UC Irvine Law Review Volume 9 | Issue 4 Article 6 5-2019 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: HOW THIRTEEN DAYS CHANGED THE WORLD Edward A. Danielyan Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons Recommended Citation Edward A. Danielyan, CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: HOW THIRTEEN DAYS CHANGED THE WORLD, 9 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 989 (2019). Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol9/iss4/6 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in UC Irvine Law Review by an authorized editor of UCI Law Scholarly Commons. Final to Printer_Danielyan (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2019 6:35 PM CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: HOW THIRTEEN DAYS CHANGED THE WORLD Edward A. Danielyan Throughout her Negotiation and Mediation course at the University of California, Irvine School of Law, Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow1 instructed her students to be prudent, diligent, creative and cooperative negotiators. This note is based on an assignment from Professor Menkel-Meadow’s course and is thus subject to inherent limitations in its scope. As a renowned national and international expert in alternative dispute resolution (ADR), Professor Menkel-Meadow facilitated the growth and frequency of use of ADR in the United States since the late 1970s and early 1980s,2 and has continued to develop this field of study to present day.3 This note focuses on three concepts that make a negotiator effective: (1) necessity of strategic and thorough preparation before negotiations; (2) use of framing and establishment of reputation during negotiations; and (3) flexibility in resorting to facilitated mediation. My analysis of these concepts is discussed through the thirteen days of negotiations Edward Aleksandrovich Danielyan is a Juris Doctor candidate at the University of California, Irvine School of Law. 1. Professor Menkel-Meadow is a founder of the dispute resolution field. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, UCI LAW, https://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/menkel-meadow/ [https://perma.cc/845B- 828Y] (last visited Apr. 5, 2019). In addition to a plethora of other awards, the first-ever Award for Outstanding Scholarly Work, presented by the American Bar Association’s Dispute Resolution section, was presented to Professor Menkel-Meadow, who was lauded as a “tireless, prolific and influential researcher and writer” who put forth the transformative idea of “lawyer as problem solver” twenty-five years ago. Id. Published in dozens of books and articles, Professor Menkel-Meadow has also taught at some of the most prestigious legal institutions in the United States and worldwide. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Curriculum Vitae, https://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/menkel- meadow/menkelmeadowCV.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3PZ-BHWE] (last visited Apr. 5, 2019). 2. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Regulation of Dispute Resolution in the United States of America: From the Formal to the Informal to the ‘Semi-formal’, in REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 419 (Felix Steffek et al. eds., 2013). 3. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1. 989 Final to Printer_Danielyan (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2019 6:35 PM 990 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:989 between President John F. Kennedy (JFK) and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev (Khrushchev) during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. This paper is divided into two major components. First, I will analyze the United States’ initial contemplation in response to evidence of the Soviet Union’s construction of offensive-weapon bases in Cuba. Then, I will analyze the correspondences between JFK and Khrushchev leading up to the United Nations-based mediation sessions. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 990 INITIAL CONTEMPLATION .................................................................................. 991 Prepare Well for Negotiations ......................................................................... 991 Strike: Factual Background ...................................................................... 991 Strike: Analysis ........................................................................................... 992 Blockade/Quarantine: Factual Background ......................................... 994 Blockade/Quarantine: Analysis .............................................................. 995 COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN JFK AND KHRUSHCHEV ..................... 997 Frame Your Position, but Remain Open to Mediation. .............................. 997 Announcement/Quarantine .................................................................... 997 Post-Quarantine ......................................................................................... 998 Negotiation and Mediation .................................................................... 1000 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 1001 INTRODUCTION It is important to recognize the existence of dozens of considerations and factors leading up to the October 1962 negotiations between JFK and Khrushchev. Due to the nature of this paper, I am unable to provide an exhaustive synopsis of every relevant consideration affecting both parties during this international conflict. Furthermore, this Note takes a somewhat oversimplified approach to the multi- lateral aspect of international negotiations; I excluded mention of JFK’s and Khrushchev’s advisors (such as Robert Kennedy), foreign ministers, military commanders, and other relevant parties directly involved in the behind-the-scenes strategy making processes. Although there is a voluminous amount of sources available regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis, the inherently complex nature of international disputes— e.g. the effects on the global perception of a state’s foreign policy, image, and strength—are also largely omitted from this Note. As such, this Note’s narrow scope is geared towards the procedural, tactical, and analytical elements of the thirteen days of negotiations between JFK and Khrushchev. The main sources guiding my discussion are: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962;4 Reflections on the Cuban 4. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962 (Laurence Chang & Peter Kornbluh eds., 1992). Final to Printer_Danielyan (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2019 6:35 PM 2019] CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 991 Missile Crisis;5 Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962;6 The Great Negotiations;7 Negotiation: Processes for Problem Solving;8 Getting to Yes;9 and Art of the Deal.10 INITIAL CONTEMPLATION Prepare Well for Negotiations On October 16, 1962, JFK along with the National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and other top advisors (collectively, The Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm)), received images of Soviet medium- range ballistic missile bases under construction in Cuba.11 ExComm faced a difficult decision of how to respond to the Soviet Union’s actions. Although ExComm and JFK contemplated various options, my analysis focuses on two possible responses to the pending threat emanating ninety miles from U.S. soil: (1) eliminating the bases through air and ground strikes; or (2) instituting a blockade on Soviet ships carrying weapons to Cuba.12 The deliberations between JFK and ExComm in choosing an adequate response to Soviet actions in Cuba best resemble conducting substantive legal research prior to a negotiation. Specifically, preparing for a negotiation by carefully analyzing the parameters of the issue allows a party to approach conflict resolution in an effective and anticipatory manner, likely yielding better results. Strike: Factual Background ExComm unanimously recognized the need to eliminate the Soviet missile bases from Cuba, because the bases posed a high risk to the U.S. national security.13 JFK and his advisors initially approached accomplishing this need by contemplating an air strike because: (1) it would include the element of surprise since the Soviet Union was not aware of the United States’ knowledge of the bases; (2) there was a sense of urgency to act because the bases were not yet operational; and (3) the air strike would quickly alleviate the immediate Soviet threat in Cuba.14 Additionally, conducting an air strike would illustrate the strength of the United States in the 5. RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF, REFLECTIONS ON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (2d ed. 1989). 6. TIM COATES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962: SELECTED FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS FROM THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY, JANUARY 1961–NOVEMBER 1962 (2002). 7. FREDRIK STANTON, GREAT NEGOTIATIONS: AGREEMENTS THAT CHANGED THE MODERN WORLD (2011). 8. CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., NEGOTIATION: PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING (2d ed. 2014). 9. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN. (3d ed., 2011). 10. DONALD TRUMP, THE ART OF THE DEAL (1987). 11. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 77. 12.Id. at 78. 13.Id. at 79. 14.Id. Final to Printer_Danielyan (Do Not Delete) 6/7/2019 6:35 PM 992 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:989 international arena as a major superpower. Once the option of an air strike was on the list of possible United States responses, ExComm began further deliberations, engaging in a fuller analysis of the implications and consequences of military action.15 Air Force officials stated the air strike would need to be massive against Cuba rather than a surgical one, and at best, it would only eliminate 60-90 percent of the missiles in Cuba.16 Furthermore,