Skaar, Steinar (2017) The utility of coercion theory in the Afghan conflict. PhD thesis. https://theses.gla.ac.uk/8872/ Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Enlighten: Theses https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] The Utility of Coercion Theory in the Afghan Conflict Steinar Skaar MPhil Submitted in fulfilment for the Degree of PhD School of Humanities College of Arts University of Glasgow 1 Abstract: This thesis examines the utility of coercion theory in complex contemporary conflicts through a study of the Afghan conflict as it unfolded in the provinces of Faryab and Kunduz from 2005 to 2012. The last two decades have produced ample examples of incidents where the UN, international alliances or states have found it necessary to use force in order to coerce states or armed groups to stop unacceptable activities or change their behaviour. However, the potential of military force to induce behavioural change in such conflicts is understudied and poorly understood. In the Afghan conflict the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) together with the Afghan security forces applied force in order to influence the Taliban and other groups who violently opposed the elected government to change their behaviour. Although neither ISAF nor the participating nations had articulated a coercive strategy, force was used consistent with coercion theory on a number of occasions. Coercion theory consists of a number of assumptions and presuppositions, the existence of which should be present on the ground for theory to have utility. This thesis argues that these were generally not, or only to a limited degree present in the Afghan conflict. It further argues that in the cases where ISAF and its Afghan allies applied force consistent with theory, it did generally not translate to the desired outcomes, in particular when coercion represented the dominant effort. This thesis consequently argues that coercion theory is not well suited to provide explanatory power to or predict outcomes in conflicts that are comparable to the conflict in Afghanistan. In particular, theory’s presumption of unitary actors, the rationality presumption and the notion of the credible threat is insufficient. Theory’s notion of coercive mechanisms also assumes a connection between human behaviour and what may influence it that is overly simplistic. This consequently proposes a revised set of assumptions and presuppositions as well as a revised understanding of mechanisms that acknowledges that coercion alone is rarely sufficient to instil sustainable change. 2 Contents Page List of figures and tables 5 Glossary 6 1. Introduction 1.1. The coercive use of force in contemporary conflicts 8 1.2. The case of Afghanistan 10 1.3. The research question 12 1.4. Structure and content 14 1.5. Preview of findings 20 1.6. Afghanistan and the Afghan conflict revisited 23 1.6.1. The Soviet occupation and its consequences 23 1.6.2. The Civil war 27 1.6.3. The Taliban 28 1.6.4. Conclusion, The Afghan conflict revisited 30 1.7. The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) 30 2. Explaining Coercion Theory 2.1. Introduction 35 2.2. Defining military coercion 36 2.3. The purpose of coercion 39 2.4. The research field, a review of the literature 41 2.4.1. The research on coercion 42 2.4.2. The research on counter insurgency 45 2.4.3. The military doctrines 48 2.4.4. Concluding remarks 51 2.5. The central elements of coercion theory 52 2.5.1. The assumption of unitary actors 52 2.5.2. The rationality presumption 53 2.5.3. The credible threat 55 2.5.4. Demands 56 2.5.5. The notion of choice 57 2.5.6. The central elements of coercion theory, conclusion 58 2.6. Coercive success 60 2.6.1. Campaign versus coercive success 62 2.6.2. Coercion theory and the notion of success 63 2.6.3. The notion of success in counterinsurgency literature 67 2.6.4. Success from the viewpoint of military doctrines 69 2.6.5. The military plan and success 70 2.6.6. Defining success in complex contemporary conflicts 72 2.7. Conclusion, theory and literature review 74 3. Methodology 3.1. Introduction 76 3.2. Methodological challenges 76 3.3. Methodological choices 77 3.4. Case selection 79 3.5. Sources of evidence 80 3.6. Some reflections on the author as a researcher 83 3 4. The cases 4.1. Introduction to the case studies 86 4.2. The case of Norway in Faryab 87 4.2.1. Context, the Province of Faryab 88 4.2.2. The Norwegian led PRT in Faryab, a short narrative 92 4.3. The case of Germany in Kunduz 104 4.3.1. Context, the Province of Kunduz 105 4.3.2. The German military in Kunduz, a short narrative 108 5. The utility of coercion theory in the Afghan conflict 5.1. The use of force and coercion theory 118 5.1.1. The campaign plans 120 5.1.2. The presence of ISAF and MOT operations 125 5.1.3. The offensive use of force 127 5.1.4. Conclusion, the use of force and coercion theory 137 5.2. The conflict and the basic assumptions of theory 139 5.2.1. The unitary actor 139 5.2.2. The rationality presumption 157 5.2.3. The credible threat 159 5.2.4. Demands 165 5.2.5. The element of choice 167 5.2.6. Summary and conclusion: the validity of theory’s assumptions 168 5.3. Coercive use of force and success 171 5.3.1. The application of force 172 5.3.2. Compliance to demands and fulfilment of objectives 173 5.3.3. Perception and behavioural changes 180 5.3.4. Duration of effects 186 5.3.5. Coercive success in Faryab and Kunduz, conclusions 188 6. Conclusion, the utility of coercion theory in Northern Afghanistan 6.1. Introduction 190 6.2. Summary of findings 191 6.3. Four factors that may explain the relative absence of success 196 6.4. Representativeness 213 6.5. How does coercion theory need to be updated 219 6.6. Lessons for NATO and recommendations 230 7. Appendices A: Interview forms 235 8. References and bibliography 243 4 List of figures and tables: Figure 1.1: Generic description of ISAF operations p 34 Table 2.1: The basic assumptions of coercion theory p 59 Figure 2.2: Hierarchy of plans p 71 Table 2.3: Coercive success p 73 Figure 4.1 Faryab province p 88 Figure 4.2: Task organisation PRT 17 p 94 Figure 4.3: Kunduz province p 105 Table 5.1: The campaign plans p 121 Figure 5.2: Illustration of informal networks p 150 Figure 5.3: The notion of the polarised contest p 152 Figure 5.4: The spaghetti slide p 155 Table 5.5: The assumptions of theory and the situation on the ground p 170 Table 5.6: The number of incidents in Faryab p 176 Figure 5.7: Graph, the number of incidents in Faryab p 177 Table 5.8: The number of incidents in Kunduz p 178 Figure 5.9: Graph, the number of incidents in Kunduz p 178 Table 5.10: The biggest problems in Faryab p 182 Table 5.11 Coercive success in Faryab and Kunduz, conclusions p 189 Table 6.1 The assumptions of theory and the situation on the ground p 193 Table 6.2 Coercive success, summary p 194 Table 6.3 The mission/incident ratio in Faryab p 203 Figure 6.4 Graph, the mission/incident ratio in Faryab p 203 Table 6.5 The revised assumptions and presuppositions p 223 Figure 6.6 A revised model of coercion p 228 5 Glossary and acronyms Acronym Explanation ABP Afghan Border Police ANA Afghan National Army ANP Afghan National Police ANSF Afghan National Security Forces. Including the Army (ANA), the Police (ANP), the Border Police (ABP) and the National Intelligence and Security Police (NDS) AOO Area of Operations AOR Area of Responsibility CHOD Chief of Defence. CIDNE Combined Information Data Network Exchange COIN Counter Insurgency. The military doctrine or concept aimed at dealing with insurgent warfare. COMISAF Commander ISAF. This includes the individual that holds the position as commander of ISAF, but also the office of the commander-in-chief. CoP Chief of Police. DCOP District Chief of Police DG District Governor DoD Department of Defence FM Field manual. US Army document FOA Freedom of Action FOM Freedom of Movement GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan HQ Military Headquarters INS Insurgent. Individuals or groups ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance JFCB Joint Force Command Brunnsum. The NATO headquarter responsible for the ISAF operation LOO Lines of Operation. Reflecting the ISAF mandate to oversee and partly deal with issues of Security, Governance and Reconstruction and Development LPB Local Power Broker. The ISAF term for actors that exerted excess influence through either their access to arms and militias, or through their access to material resources or contacts 6 Acronym Explanation MoD Ministry of Defence MOLT Military Observation and Liason Team.