Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 2013 Fideism, Evidentialism, and the Epistemology of Religious Belief Matthew P. Butcher Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss Part of the Epistemology Commons Recommended Citation Butcher, Matthew P., "Fideism, Evidentialism, and the Epistemology of Religious Belief" (2013). Dissertations. 508. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/508 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 2013 Matthew P. Butcher LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO FIDEISM, EVIDENTIALISM, AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY BY MATTHEW P. BUTCHER CHICAGO, ILLINOIS MAY 2013 Copyright by Matthew P. Butcher, 2013 All rights reserved. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation was completed only because of the wealth of support (in both personal and academic ways) of those around me. First I would like to thank Paul Moser, Thomas Carson, and Blake Dutton for their tireless work as members of my committee. They have provided invaluable corrections, advice, and guidance. Paul Moser has worked with me on every step of this dissertation, leading me back from many a rabbit trail or false start. Thomas Carson has at many points sharpened my focus and raised my awareness of competing views. And Blake Dutton, perhaps more than anyone else, is responsible for awakening me to the challenge of skepticism—particularly in regards to religious belief. This thanks should also be extended to David Yandell and James Murphy, both of whom directed me from the early proposal toward what is now the dissertation. David’s long-time friendship and sincere mentorship turned me back toward evidentialism, and it was James Murphy who suggested that fideism is an important foil to evidentialism. Additionally, I would like to thank J.D. Trout, whose guidance on my Master’s thesis has displayed itself in surprising ways in this dissertation, and also to Andrew Cutrofello, who helped me clarify (via Kant) what it means to have evidence for a religious proposition. iii I would like to thank Drs. Dina Berger and Jessica Horowitz, along with the respective participants, for their mentoring and coaching through the dissertation bootcamps in 2011 and 2012. Thanks to Kristina Grob for advising me on the technical aspects of dissertation formatting. Alfredo McLaughlin encouraged me through many a medium, including the most amusing series of SMS messages I have ever received. Thanks to the amiable staff of Caribou Coffee in Glenview. The supply of caffeine and good humor daily fortified me for writing, and all that coffee still cost less than a good therapist. And thanks to Hewlett Packard and my colleagues there for the measure of flexibility given me in the name of this dissertation. My family relinquished their claims to my time on too many occasions to count. That is a debt that I will never be able to repay, and it is a profound lesson in grace and in love. Thanks to Angie, Annabelle, Claire, and Katherine for loving me enough to love my work. Thanks to Jon and Jane Hodge, Paul and Paula Butcher, Wes Munsil and Janet Seibert, Joanna and Chris Jones, Ryan Butcher, Dorothy Lesiw, Kristy Potter, and to Amanda Grace, all of whom put up with more philosophy than any non-philosopher ever ought. Thanks to our Tuesday small group, the table group, and the Saturday men’s Bible study. I am so blessed to be surrounded by such encouragement. Dr. Walter Lesiw, my grandfather, inspired my love of knowledge. My uncle Cliff Potter instilled in me a love of wisdom. Both passed away during the writing of this dissertation, but the influence of each is apparent to me on every page. When I too have crossed the bar, we three shall have a laugh at what we here iv thought were knowledge and wisdom. v TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii CHAPTER ONE: RATIONALITY, BELIEF, AND FAITH 1 Job 1 Introduction 4 Overview 8 Rationality 11 A Model of Rationality 13 Obligation 23 Belief 25 Doxastic Voluntarism and Fideism 32 Believing In and Believing That 46 Faith 49 Bishop’s Seven Models of Faith 50 Entitlement 65 Fideism 70 Conclusion 75 CHAPTER TWO: RATIONAL FIDEISM 77 Introduction 77 Rationality 80 The Failure of Reason 86 The Limitations of Reason 87 The Effect of Sin on Reason 94 The Impact 99 Faith 102 Biblical Faith 103 Faith as a Capacity 106 Fideism and Responsible Fideism 110 Epistemic Justification and Knowledge 114 Warrant and Knowledge 121 Responsible Fideism 125 Three Questions 129 What is the Role of Defeaters? 130 Defeaters 131 What Defeats What? 134 If Knowledge is External, How Can It Depend on Faith? 140 Knowledge, Warrant, and Justification 140 Externalism 142 The Result 147 Should We Really Side with Faith Over Reason? 148 Conclusion 154 vi CHAPTER THREE: FAITH AS VENTURE 158 Introduction 158 Clarifications 161 Entitlement Refined 164 The Evidential Ambiguity Thesis 169 Does the Evidential Ambiguity Thesis Hold? 171 Epistemic and Moral Rationality 178 Privileging Moral Obligation 179 The Moral-Epistemic Link Principle 186 Supra-evidential Fideism 190 Faith 191 Doxastic and Sub-doxastic Ventures 194 Framing Principles 202 Theses (J) and (J+) 207 Thesis (J): Permissibility of Doxastic Ventures 209 Thesis (J+): Morally Moral Permissibility 212 Abraham's Doxastic Ventures 217 The Problem of the Problem of Evil 219 Is Faith a Bad Guide? 222 Is Fideism Preferable? 228 Conclusion 230 CHAPTER FOUR: EVIDENTIALISM AND FAITH 233 Introduction 233 Doubt and Skepticism 236 Entitlement and the Skeptic 238 Is Evidentialism Defeated? 245 Moderate Evidentialism 245 Evans's Claims Against Evidentialism 253 Cognitive Limitations and Inference 254 Cognitive Limitations and Sinfulness as Defeaters 258 Rational Conflict, Selfishness, and Cognitive Limitations 259 Bishop's Claims Against Evidentialism 261 The Fideist's God 271 A Robust Notion of Evidence 277 Private Evidence 281 Evidence and God 284 Disconfirming Evidence 292 A Further Challenge from Bishop 294 Conclusion 296 Future Directions 298 REFERENCE LIST 301 VITA 307 vii CHAPTER ONE RATIONALITY, BELIEF, AND FAITH Job The ancient Hebrew epic poem Job, written perhaps in the tenth century BCE, tells of Job's suffering and lamentations during the testing of his faith.1 Early in the story, Job loses assets, family members, and his own health.2 As the plot unfolds, Job exchanges several verbal volleys with three of his friends, each of whom attempts to explain why God would allow such devastation to befall Job.3 Yet none gives an answer that Job finds satisfactory. Job expresses the locus of his frustration with the explanations of his friends. Surely there is a mine for silver, and a place where gold is refined. Iron is taken from the ground, and rock is poured out as copper. Man puts an end to the darkness; he searches the farthest recesses for the ore in the deepest darkness. Far from where people live he sinks a shaft in places travelers have long forgotten, far from other people he dangles and sways.... He has cut out channels through the rocks; 1 For possible dates, and the myriad complications in accurately dating the book of Job, see Norman C. Habel's The Book of Job, 40-42. 2 Job 1:13-2:10. All biblical quotations are from the New English Translation (NET) Bible, 1st Edition. 3 Elihu, the fourth friend, has not yet appeared by chapter 28. Elihu's first speech is in chapter 32. 1 2 his eyes have spotted every precious thing. He has searched the sources of the rivers and what was hidden he has brought into the light. But wisdom—where can it be found? Where is the place of understanding? Mankind does not know its place; it cannot be found in the land of the living.4 Mining is Job's chosen image of seeking what is precious. In this poem he lists several techniques for locating and extracting precious gems and minerals. Look at the extent, says Job, to which humankind has developed a technology for finding hidden things of value. Yet wisdom and understanding, whose value is immeasurable, remain elusive. Job wants insight into his present circumstances. When God speaks to Job, enlightenment is not on the agenda.5 To the fideist, Job may be seen as a sort of epic hero.6 Here is the fideist's take on the story: Job confronts the quandary of understanding the divine. Humankind, notes Job in his rumination on mining, has made laudable progress in the realms of science and industry. Much has been learned, much has been gained. But when confronting the problems of a divine nature, human capabilities have fallen short. There is a lacuna, a mandatory lacuna, that cannot be bridged 4 Job 28:1-4, 12-13. 5 Steven M. Cahn points out that the odd thing about the story is that the reader does have insight into the reason for Job's suffering—the explanation is found in Job 1 (Cahn 2006, 31-33). The point of Job, argues Cahn, clearly is not that humans cannot understand God's motivations, for we are told his motivations. 6 For more on Job as an epic hero in the tradition of Sumerian, Hebrew, and Babylonian folklore, see Habel 1985, 35-40. 3 by human understanding.7 The fideist extracts the following moral from the story of Job: The solution is to overcome this limitation with faith.