FINAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H TITLE : Discipline Campaigns i n the Communist Party of th e Soviet Union, 1970-8 7 AUTHOR : Peter Rutland CONTRACTOR : Wesleyan Universit y PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Peter Rutland COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 803-1 6 DATE : January 199 0 The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided b y the National Council for Soviet and East European Research . Th e analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those o f the author . EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In the last four years Soviet politics has been in a state of apparent turmoil, with the appearance of unprecedented phenomen a such as relative press freedom, tolerated dissent, competitiv e elections and quasi-parliamentary institutions . Understandably, i n the rush to focus on the new and different many commentators hav e switched attention away from the dull and unchanging . Our own research has convinced us that despite the excitin g changes at the apex of the Soviet political system, the actua l institutions through which the Communist Party of the Soviet Unio n (CPSU) exercises its control over society have remaine d substantially intact . This paper seeks to analyse th e organizational practices through which the CPSU has been able t o maintain its position as a ruling party in both the Brezhnev an d post-Brezhnev eras . We attempt to analyse the CPSU through the prism of moder n elite theory, which argues that elite cohesion is the vita l precondition for political stability, and that in times of chang e (for example, the transitions to democracy in Latin America an d Southern Europe) the success of the process hinges upon the forgin g of a consensus within the political elite at an early stage . Thi s analystical approach is in marked contrast to theories whic h explain stability and transition in terms of, say, a regime' s popular legitimacy . The CPSU seems to have developed a set of procedures (mostl y dating back to Lenin) which have proved highly effective i n securing elite cohesion . Most of these procedures are well-known : the concept of a vanguard party, party discipline, democratic centralism, the nomenklatura system . Despite the central importance of these practices, they hav e been studied by only a handful of Western scholars over the years . The present project also tapped sources which have not previousl y been utilised to explore these questions . The author conducted 5 0 interviews with party officials and academics both in the USSR an d in emigration, and studied 25 local newspapers (not availabl e outside the USSR), in addition to to more conventional souroes suc h as the party journals (national and republican) . The paper begins with a reiteration of the point that th e party itself sees elite unity as the key to its role, and i s perhaps more explicitly conscious of the need to preserve elit e unity than any other ruling elite around the globe . The questio n is what are the organizational strategies they have devised t o maintain this unity, and are they still functioning effectively ? Elite unity for the CPSU has both ideological an d organizational aspects . On the ideological side, the paper survey s the role played by ideology in the selection of cadres fo r important posts party and non-party institutions (the so-calle d nomenklatura) . We examine the network of ideological trainin g institutions and the efforts to apply ideological criteria in th e appointment of officials . By the 1980s the ideological work of th e party entered a stage of major crisis and self-doubt . However , rather than representing a radical break with the organizationa l practices of the past, perestroika has involved a re-doubling o f efforts to revive and make more effective the ideologica l underpinnings of the CPSU . There do not seem to have been any significant changes in th e way the nomenklatura system has been operating over the last tw o decades . In the following section of the paper we do however repor t our estimate of the current size of the nomenklatura based on al l the passing references in party journals over the past decade . We estimate that there are some 100,000 full-time party officials i n the USSR (from primary party organization secretaries up to th e Central Committee) . There have been cuts in the party apparatus i n 1988-89, however : estimates of the size of the reduction under wa y range from 7,000 to 30,000 . In all we estimate that there are som e 1 .9 million nomenklatura officials in non-party organizations (tha t is, whose appointment is supervised by a regional party committee) . Again, in the last two years there are reports that the number o f nomenklatura posts in some regions has been cut by up to one third . The major innovation in cadre policy has been the introductio n of multi-candidate elections on a limited basis . Through a carefu l examination of the conditions under which these elections ar e conducted we conclude that the introduction of more electivity ha s not decisively changed the degree of control exercised by part y committees over cadre selection . Our focus is on elections t o positions within the CPSU : the humiliating defeats suffered b y party officials in the March 1989 elections to the Congress o f People's Deputies are another story entirely . The second half of the paper investigates the extensiv e discipline campaign in the party which was initiated by Andropo v and extended by Gorbachev . This campaign has seen dramatic turnove r at all levels of the Soviet elite, the departure of the bulk of Brezhnev era appointees, and the uncovering of huge corrup t networks in the outlying republics . However, the campaign has bee n waged using the methods and procedures forged in the pre-Andropo v era . The most visible continuities include the fact that the driv e is orchestrated from Moscow rather than being intiated from below , and uses the standard devices of the Brezhnev years (self-criticis m at party election meetings, exposes in the national press, etc .) . Also notable is the regional pattern - the way that attentio n focusses first on one region, then another, with the party ofte n having to call in the legal organs to help dislodge entrenched corrupt networks . A final continuity is the fact that th e discipline drive seems to be an uphill struggle . Merely replacin g corrupt and incompetent cadres with new faces (usually drawn fro m the same regional apparatus) does not seem to lead to a decisiv e improvement in the work of the party apparatus . Gorbachev seems to have learnt from the experience of hi s first three years in office that merely using the established methods to preserve party cohesion is no longer sufficient . Mor e radical measures may be needed to change the workstyle of regiona l party officials - but this will probably involve going outside th e party altogther (hence the creation of the Congress of Peoples ' Deputies . Our guess would be that the decisive factor forcin g change in the Soviet leadership is the economic crisis . Th e Brezhevite system tolerated a high level of corruption and letharg y in the party apparatus, but somehow the economy continued to grow . Now, however, the economy has reached a dead end, and new method s of economic management are needed . It is not clear that the old methods of securing elite consensus are compatible with a mor e decentralised, market-oriented economy . But these are matters a s yet unresolved . As for policy implications, the main point which emerges fro m our analysis is the tremendous organizational inertia of the CPSU . This organizational inertia represents both a strength and a weakness for the Soviet party . It makes for a strongly unifie d elite, well able to maintain its power over Soviet society for th e foreseeable future (barring economic catastrophe) . However, th e party's organizational inflexibility also means that change, if an d when it comes, is more likely to be outside the party than withi n it . Either way, our analysis forces us to line up with the sceptic s on the question of whether perestroika is likely to succeed i n effecting a qualitative change in the Soviet political system . THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY : IDEOLOGY . DISCIPLINE ANDTHECOHESIO N OF THE SOVIETELITE Peter Rutland INTRODUCTIO N In the last three years Soviet politics has been in a state o f apparent turmoil, with the appearance of unprecedented phenomen a such as a relatively free press, competitive elections an d parliamentary institutions . These developments are usuall y discussed in terms of their implications for the future, wit h much speculation as to the likely success or failure o f perestroika . Understandably enough, in the rush to focus on th e new and different, many commentators have switched thei r attention away from the dull and unchanging . However, our ow n research has convinced us that despite the exciting changes a t the apex of the Soviet political system, the actual institution s through which the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union ) exercises its control over society have remained substantiall y intact . This paper seeks to understand the organizationa l practices through which the CPSU has been able to maintain it s position as a ruling party in both the Brezhnev and post-Brezhnev eras . We attempt to examine the role of the CPSU through the prism of modern elite theory, which argues that elite cohesion is th e vital precondition for political stability, and that in times o f 2 change (for example, the transitions to democracy in souther n Europe and Latin America) the success of the process hinges upo n the forging of a consensus within the political elite at an earl y stage .