"Layering" as a Mode of Institutional Change: National Civic Service in Israel 1996-2014 Etta Bick Ariel University, Israel A quiet revolution is taking place in Israel in civic national service, a change which may have a far reaching effect on relations between Israel's Jewish majority and minority groups and their integration into Israeli society. It will have an impact on employment and will encourage many who up until now were often not employed, ultra-orthodox men, Bedouin and Druze women, to join the work force. Through a series of policy amendments the opportunity to volunteer to civic national service has been extended to sectors that hitherto were exempted or deferred from service. Primarily through a process of "layering", adding new rules and institutions alongside existing institutions and "displacement", replacing or amending existing legislation, Israel has undergone a process of change in civic national service that has been incremental but may be cumulatively transformative. Service has traditionally been defined in Israel as service in the military. The national security law, enacted in 1949, established a "citizen army" to which all able body men and women were drafted (three years for men and two years for women). In addition, citizens were required to do additional service each year in the reserves. The IDF (Israel Defense Force) was assigned civic tasks as well in the fields of education, welfare and immigrant absorption. Military service became a rite of passage into Israeli society for young men and women and for new immigrants. It was integrative and inclusive for those who were willing to share the Zionist ethos. Conversely, for the non-Zionist ultra-orthodox who chose to devote themselves to full time study in yeshivas and for Israeli Arabs who were exempted from military service, failing to serve was clearly a barrier to integration into Israeli society and economy (Levy, 2007; Peled & Shafir, 2002). The subject of service, military or civic arouses heated debate in Israel. While the overwhelming majority of Jewish citizens support the principle that all citizens should be required to give service to the state, Israel's Arab leaders categorically reject suggestions that they should serve. They point to Israeli governments' inveterate policy of discrimination against Arab citizens and submit that equal rights must precede citizen obligation (Zarik, 2014). Israel's ultra-orthodox sector whose sons enjoy extended deferments from service while they engage in religious studies maintain that studying Torah is their way of serving the nation. According to IDF statistics for the year 2011 approximately 50% of Israelis of conscription age were deferred, excused, or exempted from service, 13% were ultra-orthodox yeshiva 1 students, 35% religious women (orthodox and ultra-orthodox), 12.5% those unsuitable for service and 20% Israeli Arabs. Druze women were excused as well. This disparity between citizens who serve and the growing number of those who do not generated grass-root protest to change the status quo and multiple petitions to the High Court. This article explores the process of endogenous institutional change as it has evolved in Israel in the controversial policy area of civic national service. It will utilize the concepts of layering and displacement, as developed by Mahoney and Thelen (2010), and others to explore the process of gradual but yet significant and transformative change in public policy. It will show that through a slow but gradual process of policy layering new populations and new programs were added to the existing model of civic national service and limited change was achieved despite the reluctance of the IDF and the strong opposition of minority groups. Three modes of gradual institutional change: displacement, layering and drift In democratic systems, laws and rules which define and regulate public policy are the result of deliberation and compromise. They reflect the prevailing power relations between sectors in society and the dominant interests of the majority. Once defined and translated into law, they endure over time, hence their categorization as institutions. Institutions may be defined as "formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions in the organizational structure of the polity or the political economy."(Amenta and Ramsey, 2010) While stability and durability are characteristics of institutions, it is also clear that transformations and changes do occur. Some historical institutionalists, Paul Pierson (2004) and Theda Skocpol (1995), for example, have adopted a punctuated equilibrium model that conceptualizes institutions as being relatively stable, with historical trajectories that begin in a past point in time and follow a determined path of development into the future. Major changes that occur are regarded as episodic and discontinuous, usually caused by exogenous factors such as revolutions, wars, occupation or financial collapse (Skocpol and Pierson, 2002). Thelen (2009) correctly submits that the punctuated equilibrium model ignores the endogenous processes of incremental change that often characterize revisions and developments in public policy. Endogenous institutional change is more gradual and incremental, the result of distributive competition and negotiation (March and Olsen,1984; Thelen, 2009; Streek and Thelen, 2005). 2 Often the choice of slow incremental change is the best strategy for achieving any change at all. The forces that have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo may block far-reaching changes in policy that could threaten their preferred status or shift their allocations to others. Powerful interests may act to prevent modifications in the rules and regulations and will oppose the establishment of institutions that may limit or detract from their influence, funds or clients. This is particularly the case if these interests are well entrenched and enjoy privileges and status that have gone almost unquestioned for many years. Moreover, the nature of the political system, for example, whether the system is a democracy or not, and its political structure will impact on how change can occur. It will determine the extent to which interest groups and the third sector will have access to decision makers and the opportunities they will have to influence policy. Policy change may be the result of a series of small adjustments that could be attained only by incremental measures. Moreover, these steps could include a "tango" of policy revisions that may take several steps forward and then a step or two backward because of changes in the government coalition and the resultant shifts in administrative managers. Policy modifications may be put on hold during a change in government or cancelled. In multi-party democracies which typically have coalition governments, small minority parties often control the government ministries that impact on their constituents' interests. They may condition their joining the government coalition with demands for concessions in areas they define as critical. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) outline three modes of endogenous institutional change, displacement, layering, and drift that we will employ in our analysis. Displacement, or what James Hacker (2004) calls revision, takes place when the partisan balance of power shifts in support of change. New laws are passed or existing laws amended because of a change in circumstances or a shift in the relative power of political interests. It is important here to emphasize, particularly in the case of Israel, that the source of change may be not only from the legislative or executive branches but may also be triggered by a decision of a constitutional court. In democracies with judicial review, constitutional courts have the authority to strike down legislation or to order its amendment. The status quo, while politically expedient, may be invalidated by the court for being inequitable or in violation of human rights. As such, the court may be an important catalyst of policy displacement and endogenous change. When formal policy change seems unattainable in the current array of political interests, pragmatic actors may choose to adapt existing policies rather than challenge the existing institutions directly. They may work instead within the existing system by adding new rules on top of or alongside old ones, a 3 process called "layering".(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Streek and Thelen, 2005; Hacker, 2004). Mahoney and Thelen (2010) correctly suggest that defenders of the status quo may be able to preserve the original rules, but they may be unable to prevent the introduction of modifications. Each may be a small change in itself, yet when they accumulate, they may create a big change. Institutional change may also depend upon the extent of compliance or non-compliance in the ministry assigned to implement policy. If the minister or top bureaucrats are lukewarm toward a policy, administrative foot-dragging and delays may result. Additionally internecine fights between executive departments, each protecting and advancing its own interests may also cause a delay in implementation. Regulations may not get written; inter-ministerial committees may convene and disband without decision. Moreover, because primary legislation is typically ambiguous and subject to interpretation, the resultant policy may in fact turn out to be quite different from the intent of its statutory architects. (Allison and Halperin, 1971; Kaarbo, 1998) A third form of gradual institutional change,