Copyright by Megan Ann Reiss 2016 The Dissertation Committee for Megan Ann Reiss certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: ! ! ! ! Priorities and Constraints: Presidential Decision Making and Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy in the First Decade of the NPT ! ! ! ! Committee: ! ! William Inboden, Supervisor Bruce Buchanan Robert Chesney Mark Lawrence Jeremi Suri Priorities and Constraints: Presidential Decision Making and Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy in the First Decade of the NPT by Megan Ann Reiss, B.A.; M.Laws Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin December 2016 ! Acknowledgements Although completing a dissertation is a notoriously isolating experience, for me, it clarified just how many people contribute to completing a large project like this. First, I want to thank my dissertation chair, William Inboden. I could not ask for a better teacher, boss, mentor, and friend. His generosity towards students is unmatched, and I am blessed that I had the opportunity to learn from him for years. I was lucky to compile my dissertation committee dream team. Jeremi Suri, in addition to his astute guidance in bringing the dissertation together, is my model for teaching others. Mark Lawrence was a wonderful guide, especially in helping me think through how to structure the dissertation. Bruce Buchanan was a brilliant teacher who helped me think about theory and the U.S. government, especially with regards to the interactions between Congress and the president. Unsurprisingly, Robert Chesney was a remarkable resource for understanding the significance of law making and international institutions in understanding constraints on presidential decision making. I would also like to thank the faculty at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs. In particular, Francis Gavin was my faculty mentor in my first two years in the department. I would also like to give special thanks to the ever-encouraging director of the Ph.D. program, Victoria Rodriguez. I am indebted to Abraham Sofaer, a constant mentor and friend. Without Abe, I never would have pursued policy. I am also thankful for the time I spent with George P. Shultz, who sparked my interest in nuclear nonproliferation. Additionally, Henry Nau kindly gave me in depth comments that shaped my chapter on Ronald Reagan. ! iv! ! Friends gave me the encouragement through every hurdle I faced. To Rana Inboden, for giving me guidance and encouragement throughout the entire PhD process; to Elena Wright Mayville, for your insights and advice at each step in the PhD; to Theresa Berens Loveless, for advice in navigating the admission process; to Jeremy Ershow, for encouraging me while navigating the politics of academia; to Heather Russell and the Routt family, for helping me see the bigger picture; and to Cathy Evans, for your continual encouragement: thank you. I received generous funding from multiple sources over the course of my graduate student career in the form of fellowships and grants. These include the Rumsfeld Foundation, the Clements Center for National Security, the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum, and the University of Texas Graduate School. Without these sources of funding, this dissertation would not have been possible. My writing has improved significantly due to the editing of Nancy Reiss, Mary Hardy, Catherine Knepp, and Ashley Nelle-Davis. Without their guidance, I never would have emerged from the editing stage. Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank my parents, Robert and Nancy Reiss, for their encouragement and support during this experience. That I could not have done this without them is an understatement. Their kindness, generosity, and guidance is the only reason I was able to do this work. ! v! ! Priorities and Constraints: Presidential Decision Making and Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy in the First Decade of the NPT by Megan Ann Reiss, PhD The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 SUPERVISOR: William Inboden The signing and ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) had the potential to be an inflection point in presidential decision making regarding nonproliferation policy. The norm-creating treaty was a new tool for presidents to use to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce the possibility that states would someday participate in a nuclear war. However, the NPT had only a limited impact on presidential nonproliferation policy in the years after the implementation of the treaty, and it failed to lead to a standard response to proliferation challenges. While most attempts to understand U.S. nuclear policy after the enactment of the NPT center on arms control, this dissertation explores why and how presidents developed nonproliferation policy in the decade after the signing and ratification of the NPT. It is an historical analysis of how and why presidents made decisions to either prioritize or deprioritize nonproliferation policy as compared to pursuing other objectives. Presidential preferences for nonproliferation varied greatly depending on their personal commitments to nonproliferation as well as their calculations of threats that stemmed from proliferation. Other actors like Congress, the public, the nuclear industry, the Soviet Union, and allies placed restraints on the president’s ability to enact his preferences. Although Congress generally gives the president a large amount of leverage in ! vi! ! determining the direction of foreign policy, it proved to be a particularly strong domestic check on presidential preferences for nuclear policy. Geopolitical objectives, especially Cold War goals, overwhelmed presidential preference for nonproliferation policy. When nonproliferation goals aligned with Cold War objectives, presidents directed resources towards achieving those goals; however, if pursuing a nonproliferation policy would reduce American power or its ability to compete with the Soviet Union, presidents repeatedly deprioritized nonproliferation goals in favor of Cold War objectives. ! vii! ! Table of Contents Chapter One: Introduction………………………………………………………….……..1 The Argument……………………………………………………………………..2 Introduction to Presidential Decision and Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy…………………………………………….12 Literature Review………………………………………………………………...25 Chapter Outline…………………………………………………………………..37 Chapter Two: West Germany and Nuclear Weapons……………………...…………….45 West Germany and the NPT……………………………………………………..48 Nixon, West Germany, and the NPT…………………………………………….62 Chapter Three: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Loophole………………………...…..….101 The Brief History of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions……………………………………………………………..104 Nixon and the Indian Nuclear Test……………………………………………..118 President Ford and the Smiling Buddha………………………………………..141 Chapter Four: Nuclear Suppliers and Curbing Proliferation……………………….…..160 The Tarapur Shipments…………………………………………………………165 American Export: Israel and Egypt……………………………………………..186 The Nuclear Suppliers Group………………………………………………..…193 Chapter Five: The Making and Unmaking of The Nonproliferation President…...……211 Jimmy Carter and Nuclear Weapons…………………………………………...213 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan………………………………………………....242 ! viii! ! Supplying India………………………………………………………………....262 Chapter Six: Seeking Security………………………………………………………….270 Ronald Reagan Faces Nuclear Weapons……………………………………….273 Reagan and the Proliferators…………………………………………………....279 Reagan, Osirak, and the Nonproliferation Crisis…………………………….…294 Chapter Seven: Conclusion……………………………………………………………..345 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………364! ! ix! CHAPTER ONE Introduction The year 1968 was one of the tensest years since World War II. The Tet Offensive strengthened the anti-Vietnam War protest movement and turned popular support away from the war. The assassinations of civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr. and Democratic presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy shocked and saddened the nation. Yet, in the tumultuous months of civil unrest, of Soviet nuclear build-up and tensions abroad, the world came together to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT was a symbol of peace, an agreement that states were willing to give up the right to develop nuclear weapons in order to protect the greater good and decrease the likelihood that the world would someday descend into nuclear war. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia the month after the signing of the NPT temporarily dashed the hopes of many that the treaty would succeed. The invasion was a major disruption, causing President Johnson to withdraw the NPT from consideration of Senate ratification. After campaigning against the ratification of the NPT, Richard Nixon won the 1968 presidential election. However, when Nixon entered office, he made a choice. The Cold War warrior, the realist, chose to send the norm-developing international treaty to the Senate for ratification. What would this decision mean for the future of American foreign policy? Would the NPT transform the way presidents made decisions regarding nuclear nonproliferation policy? 1 The Argument Presidential Policy Presidents from Johnson to Reagan all pledged American support for the NPT and the nonproliferation principles it enshrined. Yet, these presidents addressed nonproliferation concerns within the broader context of geopolitical concerns, especially in relation to Cold War priorities. Each president prioritized