Copyright by Marcella Marisa Ribetti 2002 The Dissertation Committee for Marcella Marisa Ribetti certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: SOME CONFLICTS MAY NOT END: THE STABILITY OF PROTRACTED VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA Committee: _________________________________ R. Harrison Wagner, Supervisor _________________________________ Henry Dietz, Co-Supervisor _________________________________ Catherine Boone _________________________________ Raul Madrid _________________________________ Harvey Kline Some conflicts may not end: The stability of protracted violence in Colombia by Marcella Marisa Ribetti, B.A. Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor Of Philosophy The University of Texas at Austin August, 2002 Dedication To the Colombian people, with love and friendship for peace Acknowledgements Internal conflicts cause devastation and desperation in the hearts and lives of those who experience them. Common sense would lead one to believe that leaders could find peaceful ways to solve their differences, yet there are numerous on going conflicts. Common sense would also lead one to believe that leaders would strive to find an agreement quickly, once the conflict has started in order to limit the suffering of their people, yet this is not always the case. My dissertation tackles these problems. Mine is an ambitious project, which I could never have pursued without the relentless help and constant encouragement of my adviser Harrison Wagner. Under Harrison’s supervision I progressed from being a graduate student to becoming a professional and a researcher. I am thankful to him for the endless hours that he has dedicated to this project during the last four years. During many of those hours we engaged discussions on how to conduct research and on the meaning of violence, war, and conflict, but we also laughed a lot. Harrison has rendered the dissertation writing process fun, interesting and rewarding. v Henry Dietz, the co-supervisor of this dissertation has also dedicated much time to reading, reviewing and even editing my chapters. A part from academic focus, Henry has also offered me sincere emotional support during the most challenging times in graduate school. I am extremely grateful to him as well as to Raul Madrid, Harvey Kline and Catherine Boone, the other members of my dissertation committee for providing constructive criticism and stimulating feedback. I owe many thanks to all those who helped me during my fieldwork in Colombia. I am particularly grateful to Camilo Echandia, a peace Commissioner and Fabio Sanchez of Los Andes University; to Oscar Naranjo, the Police Intelligence Director, and the agents that procured much of the information included in the dissertation. I am equally grateful to members of the armed forces, whose names I cannot disclose, and particularly to the Interinstitutional Committee on the Finances of the Insurgents. I am most grateful, though to the peasants in San Jose del Guaviare, to many reinserted guerrillas and displaced people who exposed themselves to danger when they talked to me about their experiences with the insurgents. I still think of them often and hope that some day they, and the rest of the Colombian people will experience peace. I want to thank the members of my dissertation group, Sultan Tepe and Michelle Gallman for offering helpful comments on the first iterations of my chapters. Those first chapters were not always fun or easy to read. My best friends, Elizabeth Read and Christine Jernigan helped me to get through tough moments and to enjoy the rewarding moments too with constant emotional vi support, warm meals, and long, stress-relieving walks. I am so thankful to my wonderful family for their many contributions through my graduate program and for their positive and cheerful involvement in my life. My mother has always been an inspiration to me. She is the person that has inspired me and instilled in me the want to help others above all discomfort or danger. I am still learning from her every day. Finally, I want to thank my exceptional husband, Linwood Ham, jr. I could not have completed this dissertation without his constant support, encouragement and love. Linwood is my emotional and intellectual partner. He is my best friend, and the love of my life. vii Some conflicts may not end: The stability of protracted violence in Colombia Publication No._____________ Marcella Marisa Ribetti, PhD The University of Texas at Austin, 2002 Supervisor: R. Harrison Wagner This dissertation explains why intrastate conflicts may persist beyond the point where agreements are expected. I argue that the prolongation of certain conflicts may be tied to the character of the groups involved in them, and ultimately to the source of their finances. All groups seek primarily to preserve themselves and to fulfill the aspirations of their members. In intrastate conflicts, groups exhibit one of two characters depending on their orientations: calculative or emotional. Calculative groups are primarily profit-oriented; emotional groups are driven primarily by the desire to demand redress of the grievances of the community to which they belong. viii Calculative groups may hinder the pursuit of any feasible agreement. There may be no agreements that would allow such groups to preserve themselves, and their members to continue to receive tangible benefits. Fighting remains necessary for groups to maintain control over what I call “profitable” and “strategic” territories, which are used for the extraction and commercialization of resources that have a high value in the international market (primarily because of their illegal nature). However, in the absence of viable formal agreements, informal and local agreements are sought, instead. These aim at minimizing the costs associated with fighting (between opponents), while increasing the violence against challenging members of the organization, and against civilians as a proxy, as a way to neutralize possible opposition, as a form of coercion, and as a means to financial gains. The corollary to the argument is that, if the costs of fighting are low and the benefits remain high for all the groups involved in the fighting, an “institutionalized” systemic incentive to preserve the status quo arises. Because every group and its members are at least content with the status quo, there are no strong incentives to reach any formal compromise. In sum, the solution to the puzzle of conflict duration is quite counterintuitive; certain conflicts, though prolonged, may not be costly for those that are involved in them. Contrary to ix common sense, violence and fighting in these cases are the norm rather than the aberration. I test this argument in the Colombian environment. x Table of Contents List of Tables........... .............................................................................................xvi List of Illustrations ..............................................................................................xvii CHAPTER ONE ..................................................................................................... 1 The Colombian Problematic: A Case of Its Own or a Trend? ............................... 1 The literature and the puzzle .......................................................................... 4 The Colombian literature ...................................................................... 5 The Greed versus Grievance literature................................................ 11 The Conflict literature ......................................................................... 25 My argument ................................................................................................ 34 The case of Colombia.......................................................................... 44 My contributions to the existing literature ................................................... 46 Dissertation layout........................................................................................ 49 CHAPTER TWO................................................................................................... 53 Fighting For What? Greed, Seduction, and Salvation in an Anarchic Environment ................................................................................................. 53 The State: force and power.......................................................................... 56 Gangs and States ................................................................................. 57 Isolation, anarchic situations, and the rise of strongmen .................... 64 Isolation in modern times.................................................................... 68 Motivation at the individual and group levels.............................................. 69 The character of the gang and natural resources ................................. 73 Individual motivations and selective incentives.................................. 77 xi Why fight? Why use violence ? ................................................................. 103 Current explanations ......................................................................... 104 Character of a Gang and fighting ...................................................... 107 The meaning of violence ................................................................... 115 CHAPTER THREE............................................................................................