perception, philosophical perspectives subjectivity simply is what ‘intrinsicness’ amounts to. Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Another consideration is that, given that the brain is CliVord, W. (1874/1886). ‘Body and mind’. In Fortnightly Review, 1886 the physical ground of consciousness, we might regard December. (Page references are to the reprint.) 1890 1950 The Principles of Psychology 1 experience as a kind of window into the intrinsic nature James, W. ( / ). , Vol. Levine, J. (2001). Purple Haze. of at least this one, very complex, physical entity which 1991 Mind, Brain and the Quantum: The W Lockwood, M. ( ). we thus nd to be mentalistic in nature (see Lockwood Compound ‘I’. 1991 ). It is then perhaps a natural inference to the McLaughlin, B.(1992). ‘The rise and fall of British emergentism’. ubiquity of the mental, although the sort of experience In Beckermann, A. et al. (eds) Emergence or Reduction. that characterizes the physically fundamental entities in Nagel, T. (1979). ‘Panpsychism’. In Mortal Questions. the world is presumably altogether diVerent and radic- Rosenberg, G. (2004). A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep ally simpler than our own complex mental lives, reXect- Structure of the Natural World. 1999 Theories of Consciousness ing the diVerences in complexity between brains and Seager, W. ( ). 2005 Panpsychism in the West electrons (see Rosenberg 2004, Strawson 2006). Skrbina, D. ( ). Strawson, G. (2006). ‘Realistic monism: why physicalism entails Against these points stands the Xat intuitive implaus- panpsychism’. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13. ibility of the hypothesis that everything has a mental Whitehead, A. N. (1929) Process and Reality: An Essay in Cos- dimension. But in addition there are some counter- mology. arguments. One is that the physical nature of reality seems to be entirely suYcient to account for everything that happens (this is often called the ‘causal closure’ perception, philosophical perspectives Percep- of the physical world). If the mental is not itself a tion is a way of acquiring information, beliefs, or physical feature at bottom (via some sort of reductive knowledge about the world by means of the senses. relation or some other acceptable dependence upon the In philosophy, ‘perceive’ and its derivatives ‘see’, ‘hear’, physical) then it threatens to become *epiphenomenal. and the like, are usually taken to be success verbs. A panpsychist might reply that at the fundamental level, Thus, when Macbeth claimed to see a dagger before him the mental features are essential to the causal powers of when there was no such dagger, he was mistaken; things (see Rosenberg 2004). he merely seemed to see a dagger. In fact, he *hallucinated Another objection holds that panpsychism has its a dagger. A major goal of philosophical theories of per- own emergence problem (see James 1890/1950:Ch. 6, ception is to provide an account of perception that differ- Seager 1999:Ch. 9). Somehow there is a transition from entiates it from hallucination and from other mental the ‘elemental’ mental features of the physical constitu- occurrences. Section 2 below looks at approaches to the ents of things to the complex minds possessed by com- latter, while sections 3 and 4 outline approaches to posite entities such as ourselves. If the panpsychist is the former. Another goal is to address the question willing to admit this kind of emergence why not simply of how perception can yield and justify belief, thus opt for an emergentist solution to the whole problem of making it a source of knowledge. In answering this second mind, and avoid the basic implausibility of panpsy- question philosophy of perception overlaps with episte- chism? In reply, it might be noted that emergence mology. of complexes of a given set of features is generally Some terminological preliminaries need to be much easier to understand than the apparently radical noted. First, when we consciously perceive the world emergent transformation of matter into consciousness. we have ‘perceptual experiences’. It is usually taken to Finally, there is a methodological objection to panpsy- be the case that we can also have perceptual experiences chism. One of our chief metaphysical goals is to under- when we are hallucinating (and hence not perceiving). stand everything in terms of the best accounts of the Whether the perceptual experiences involved in percep- world which we currently possess. The physical sciences tion and hallucination are the very same kinds of states provide these accounts and they do not avail themselves is an important question in recent philosophy of percep- of the panpsychist option. One might argue that it is thus tion and supporters of common-kind and disjunctive incumbent upon metaphysicians to exert every eVort to theories of perception, discussed in sections 3 and 4 understand mind from within the structure provided by below, endorse very diVerent answers. the physical sciences. There is a kind of cogency to such Secondly, most philosophers hold that perceptual an objection, if it is taken to encourage eVorts at a experiences are by deWnition conscious states. A great naturalistic metaphysics. But such a metaphysics might deal of philosophy of perception is concerned with the fail, and it is good to explore options which might come nature of these states. The sense-datum theory holds that in handy, even if they stretch imagination beyond its such states involve perceiving non-physical mind-depen- usual bounds. dent objects. Adverbialism conceives of such states WILLIAM SEAGER as states in which one is sensing in a certainly way. 502 perception, philosophical perspectives *Representationalism argues that such states represent phenomenal character. Moreover, as stated above, per- the world to be a certain way. A great deal of modern ceptual experiences have their phenomenal character philosophy of perception has been concerned with essentially, but beliefs, qua beliefs, do not. Which par- the precise nature of perceptual representation. Sense- ticular belief a belief is, say the belief that crabs pinch datum theory, adverbialism and representationalism are hard, is a matter solely of which content it has, and any discussed in sections 6–8 below. phenomenal character that a particular instance of Finally, perceptual experiences are said to have *phe- a belief may have is irrelevant to its being that nomenal character. This means that there is ‘something belief. (Note that many people think beliefs themselves that it is like’ to undergo those experiences. Philosophy have no phenomenal character—they are simply usually of perception comes closest to philosophy of mind when accompanied by states that do.) it discusses the nature of perceptual phenomenal char- However, the traditional view that perceptual experi- acter and consciousness and whether a physical account ences are diVerent from sensations and beliefs has of it can be given. Recently, many philosophers have been challenged. On the one hand, arguing that sensa- sought an answer by enquiring about the precise rela- tions and perceptual experiences are not dissimilar, tionship between phenomenal character and represen- some representational views take sensations to be per- tation and whether the former can be explained solely in ceptions of one’s own body. For example, pains might terms of the latter. Section 8 elaborates on this issue. be thought of as states that represent damage or dis- 1. Perception, sensation, and belief order at a location in one’s body. On the other hand, 2. Unconscious perception arguing that perceptual experiences are more akin to 3. The common-kind view and the causal theory of beliefs than the traditional view, some doxastic views of perception experience hold that to have a perceptual experience 4. Disjunctivism is simply to believe, or to be inclined to acquire a belief, 5 that we are immediately perceiving some physical ob- . Empirically informed direct realist views V 6. Sense-datum theory ject or state of a airs by means of the senses. However, 7. Adverbialism this view is not widely endorsed for, plausibly, unlike 8. Representational theories belief-like states, experiences are necessarily conscious and occurrent and relatively unaVected by one’s other 1. Perception, sensation, and belief beliefs. Furthermore, the content of perceptual experi- Traditionally, philosophers have contrasted perception ence is sometimes held to be diVerent from that of belief with sensation. Perception was taken to be a process in various ways, notably by being non-conceptual. that involved states that represented—or that were about—something. For example, typical visual experi- 2. Unconscious perception ences had at a beach might represent sand, crabs, or the Can perception occur without a perceptual experience blueness of the sea. These experiences might accurately and without any conscious state? Recent empirical represent the beach or misrepresent it, if undergoing an Wndings have led some to answer positively (see uncon- illusion or hallucination. Sensations like pains, itches, scious perception). Consider the phenomenon of and tickles were not taken to be representational. For *blindsight, in which people claim to be blind. None- example, the feeling of pain was not taken to be theless, when asked to guess what is in front of them in ‘about’ anything—it was a mere feeling. At the same a forced-choice paradigm, they select the right answer time, philosophers have traditionally recognized that more frequently than chance. Is this evidence of uncon- sensations and perceptual experiences are alike in scious perception? It depends, Wrst, on whether the some respects. Both types of state have phenomenal subject really lacks a perceptual experience. This issue character, and which phenomenal character they have in turn depends on a commonly encountered question determines or partly determines, which particular kind in consciousness studies: to what extent can belief or of sensation or experience they are. *introspection about experience be inaccurate? Sec- Perceptual experiences have also usually been con- ondly, it depends on whether the accurate guessing trasted with beliefs.