THESIS OF MICE AND KANT: RE-EXAMINING MORAL CONSIDERABILITY TO NON-HUMAN ANIMALS ON KANT‘S COGNITIVE GROUNDS Submitted by William Eric Easley Department of Philosophy In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the Degree of Master of Arts Colorado State University Fort Collins, Colorado Summer 2014 Master‘s Committee: Advisor: Bernard E. Rollin Jane Kneller Vicki J. Volbrecht Copyright by William Eric Easley 2014 All Rights Reserved ABSTRACT OF MICE AND KANT: RE-EXAMINING MORAL CONSIDERABILITY TO NON-HUMAN ANIMALS ON KANT‘S COGNITIVE GROUNDS In this thesis, I examine Kant‘s criterion for moral considerability in light of the intersection between the moral, critical, and epistemic principles Kant commits himself to and evidence of advanced cognitive capacities in non-human animals. As I argue, Kant‘s denial of crucial cognitive capacities in non-human animals represents a flawed attempt at applying a principle of parsimony which threatens to undermine the transcendental base of his theories. Further, expelling the anachronisms and human exceptionalism Kant fell victim to in his theories reveals a robust sense of ethical duties directly to non-human animals, beyond non-cruelty. In Chapter One, I argue that the basis of moral considerability in Kant‘s ethics ought to extend directly to non-human animals if they possess sufficient degrees of the three cognitive capacities that comprise dignity and the ability to meaningfully set ends: reason, autonomy, and self- consciousness. In Chapter Two, I examine Kant‘s cognitive theory and argue that it lacks a developmental account in terms of degrees of these capacities that is crucial to completing Kant‘s ethical project. In Chapters Three and Four, I develop a model for such an account based upon evidence and theories in the philosophy of mind and the sciences, concluding that many non-human animals do possess advanced cognitive capacities and the we, thus, have moral duties directly to most non-human animals. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Foremost, I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Bernard E. Rollin, for his guidance and support throughout the stages of this project, most especially for his candidness, thoughtfulness, and for permitting me the freedom to fail and all the lessons that come with it. I would also like to thank Dr. Jane Kneller for her expert direction in navigating Kant‘s labyrinthine theories, and Dr. Vicki J. Volbrecht for her thoughtful comments and the courage to immerse herself in this often ponderous project. Further, I would like to express my indebtedness to the faculty and staff of the Philosophy Department for their support, discussion, and comments; my fellow graduate students for their attentive ears and seemingly endless talent and insight; and, of course, my family and friends for their unwavering encouragement and love, despite never wanting to hear another word about philosophy. Finally, I must give special thanks to Dr. Steve Naragon, whose scholarship and patient correspondence has been invaluable in uncovering and deciphering Kant‘s views regarding non-human animals and orienting my project among them. iii DEDICATION To my late father, Wayne E. Easley, who showed me what it is to be human …and to ―the brutes‖ who continually demonstrate that there is more to being human than simply being a human. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iii DEDICATIONS ............................................................................................................................. iv CHAPTER ONE: THE MEASURE OF MORAL WORTH ...........................................................1 §1.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................1 §1.2 Ethical Duties in Kant‘s Ethics ....................................................................................3 §1.3 Non-Cruelty to Animals, as Perfect and Imperfect Duties to Ourselves ...................12 §1.4 Respect, Dignity, and Duties to versus Duties with Regard to ..................................16 §1.5 The Dilemma of Moral Considerability .....................................................................20 §1.6 Setting the Bar for Cognitive Capacities ...................................................................26 §1.7 Anachronism, Religiosity, and Speciesism ................................................................33 CHAPTER TWO: THE GROUNDWORK OF COGNITION ......................................................41 §2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................41 §2.2 Kant‘s Theory of Cognition .......................................................................................42 §2.3 Why There Must be Degrees of Self-Consciousness, Rationality, and Autonomy ...55 CHAPTER THREE: DEGREES OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION: Part I: From Transcendental Conditions to Self-Conscious Reflection ....................................................65 §3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................65 §3.2 A Partner in Crime: Gennaro‘s Model of Degrees of Self-Concept ..........................67 §3.3 Level Zero: The Non-Conceptual Kantian Base of Self-Conscious Experiences .....69 §3.4 Level One: Bodily Self-Consciousness .....................................................................75 §3.5 Level Two: Concepts, Facts, and ―I‖ as Experiencer of Mental States .....................78 §3.6 Level Three: Reflection, Episodic Memory, and ―I‖ as Enduring Thinking Thing ..80 §3.7 Interlude: Recapitulation and Clarification ................................................................86 CHAPTER FOUR: DEGREES OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION: Part II: From Theory of Mind to Moral and Parsimonious Theorizing .....................................................93 §4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................93 §4.2 Level Four: Implicit Autobiographical Memory and a Theory of Mind ...................94 §4.3 Level Five: Autobiographical Narrative Enhancement and Moral Agency ............104 §4.4 Full Circle: Moral Considerability for Kantian Ethics Based Upon Cognitive Lives .................................................................................................................................112 §4.5 Subjectivity, Scientific Observation, and Parsimony ..............................................113 References ....................................................................................................................................134 v CHAPTER ONE THE MEASURE OF MORAL WORTH ―All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.‖ --George Orwell, Animal Farm ―Trouble with mice is you always kill ‗em.‖ --John Steinbeck, Of Mice and Men §1.1 Introduction Grounding an ethical theory that includes non-human animals within the realm of moral concern presents many issues. Some of these issues are practical, such as deciding when human interests are permitted to override concern for animal welfare. But, perhaps the deepest issues are theoretical: how do we account for the differences between humans and non-human animals in such a way that we do not also drive too wide of a gulf between the similarities? Moreover, the application of whatever criteria constitutes moral considerability must not unjustifiably exclude beings which would otherwise meet the criteria. If non-moral considerations—such as race, nationality, gender, handicap, or, in this case, species—are used to exclude beings from moral considerability despite their meeting the criteria, then those considerations are not morally relevant, and, thus, unjustified. Such inconsistent application of moral criteria would violate the stabilizing principles of rational consistency and universality which characterize moral claims in most ethical theories and prevent our moral theories from degrading into arbitrary and pernicious forms of relativism. Put another way, unless membership in a species can be shown to be morally relevant, we do not want a special ethics for humans and a special ethics for non-human animals. Thus, we require a theory that fits humans and non-human animals on the same scale of moral worth with differences of degree, but degrees of the same, or similar, kind. Constructing such a scale 1 requires identifying and isolating what criterion constitute moral worth. Though a capacity to suffer often serves as the prima facie criteria, determining the presence of such a capacity involves determining the presence of a conscious cognitive mental life, or the capacity to have experiences which meaningfully organize and guide the life and ends of that being.1 As such, I believe that a conscious cognitive mental life ought to be the criteria for moral worth and, in this chapter, I will ground this scale of moral worth in Kant‘s ethical theory. This project presents its own difficulties, as Kant‘s ethics are often criticized as establishing little to no concern for non-human animals. In fact, Kant explicitly denies moral considerableness to non-human animals, and explicitly for the reason that they do not have the same kind