THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA Aristotle on Nature and the Moral Life A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Philosophy Of The Catholic University of America In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree Doctor of Philosophy By Margaret Ross Cecere Washington, D.C. 2014 Aristotle on Nature and the Moral Life Margaret Ross Cecere, Ph.D. Director: Jean De Groot, Ph.D. Aristotle‘s teleological view of nature has become increasingly difficult to understand and to accept the further we move from him in time. The goal of this dissertation is to offer a way of looking at Aristotle‘s teleology that will make it more accessible to the contemporary reader while remaining true to Aristotle‘s vision of nature. I compare his account of nature to his theory of moral action. Since Aristotle‘s natural teleology is directly related to his definition of nature as an inborn principle of change or rest, the dissertation begins by examining Aristotle‘s understanding of nature, focusing on the convergence of formal, final, and efficient causes in natural objects. For Aristotle, natural objects possess their own principles of change and rest and are therefore directed from within their own being. This means that natural processes are not simply the result of objects external to them acting in accordance with natural laws. The dissertation then distinguishes Aristotle‘s account of natural causality from that of modern mechanism and further distinguishes it from the account he gives of the causality at work in artifacts, both of which lack the convergence of causes that Aristotle sees in natural objects. I argue that the concept of energeia, actuality, lies at the heart of Aristotle‘s account of natural objects and is necessary for understanding the convergence of causes he finds there. The dissertation contrasts Aristotle‘s teleology with the contemporary functionalist account, again focusing on the role of energeia. The most common analogy for understanding nature in Aristotle has been making, i.e., craftsmanship or the design and production of artifacts. The dissertation concludes by arguing that Aristotle describes the moral life in a way that in some respects parallels the teleology found in nature. In particular, the orientation of the moral life toward human flourishing highlights the concept of energeia, and to that extent provides a better model for natural objects than artifacts do. After considering the benefits and drawbacks of both the moral life and artifact models, we propose the moral life as a supplementary model for natural teleology. This dissertation by Margaret Ross Cecere fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in philosophy approved by Jean De Groot, Ph.D., as Director, and by Richard Hassing, Ph.D., and Tobias Hoffmann, Ph.D., as Readers. _____________________________ Jean De Groot, Ph.D., Director _____________________________ Richard Hassing, Ph.D., Reader _____________________________ Tobias Hoffmann, Ph.D., Reader ii To my parents iii Contents Introduction ....................................................................................................................................1 I. A Brief History of Teleology............................................................................................1 II. Natural Sources of Obscurity ..........................................................................................8 III. Aristotelian Teleology .................................................................................................22 III.1 Aἴtia as Causes, Aἴtia as Explanations .....................................................23 III.2 Immanent and Universal Teleology ...............................................................38 IV. Outline of the Dissertation ...........................................................................................44 1 The Debate over Teleology and Mechanism ..................................................................47 I. What is ―Mechanism‖? ...................................................................................................47 I.1 Mechanism in Modernity..................................................................................48 I.2 Mechanism in Contemporary Philosophy of Science.......................................49 I.3 Mechanism in the Literature on Aristotle‘s Natural Philosophy ......................53 II. Debate: Is Non-Teleological Causation Present in Aristotle‘s Account of Nature? .....58 II.1 Soft Compatibilism .........................................................................................58 II.2 Hard Compatibilism ........................................................................................60 III. Teleological and Non-Teleological Causation in Aristotle .........................................65 III.1 The Non-Teleological ....................................................................................66 III.2 The Relationship Between Teleological and Non-Teleological Causation ...67 III.3 Why Is Natural Teleology Necessary? ..........................................................71 III.4 Aristotle‘s Proof of Natural Teleology ..........................................................77 III.5 Hypothetical Necessity and the Role of Form in Natural Processes .............84 III.6 The Value of the Debate over Compatibilism ...............................................92 IV. Final Cause as TÕ Oá Ἕneka ....................................................................................94 2 The Convergence of Formal, Efficient, and Final Cause ...........................................102 I. Form and Final Cause ...................................................................................................103 I.1 The Weaker Senses of Eἶdoj: Form as Accidental Being and as the Being Specified by a Definition ................................................................................105 I.2 Form, Nature, and Efficient Cause .................................................................111 I.3 The Convergence of Formal and Final Cause Through Efficient Cause ........116 II. The Role of Form in Teleology ...................................................................................123 II.1 Actuality: ἖nέrgeia and ἖ntelέceia .......................................................124 II.2 ‗Éxij as Δi£qesij and ἖nέrgeia ...............................................................129 II.3 Levels of Actuality and Form: Δi£qesij, ἖nέrgeia, and ἖ntelέceia ....134 3 Aristotle and Contemporary Teleology .......................................................................146 I. Contemporary Teleology ..............................................................................................148 II. Making Aristotle Our Contemporary ..........................................................................158 II.1 The Functionalist Account of Form ..............................................................162 II.2 Why Aristotle Is Not a Functionalist.............................................................175 iv 4 Poίηsiς and the Artifact Model ..................................................................................183 I. Modeling Natural Poίηsiς ..........................................................................................183 I.1 Poίηsiς .........................................................................................................187 II. The Artifact Model ......................................................................................................193 II.1 Tšcnh ............................................................................................................195 II.2 The Benefits of the Artifact Model ...............................................................199 II.3 The Inadequacy of the Artifact Model ..........................................................205 5 Pr©xiς and the Moral Life ...........................................................................................214 I. Pr©xiς as a Model for Natural Teleology ..................................................................215 I.1 Pr©xij as ἖nšrgeia ....................................................................................216 I.2 Pr©xij as Action Done for Its Own Sake ....................................................222 I.3 Types of Pr©xij: Pleasure vs. Moral Action ................................................238 II. The Model of Moral Action ........................................................................................241 II.1 The General Structure of Moral Action ........................................................241 II.2 Causal Convergence in Moral Action ...........................................................245 II.3 The Moral as a Mirror for the Natural...........................................................246 6 Limitations, Objections, and Replies ...........................................................................252 I. Limitations of the Moral Model .......................................................................252 II. Natural Pr©xij? ............................................................................................262 III. Morality as Poietic .........................................................................................267 Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................272 I. Old Debates ..................................................................................................................273