Intimacy at a Distance: A History of United States-Singapore Foreign Relations from 1965 to 1975 A thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University. Wei Boon Chua March 2014 Declaration of Original Work I, Wei Boon Chua, declare that, except where otherwise acknowledged, this thesis is entirely my own work. Sign: i Acknowledgements I thank God for His unceasing love, abiding grace and manifold blessings that carried me though this PhD journey. I thank little Eliza and Emily for being the highlight of my days in Canberra. I look forward to coming home each day to bask in the love, joy and laughter that you share with me, and cannot imagine doing a PhD without the two of you. I thank my family in Singapore for their love and support. Most of all, I thank Grace for her courage to give up the life that we are used to in Singapore and to begin a whole new chapter in a foreign land. I dedicate this thesis to her. I am indebted to Robert Cribb who has taught me to write and to think critically about my sources and arguments. Thank you, Robert, for agreeing to supervise my doctoral research and supporting the application of my candidature. I thank Douglas Craig who has been influential at critical junctures throughout the writing of this dissertation and always finds time to listen to my ideas and read my drafts. I thank Benjamin Schreer who has been an indispensable critic for my ideas and strengthening my grasp on International Relations and Security Studies. I thank Greg Fealy for taking an interest in my project at the initial stage and urging me to conduct interviews during my fieldwork. Andrea Benvenuti gave me my first lesson on the use of archival sources when we met in London during my fieldwork. I am especially grateful for his help in checking the accuracy of the maps used in this dissertation. My teachers and mentors in Singapore inspired my interest in history and rendered invaluable support before and during my candidature. I thank Rahil Ismail for igniting my passion for history, Ang Cheng Guan for introducing me to Southeast Asian diplomatic history and Joey Long for inspiring my research topic. I would like to acknowledge the generosity and help from the former President of Singapore, Mr S.R. Nathan, who agreed to be interviewed under the recommendation of Ang Cheng Guan. The insights that Mr Nathan shared during the interview pointed me to the most relevant and crucial sources that I needed from the archives in Britain and the United States. Without the help and resourcefulness of staff at the Australian National University and the archives, this dissertation would have taken much longer to complete. I thank Jo Bushby, Penelope Judd, Sandie Walters and Geoff Collin at the ANU for their administrative and IT support. The maps used in this dissertation are created by Jennifer Sheehan from CartoGIS, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific. ii Maxine McArthur did an excellent job of proofreading my final draft. I am grateful for the help rendered by archivists and staff at The National Archives in Kew, US National Archives in College Park, National Archives of Australia, National Archives of Singapore, and the Presidential Libraries of Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and the School of Culture, History and Language at the ANU provided me with tutoring opportunities, which provided income and developed my ability to teach. Fieldwork conducted in Singapore, the UK and the US was made possible by the generous research funding from the School of Culture, History and Language. The Academy of Korean Studies funded my administrative position at the ANU Korea Institute, which provided financial stability during my candidature. I would like to thank Hyaeweol Choi, Roald Maliangkay and Ruth Barraclough of the Institute for their guidance, support and friendship. This PhD project would have ended prematurely if not for the support of Ken George. Thank you, Ken, for making this possible. Sections of Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation have been used for an article accepted for publication by Asian Studies Review under the title “Revisiting Lee Kuan Yew’s 1965-66 Anti-Americanism”. Sections of Chapters 6 and 7 have been used for an article currently under consideration for publication at the Australian Journal of Politics and History under the title “Becoming a Good Nixon Doctrine Country: Political Relations between the United States and Singapore during the Nixon Presidency”. I thank the editor and anonymous reviewers at Asian Studies Review for their invaluable comments on my work. Whereas many individuals have contributed towards the improvement of this dissertation, I take sole responsibility for the arguments made and errors that might arise. iii Abstract Singapore became an independent state on 9 August 1965, six months after United States forces landed in Vietnam in March 1965. As part of an effort to contain the influence of the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China in Southeast Asia, Washington deployed a strategy that encompassed political, economic and defence engagements with non-communist countries in the region. Because of its strategic location and significant population of overseas Chinese, Singapore became a key country in Washington’s policy towards Southeast Asia. Between 1965 and 1975, Washington aimed to maintain its access to Singapore’s naval dockyards and to keep the island state’s economy viable, so as to limit the risk of communist subversion in Singapore. The Singapore government’s objectives were to preserve its legitimacy to govern by developing Singapore’s economy and boosting its security during the Cold War. In order to gain international recognition of its independence after separation from Malaysia, the Singapore government decided to join the Non-aligned Movement and maintained an image of neutralism in the bipolar conflict between the US and the USSR. After a rocky start in the US-Singapore relationship in late 1965, America’s relations with Singapore improved in 1966. Nevertheless, the Singapore government seemed to distance itself from the US while drawing nearer to the Soviet Union between the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Drawing from archival documents from the United States, Britain and Australia, this dissertation presents a history of US-Singapore foreign relations during the period of the Vietnam War, and argues that relations between the two countries were determined by the interplay of America’s policy of containment and Singapore’s attempt at projecting a non-aligned foreign policy stance. Although the first decade of Singapore’s independence established the United States as an indispensable contributor to Singapore’s economic growth and security during the Cold War, the process was not always smooth because the leaders in both countries recognised that their interests were best met when Singapore and the US maintained political distance from each other. This study adds to a current trend in Cold War historiography in Southeast Asia by demonstrating how American strategy was influenced by smaller states such as Singapore. The Singapore government attempted to sway US strategy in the region and was able to achieve its goals when it played the Soviet card. Non-communist Southeast iv Asian leaders, including Lee Kuan Yew, exerted pressure on the US government to maintain troops in Vietnam and prolonged the Vietnam war. This study establishes a link between a prosperous Southeast Asia and a Vietnam that became a war zone and proposes that Singapore was able to prosper not only due to good governance, but also because of America’s interest in keeping Singapore economically viable. v Contents Acknowledgements ii Abstract iv Abbreviations vii Dramatis Personae ix Map of Commonwealth Bases in Singapore xiii Map of Commonwealth Bases in Malaysia xiv Introduction 1 Part 1 Avoiding Proximity: From Conflict to Common Interests Chapter 1 American Containment and Singapore Survival 22 Finding Common Ground Chapter 2 “Never the Americans” 48 Behind Lee Kuan Yew's Anti-American Press Campaign Chapter 3 United States-Singapore Entente 68 Removing Doubts and Building Trust Part 2 Keeping at Arm's Length: Securing Singapore's Future Chapter 4 Resolving the British Withdrawal 92 US-Singapore Defence Cooperation After East of Suez Chapter 5 Activating Singapore's Economy 131 US Economic Diplomacy in Singapore Part 3 Strategic Distancing: Balancing Non-Alignment and Containment Chapter 6 Catching the Cold 153 Obstacles in US-Singapore Relations Chapter 7 From Nixon to Ford 179 Cementing US-Singapore Relations Conclusion 212 Sources and Bibliography 216 vi Abbreviations AAPSO Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organisation AMDA Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement; after 1963, Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement ANZUK Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom ANZUS Australia, New Zealand and United States alliance ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BSP Barisan Sosialis (Singapore) CCP Chinese Communist Party CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US) CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Command CNO US Chief of Naval Operations COMLOG Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific WESTPAC CSR Commonwealth Strategic Reserve CTO Communist Terrorist Organisation DOD United States Department of Defense DSA Defense Supply Agency (US) FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK) FDI Foreign direct investments FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangements GOA The Government of Australia GOM The Government of Malaysia