Understanding Scientific Theories: An Assessment of Developments, 1969-1998 Author(s): Frederick Suppe Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers (Sep., 2000), pp. S102-S115 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/188661 . Accessed: 30/11/2012 17:05 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The University of Chicago Press and Philosophy of Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy of Science. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.63 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 17:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Understanding ScientificTheories: An Assessment of Developments, 1969-1998 FrederickSuppeti TexasTech University The positivistic Received View construed scientifictheories syntacticallyas axiomatic calculi where theoreticalterms were given a partial semantic interpretationvia corre- spondence rules connecting them to observationstatements. This paper assesseswhat, with hindsight,seem the most importantdefects in the ReceivedView; surveysthe main proposed successoranalyses to the Received View-various SemanticConception ver- sions and the StructuralistAnalysis; evaluates how well they avoid those defects; ex- amines what new problems they face and where the most promising require further development or leave unansweredquestions; explores implications of recent work on models for understandingtheories; and rebuts the few criticismsof the SemanticCon- ception that have surfaced. 1. Introduction.The Received View on Theories was the epistemic heart of Logical Positivism. Twelve hundred persons were in the audience the night it died. It was March 26, 1969-opening night of the Illinois Symposium on the Structure of Scientific Theories. The Received View had been under sustained attack for a decade and a critical mass of main protagonists had been assembled to fight it out. Carl Hempel, a main developer of the Received View, was the opening speaker and was expected to present the Received View's latest revision. Instead he told us why he was abandoning both the Received View and reliance on syntactic axiomatizations (Hempel tSend requestsfor reprintsto the author, Departmentof Philosophy,Box 43092, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX 79409-3092. i: thank Steven Frenchfor helpful discussionand access to forthcomingworks. Thanks also to other symposiumspeakers and to Walter Vincenti. Philosophy of Science, 67 (Proceedings) pp. S102-S1 15. 0031-8248/2000/67supp-0009$0.00 Copyright 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved. S102 This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.63 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 17:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions UNDERSTANDING SCIENTIFIC THEORIES S103 1974). Suddenly we knew the war had been won, and the Symposium became an energized exploration of where to go now.1 I assess where we actually went and what we learned about theories and science in the process. 2. Why the Received View Failed. In the 1960s, the Positivistic Received View on theories was attacked on the following grounds: (1) its observational-theoretical distinction was untenable; (2) correspondence rules were a heterogeneous confusion of meaning relationships, experimental design, measurement, and causal re- lationships some of which are not properly parts of theories; (3) the notion of partial interpretation associated with more liberal correspondence rules was incoherent; (4) theories are not axiomatic systems; (5) symbolic logic is an inappropriate formalism; (6) theories are not linguistic entities and thus theories are individu- ated incorrectly. To my mind the most significant objections, in order, are (6) and (2). (1) requires qualification since not all versions of the challenge are suc- cessful. (3) is false. (4) seems to me irrelevant. I discuss (5) in the next section. In 1969 a variety of alternative analyses were on the table such as con- struing theories as answers to scientific problems, or as paradigms, or conceptual frameworks. Gradually analyses that construed theories as extra-linguistic set-theoretic structures came to dominate post-positivistic understanding. 3. Syntactical vs. Semantical Approaches. Objection (5) seems to me cor- rect. But wide misunderstanding of it leads to endless silly, largely unpub- lished debates over what semantic approaches can do that syntactical or statement approaches intrinsically cannot. For positivists, theories were partially interpreted axiomatic systems TC where the axioms T were the theoretical laws expressed in a theoretical vocabulary VT; C were correspondence rules that connected T with test- able consequences formulated using a separate observational vocabulary V,. Only V0 sentences were given a direct semantic interpretation. Note 1. Unattributeddetails of the Received View, its critics, and some associatedhistorical comments are based on Suppe 1994a; other undocumentedhistorical comments re- gardingthe SemanticConception are based on Suppe 1989 and 1998;personal involve- ment and recollectionare the basis for other undocumenteddetails. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.63 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 17:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions S104 FREDERICK SUPPE that the Received View has a semantic component and is not wholly syn- tactical. The Received View was a model of science ("explication") that had to accommodate all genuine examples of good theories and exclude all clear examples of bad theories. Modern physics was their paradigm of good science and whenever they found incompatibilities with exemplary science they modified their analyses accordingly. In practice this meant that they adjusted their analyses to accommodate the best physics had to offer, but deployed them normatively in evaluation of the social sciences. When the C were required to be explicit definitions, theoretical asser- tions were guaranteed to refer to observable reality within TC's scope. Once reduction sentences or interpretative systems were allowed, VTterms could refer to observables or to nonobservables. That is, models of TC included both. A general problem was that the Lowenheim-Skolem the- orem implied that TC models must include both intended and wildly un- intended models. Unintended models provide potential counterexamples. Blocking them more concerns eliminating syntactical-approach arti- facts than dealing with substantive analysis. Positivistic syntactical anal- yses of theories, confirmation, simplicity, and explanation persistently were plagued by problems of unintended models a problem not peculiar to positivism. For example, Kitcher's (1989) unification explanation ac- count has a very simple idea. But he develops it syntactically spending most of the paper trying to block unintended consequences that are arti- facts of his formalism. Most of his paper has little to do with developing his main idea. Suppes (1967) contrasted positivism's "intrinsic formulation" syntac- tical approach to the "extrinsic" semantic approach wherein one directly designates an intended family of models. Although formal semantics can- not designate precisely the intended set of models, our ordinary linguistic resources suffice. In practice we do pick out just intended models (else there would not be a problem of unintended models), and so we can pro- ceed directly to the specification of these intended models without recourse to syntactic axiomatization. Increasingly positivism had become sidetracked from development of their substantive ideas by technical problems that were mere artifacts of modeling science via predicate-calculus axiomatizations. This is the correct sense of (5)'s claim symbolic logic is an inappropriate formalism. It concerns how serviceable the formalism is to the enterprise of mod- eling and understanding science. It has nothing to do with whether there are things semantic approaches can do that syntactical approaches in prin- ciple can't do. That issue is irrelevant to assessing either the Received View or semantic approaches. Rather, the Devil is in the details. This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.63 on Fri, 30 Nov 2012 17:05:41 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions UNDERSTANDING SCIENTIFIC THEORIES S 105 4. The Semantic Conceptionof Theories. The Semantic Conceptionidentifies theories with certain kinds of abstract theory-structures,such as configu- rated state spaces, standing in mapping relations to phenomena. Theory structures and phenomena are referents of linguistic theory-formulations. The basic idea is that theory structures are identified with suitably con- nected families of models. Depending on mapping relationships required for theoretical adequacy, realist, quasi-realist or antirealist versions are ob- tained (Suppe 1998). The Semantic Conception has