AUGUSTINE AND THE DIALOGUE A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Erik Kenyon May 2012 © 2012 Erik Kenyon AUGUSTINE AND THE DIALOGUE Erik Kenyon, Ph. D. Cornell University 2012 One cannot understand the literary form of a dialogue without understanding its philosophical project and vice versa. This dissertation seeks to establish how Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues work as dialogues. Each of these works, Contra Academicos, De beata vita and De ordine, pursues two streams of inquiry: one dialectical, one self-reflexive. The first uses aporetic debates to identify problems with individuals' current beliefs. The second reflects on the act of debate as an instance of rational activity and through this draws attention to features of human rationality. The goal of all this is to change how the inquirer thinks about himself, to bring him to see some final theory as plausible (probabile). We find all the elements of this method in earlier authors: aporia in Plato, self-reflection in Plotinus, plausible conclusions in Cicero. But in Augustine these are fused into a system, one which structures all seven of his dialogues. This study situates Augustine against this philosophical tradition and provides a fresh start for future work on his texts. Chapter 1 argues that standing scholarly debates have imposed an unhelpful set of concerns on the dialogues. Chapters 2 through 4 set out the basic literary and philosophical project of each dialogue. Chapter 5 argues that the three dialogues, taken as a set, are programmatic for a particular kind of philosophical undertaking, one which can be traced through Augustine's subsequent works. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Erik Kenyon entered the University of Vermont as a Music major and left in 2002 with a Bachelor of Arts in Greek and Philosophy. He earned a Master of Arts in Classics in 2004, also from UVM. As a graduate student in Cornell University's joint program in Ancient Philosophy, he has had the pleasure of moving among philosophers, philologists and historians. He was awarded a Doctor of Philosophy in 2012. While graduate school got in the way of his practicing, he has managed to keep up an alternate life as an organist. iv M. J. v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It is perhaps fitting that a dissertation on dialogue be the result of ample conversations. Looking back at my many interlocutors, I want to thank first and foremost my adviser, Charles Brittain, for many hours of far-ranging discussion, my committee members Eric Rebillard and Scott MacDonald for holding me to the standards of their respective disciplines, and Tad Brennan for his ever useful perspectives. The members of numerous reading groups and an annual Augustine lectio have taught me how to read a philosophical text. From Gary Matthews I learned to embrace perplexity. I am fortunate to have had splendid classmates, and have enjoyed many lively debates with Jeff Leon, Zach Yuzwa and Aaron Pelltari in our dissertation writing group. A last thanks goes to dear friends Antonia Ruppel, Leigh Harrison, Sherry Smart and Jack Austin, who helped me keep matters in perspective through till the end. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Biographical Sketch....................................................................................................................iv Acknowledgments...................................................................................................................... vi Abbreviations..............................................................................................................................viii Chapter 1: Introduction...............................................................................................................1 Chapter 2: Contra Academicos...................................................................................................19 The uses of history..........................................................................................................25 The fruits of perplexity................................................................................................... 30 An anti-Empiricist argument.......................................................................................... 34 A probabile solution....................................................................................................... 37 Changing our perception................................................................................................ 39 The propaideutic function of C. Acad.............................................................................41 An argument for faith..................................................................................................... 44 Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 51 Chapter 3: De beata vita............................................................................................................ 54 Christian inspiration and Hellenistic epistemology........................................................ 56 First- and second-order vera...........................................................................................58 A puzzle about seeking God........................................................................................... 60 Happiness and the Trinity............................................................................................... 62 The propaideutic function of De beata v........................................................................ 67 Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 70 Chapter 4: De ordine.................................................................................................................. 74 Getting puzzled...............................................................................................................75 Thinking about providence.............................................................................................77 The providence of thought............................................................................................. 81 A probabile conclusion? Un-learning and self-discovery...............................................84 De ordine as a methodological work.............................................................................. 86 Providence as a Platonist teacher....................................................................................91 Chapter 5: The Cassiciacum Project...........................................................................................98 The Cassiciacum set....................................................................................................... 98 Propaideutic philosophy..................................................................................................105 Models of development.................................................................................................. 114 The later dialogues and Confessions.............................................................................. 118 Appendix.................................................................................................................................... 125 Bibliography............................................................................................................................... 128 vii ABBREVIATIONS C. Acad. Contra Academicos Conf. Confessiones De beata v. De beata vita De ord. De ordine De mag. De magistro De mus. De musica De imm. an. De immortalitate animae De lib. arb. De libero arbitrio De quant. an. De quantitate animae De Trin. De Trinitate De util. cred. De utilitate credendi Ep. Epistulae Retract. Retractationes Sol. Soliloquia viii CHAPTER 1 Introduction Augustine's earliest dialogues are most fundamentally concerned with the practice of inquiry and how it should be done. When it comes to finding guidance, these works look foremost to the act of inquiry itself. The fact that we can inquire at all tells us various things about ourselves, and by reflecting on our own act of inquiry, we are put in a position to improve how we go about inquiring. From this basic idea, Augustine works out a method consisting of three main stages. An initial impasse gives rise to debates which fail to reach any definitive conclusion, which failure exposes the shortcomings of debaters' various assumptions and modes of thought. Yet each work moves beyond aporia, as Augustine reflects on these debates as instances of rational activity. From this, he draws various conclusions about human nature. And from these, he takes a great leap to various 'big picture' theories which he presents as 'worthy of approval.' We find this method at play in each work, while in each case the shift from debate to reflection on debate and the jump to some grand conclusion is marked by a formal shift from dialogue between characters to oratio perpetua. Augustine presents this method as a process through which a teacher conceals his own views and un-teaches (dedocere) those of his student to prepare him for initiation into philosophical mysteria. This description of method provides a framework for making sense of each dialogue's seemingly sprawling lines of thought. Yet Augustine articulates this method in Contra Academicos [C. Acad.] by attributing it to the Academic skeptics. In a revisionist history of