THE UNNATURAL LIKENESS OF DEFERENCE: THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS by Kristin Claire Hulme A thesis submitted to the Department of Political Studies In conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Queen‟s University Kingston, Ontario, Canada (December, 2011) Copyright ©Kristin Claire Hulme, 2011 Abstract This dissertation examines the behaviour of the Supreme Court of Canada in cases involving electoral/referendum laws and the alleged violation of freedom of expression and/or the right to vote. In 2007, it declared that the judiciary should adopt „a natural attitude of deference‟ towards Parliament‟s decisions about the democratic process when determining, under section one of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, whether the infringement is reasonable and justified. This declaration reflected institutional concerns about judicial competence to review legislative choices in this area of public policy and the democratic legitimacy of it doing so. It was made even though the Court had found laws unconstitutional in a majority of the cases that it had heard to date. Deference is often simply equated with government „wins‟ in court. Such an equation ignores the effect that the decision has on judicial reasoning. It sets the standard of review the court uses when applying the Oakes test, the framework within which the section 1 analysis occurs. It also establishes the standard of proof that the Crown must meet to demonstrate that an infringement is justified. The outcome of constitutional disputes can turn on the decision about deference, pointing to a need for structure and coherence in the judiciary‟s approach. A review of the Court‟s jurisprudence shows that this need has not been met. In spite of its importance to constitutional adjudication, the analytical process by which the decision is made has garnered little attention from those who study the Charter. This dissertation seeks to fill this gap by examining deference theory and the use of deference in disputes involving the democratic process and by proposing an approach for specific use in these cases. The approach links the decision to the nature of the legislation, the nature of the right and the nature of the parliamentary discourse that preceded the enactment or amendment of the impugned law. Before setting the standards of review and proof used during the Oakes test, courts should determine whether: they have the necessary competence and legitimacy to act; the right warrants stringent constitutional protection; and parliamentarians engaged in serious deliberations that included the Charter and the reasonableness of any infringements. Acknowledgements I would like to thank my supervisor, Jonathan Rose, and the members of my defence committee, Grant Amyot, Janet Hiebert, James Kelly, Udo Schuklenk and Mark Walters. I am thankful for their advice and comments. I would also like to thank the many people who, through the years, have offered their support. Of particular note are Marie-Anne, John and Magi. I am indebted to my sister, Barb. She, more than anyone else, encouraged me to carry on when our world crumbled around us. I am finally grateful for my late parents, Audrey and John Hulme. I wish that my mum and dad were here to share in the joy of this moment. ii Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. i Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... ii Chapter 1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter Outline .......................................................................................................................... 13 Chapter 2 Democracy, Rights and Theoretical Perspectives ......................................................... 17 The Role of the Judiciary in the Democratic Process ................................................................ 19 Ronald Dworkin and Equal Concern and Respect ................................................................ 20 Waldron and the ‘Right of Rights’ ......................................................................................... 26 John Hart Ely and Participation Oriented and Representation-Reinforcing Review ............ 36 The Supreme Court of Canada and the Debate ..................................................................... 44 The Models of Judicial Decision-Making .................................................................................. 46 The Legal Model .................................................................................................................... 46 The Attitudinal Model ............................................................................................................ 53 The Strategic Model ............................................................................................................... 60 The Historical Instrumentalist Model .................................................................................... 66 The Model Employed in this Dissertation .............................................................................. 70 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 70 Chapter 3 The Theory of Deference .............................................................................................. 72 Conceptualizing Deference ........................................................................................................ 75 Rationales for Deference ............................................................................................................ 83 Institutional Competence ....................................................................................................... 84 Democratic Legitimacy .......................................................................................................... 88 The Approaches to Judicial Deference .................................................................................... 100 The Non-Doctrinal Approach .............................................................................................. 102 Formalism ............................................................................................................................ 104 (i) Politics and Law .............................................................................................................. 105 (ii) Policy and Principle ....................................................................................................... 107 Contextualism ...................................................................................................................... 111 A Contextualized Approach to Deference and the Democratic Process .................................. 117 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 121 iii Chapter 4 The Oakes Test and the Integration of Deference ....................................................... 123 Charter Adjudication ............................................................................................................... 127 Oakes Classic ........................................................................................................................... 128 The Oakes Test 2.0 .................................................................................................................. 134 The Integration of Deference in the Oakes Test ...................................................................... 139 Edwards Books: Reasonableness and Context ..................................................................... 139 Irwin Toy: The Nature of the Legislation ............................................................................. 145 RJR--MacDonald: The Contextual Elements Approach ...................................................... 152 Thomson Newspapers: The Contextual Factors Approach .................................................. 159 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 164 Chapter 5 Judicial Deference and the Democratic Process .......................................................... 166 Freedom of Expression and Charter Adjudication .................................................................. 169 Libman v. Attorney General (Quebec) (1997) ..................................................................... 172 Thomson Newspapers v. Canada (Attorney General) (1998) .............................................. 176 Harper v. Canada (Attorney General) (2005) ..................................................................... 185 R. v. Bryan (2007) ................................................................................................................ 193 Freedom of Expression and the Contextualized Approach to Deference ............................ 201 The Right to Vote and Charter Adjudication .......................................................................... 202 Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchewan) (1991) .............................. 204 Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) (1993)