Kremlin Watch Report 16.05.2017 Overview of countermeasures by the EU28 to the Kremlin’s subversion operations How do the EU28 perceive and react to the threat of hostile influence and disinformation operations by the Russian Federation and its proxies? Jakub Janda Kremlin Watch is a strategic program which Head of the Kremlin Watch Programme aims to expose and confront instruments of Veronika Víchová Russian influence and disinformation operations Kremlin Watch Analyst focused against liberal-democratic system. Monika Richter Kremlin Watch Analyst Ilyas Sharibzhanov Kremlin Watch Analyst Jakub Fišer Kremlin Watch Member Overview of countermeasures by the EU28 to the Kremlin’s subversion operations Contents 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 3 2. Method ............................................................................................................................................... 4 Analytical framework: Operationalisation of the rating scale............................................................... 5 3. Summary and Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 9 I. General Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 11 II. Trends and setbacks .................................................................................................................... 12 III. Sectoral trends ............................................................................................................................ 15 4. Policy Recommendations: Opportunities and best practices ............................................................ 20 I. On country practices: .................................................................................................................... 20 II. On policy development: ................................................................................................................ 21 III. Towards the game-changer:........................................................................................................ 21 IV. Best NGO practices: ................................................................................................................... 21 5. Recommendations for Donors ......................................................................................................... 23 I. Outlook of EU28 with Group Categorisations ................................................................................ 23 II. Specification of Suggested Steps ................................................................................................. 24 Diagram: Domains of support ........................................................................................................... 26 6. Individual profiles of the EU28 ......................................................................................................... 27 I. Austria ....................................................................................................................................... 27 II. Belgium ..................................................................................................................................... 30 III. Bulgaria .................................................................................................................................. 33 IV. Croatia ................................................................................................................................... 36 V. Cyprus ....................................................................................................................................... 39 VI. Czech Republic ...................................................................................................................... 41 VII. Denmark ................................................................................................................................ 44 VIII. Estonia ................................................................................................................................... 47 IX. Finland ................................................................................................................................... 50 X. France ....................................................................................................................................... 53 XI. Germany ................................................................................................................................ 56 XII. Greece ................................................................................................................................... 59 XIII. Hungary ................................................................................................................................. 61 XIV. Ireland .................................................................................................................................... 63 XV. Italy ........................................................................................................................................ 65 1 Overview of countermeasures by the EU28 to the Kremlin’s subversion operations XVI. Latvia ..................................................................................................................................... 67 XVII. Lithuania ................................................................................................................................ 70 XVIII. Luxembourg ........................................................................................................................ 73 XIX. Malta ...................................................................................................................................... 75 XX. The Netherlands ..................................................................................................................... 77 XXI. Poland .................................................................................................................................... 80 XXII. Portugal .................................................................................................................................. 83 XXIII. Romania ............................................................................................................................. 85 XXIV. Slovakia .............................................................................................................................. 88 XXV. Slovenia ................................................................................................................................. 91 XXVI. Spain .................................................................................................................................. 93 XXVII. Sweden ............................................................................................................................... 95 XXVIII. The United Kingdom ........................................................................................................... 98 2 Overview of countermeasures by the EU28 to the Kremlin’s subversion operations 1. Introduction This Report summarises the attitudes, policies, and strategic responses of the EU28 to Russia’s disinformation campaign and other hostile influence operations. It is now a robustly documented fact that, since the eruption of the Ukrainian conflict in 2013, the Kremlin has pursued increasingly aggressive efforts to destabilise Western alliances, undermine their democratic processes, and sow civil discord. The purpose of this Report is to describe and assess the specific strategies and countermeasures (or lack thereof) adopted across the EU28 in response to the Kremlin’s malign influence operations. The findings of the Report are based on a qualitative analysis of national strategy documents, reports, and official statements from all 28 member states that reveal the priorities of their individual foreign, security, and defence policies. Demand is growing for a coordinated international response to Russian aggression, with many EU heads of state, other European politicians,1 and security experts2 voicing alarm about the threat. As of May 2017, several Western countries have experienced Russian interference in their elections, while the number of cyberattacks across Europe continues to rise.3 Specifically, this Report aims to summarise how individual EU member states are reacting to this growing threat in three separate domains: 1) the government and political establishment, 2) the counterintelligence community,4 and 3) the non-governmental (civic) sector. The Report thus provides a comprehensive comparative overview of the current state of play in Europe, identifying common strengths and weaknesses between countries and, most importantly, providing concrete policy recommendations for security and defence enhancement based on specific regional and group trends. Of course, it is important to keep in mind that typological studies are inherently reductive and thus cannot fully account for the particularities and complexity of individual cases (in this instance, the EU28 country profiles). Nonetheless, the identification of regional and group patterns, common challenges, and proven best practices is a valuable exercise for gaining a deeper understanding of both the threat in