Research Papers in Management Studies CHANCE, CHOICE AND DETERMINISM IN STRATEGY M de Rond & R-A Thiétart WP 05/2004 The Judge Institute of Management University of Cambridge Trumpington Street Cambridge CB2 1AG, UK www.jims.cam.ac.uk These papers are produced by the Judge Institute of Management, University of Cambridge. The papers are circulated for discussion purposes only. Their contents should be considered preliminary and are not to be quoted without the authors’ permission. CHANCE, CHOICE AND DETERMINISM IN STRATEGY M de Rond & R-A Thiétart WP 05/2004 Raymond-Alain Thiétart Mark de Rond Université de Paris IX - Dauphine Judge Institute of Management and ESSEC Business School University of Cambridge Tel: +44 (0) 1223 764135 Fax: +44 (0) 1223 339701 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Please address enquiries about the series to: Research Support Manager Judge Institute of Management Trumpington Street Cambridge CB2 1AG, UK Tel: 01223 760546 Fax: 01223 339701 E-mail: [email protected] CHANCE, CHOICE AND DETERMINISM IN STRATEGY Mark de Rond Judge Institute of Management Cambridge University Trumpington Street Cambridge CB2 1AG United Kingdom Phone: +44 1223 339700 Fax: +44 1223 339701 Email: [email protected] Raymond-Alain Thietart Université de Paris – Dauphine and ESSEC Business School 75775 Paris, France Email : [email protected] Please do not quote, reproduce or use without permission of the authors. Please contact Mark de Rond for correspondence. April 2004 CHANCE, CHOICE AND DETERMINISM IN STRATEGY Abstract Experience suggests that strategy entails some interplay of choice, chance, and determinism as causal elements. Specifically, strategy is predicated on causality, or the principle that strategic choices have causes as well as consequences. Yet our discipline lacks a fundamental theory of causation, one that integrates strategic choice and deterministic perspectives and leaves room for chance. In reply, we venture beyond strategy and the organization sciences into intellectual history and complexity theory. Not only does each tradition have a long and respected track record in confronting causation, but when combined they allow us to address epistemological and ontological issues alike. We conclude with three propositions on the nature of causation in strategy, and examine their epistemological and methodological consequences. Keywords: strategy, causation, intellectual history, complexity theory, philosophy 1 Why do events—the record of which we call history—occur as they do? Is all chaos and accident? Or is there some single, central vision, some unifying principle, which can explain the immense variety of human actions on a battlefield, or in the history of a nation? – Isaiah Berlin Strategy, in practice and in scholarship, is predicated on causality, or on the principle that events have causes as well as consequences. Organizations develop strategies precisely because they believe these to contribute substantially to their performance and survival. At the same time our chronicles contain plenty illustrations of chance as a significant contributing factor in firm performance, not least Honda’s much discussed success in the US motorcycle market. Moreover, the public domain offers a plethora of explanations of corporate failure, as a consequence not of poor choices but of the inevitable forces of competition, globalisation, government regulations, demographic changes, interest rate fluctuations or bear markets. Obviously, choice, chance and determinism matter; firm performance is likely to reflect an element of each. It is the common-sense view. But, surely, this intuitive view is dissatisfying on account of its triviality? After all, it gives no explanation of the relative importance of each or, crucially, of the relationship between them. This article seeks to provide a meaningful conceptual approach to causation in strategy. The use of meaningful is deliberate as we make no claim of our account being true. How can we? After all, the problematic relationship between free will and determinism is tied in with the entire history of human thought, given its complexity and relevance to important philosophical puzzles such as causation, but also ethics, metaphysics, and time (Dorato, 2002: 339). In this respect, Nozick’s admission is sobering: “I have spent more time thinking about the problem of free will – it felt like banging my head against it – than about any other philosophical topic except perhaps the foundation of ethics” (Nozick, 1981: 293). Here we merely argue that, in the absence of logical or empirical proof, our approach is rational. It is meaningful to the extent that it tackles one of the most fundamental problems in strategy scholarship, namely the nature of causation: To what extent is strategy ‘determined’, either by particular resource configurations, by competitive or industry dynamics, by institutional 2 pressures, or by other elements outside of the organization’s control? To what extent are those in charge genuinely free to ‘choose’? How can the public hold organizations accountable if it does not also believe these choices to have been made deliberately? What scope, if any, is there for chance to help account for the strategic choices and performance of organizations? More critically, determinism seems to undermine freedom of choice, and thus the value added by the process of strategizing, and yet organizational actors experience a sense of freedom when making choices. Can determinism and freedom of choice be reconciled to produce a concept of strategy that is reasonable as well as consequential? If so, what sorts of implications would this have for scholarship? The task is to formulate a concept of strategy that allows for freedom of choice and thus grants human agency a constructive role. Strategy, by its very nature, would seem to necessitate a theoretical foundation that provides for freedom of choice. After all, it is the assumption of free will that gives rise to such strategy process orientations as the design, planning, positioning, entrepreneurial, learning and cognitive schools (Mintzberg et al. 1998) Each takes some measure of freedom for granted. It also justifies the significant compensation packages awarded to senior executives, and allows us to hold them accountable for their strategic choices. Even if this assumption is corroborated by our everyday experience, strategy does not appear to have a theoretical basis to account for freedom of choice. Lastly, even claims of correlation, the staple of empirical papers, are pregnant with allusions to causation. Moreover, to explain organizational performance generally means to identify its causes. And it is this bolder research agenda into the nature of causation that this article seeks to revive. With this aim in mind we formulate three propositions that hypothesize causal conditions as pivotal but leave room for choice and chance. The process by which we arrive at these is as follows. We begin with a review of the strategy and organization sciences literature to characterize deterministic and voluntaristic approaches, as well as attempts at reconciliation. Second, we broaden the theoretical base in which strategy is traditionally grounded by drawing on contributions from two distinct disciplines, intellectual history and complexity theory. This approach allows us to revisit epistemic and ontological positions, in that order. We conclude by means of propositions that posit causal conditions (the raw materials of determinism) as pivotal insofar as choice and chance are necessarily contingent on it. It is, we 3 argue, rational and practical to think of these as reciprocally implicated. We conclude with a discussion of implications for scholarship. Consistent with the scope of our argument, we deliberately rely on broad definitions: Chance refers to an event of which the cause is unknown or unknowable. A helpful example is the flipping of a coin. If only we were we able to account for every variable (speed, surface, density and humidity of the air, etc.) we would be able to accurately predict its outcome. Yet because the event is sensitive to so many variables, no feasible list of conditions could be singled out as the cause, making it a perfect randomising device (Dennett, 2003: 85). Choice is defined as the freedom of organizational actors to choose and act of their own will. Determinism suggests that every choice is determined by antecedent causal conditions that are sufficient to bring about particular choices. For every choice, the conditions preceding it are sufficient in and of themselves to produce that choice, and that choice could not have been different unless these causal conditions were different also (Searle, 2001: 277). Causality is the principle that events have causes. Causal conditions, a concept introduced later in the paper, refers to a plethora of variables such as experience, habit, circumstance, particular dispositions, the structural properties of social systems, institutional pressures, culture, the dynamics of industry and markets, technological developments, resource constraints, and causality itself. Finally, strategy is broadly conceived to include strategy content as well as strategy process. Choice, chance and determinism in practice The development of Pfizer’s erectile dysfunction drug Viagra may serve as a useful metaphorical example of strategy in the context of pharmacology, as it involves the interplay of chance, choice and determinism. A research