the Western world. “Many Muslims feel very strongly not only that the West never made serious amends for the past suffering and oppression it inflicted on them, but that it is currently engaged in a renewed effort to victimize and oppress them.”3 Those living in post-colonial societies still experience the lasting burdens that imperialism has left on their countries—poverty, governmental instability, and underdevelopment, to name a few—while also struggling to adapt to a world