Doug Porter Musharraf Cyan Panthea Lee Zack Brisson Osione Itegboje Adam Talsma © 2015 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpreta- tions and conclusions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 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All queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2625; e-mail:[email protected]. Table of Contents 1 Introduction 6 Acronym List 7 Acknowledgements 8 Road Infrastructure Spending at a Glance 12 Capital Spending in a Challenging Context 20 Responding to the Challenges of Context: Mobilizing Strategic, Technical, and Financial Assets 24 The Project Management Cycle at Work in Edo 40 Conclusion and Proposals Infrastructure Development in Edo State i ii Introduction Governor Adams Oshiomhole assumed Soon after Oshiomhole came to power, office in November 2008 following a the World Bank announced it would successful court appeal to retrieve the use every instrument available to help mandate given to him by the people of consolidate an Amnesty agreement in Edo. Widespread support from a variety 2009 in the oil-rich Niger Delta. While of interest groups buttressed the legal Edo State is not one of the core oil states, challenge and helped create the political reflecting an undeclared policy of sup- space for the Governor’s pursuit of an porting reformers, the Bank decided that agenda focused on both reform and Edo would be one of four states around speedy delivery. Popular demand for re- which it would focus its engagement. form was evident, but responding to this Across the four states of Edo, Rivers, presented major challenges. Historically, Bayelsa and Delta there would be a youth Edo had been one of the best performing training and public works employment states in the country. Expectations were program, measures to extend and deepen high that he would restore this status successful nation-wide CDD programs and address the perceived poor perfor- and assistance with ongoing PFM re- mance and allegations of corruption forms. On the strength of the Governor’s leveled against previous administrations. reform commitments, Edo seemed a special case, warranting more – thus Edo This process saw a shift begin in the became one of only two states in Nigeria nature of Oshiomhole’s relationship to be offered budget support, in the with the State’s polity - a shift from form of a Development Policy Credit. more traditional patron-based collective bargaining towards a kind of popular, The Bank was aware that these measures constituency-based politics that is less fa- might help restore some confidence, but miliar in Nigeria. The Governor was no that more would be required. By June doubt aware of the imperative to respond 2010, a Public Expenditure Management decisively, to send credible signals that a and Financial Accountability Review new regime would deliver to this grow- had underscored the urgent need for, in ing support base and the need to balance the language of the WDR 2011, across commitments to ‘good governance’ the board “institutional transforma- with a new form of social accountability tion”1, and championed a ‘Public Finance that was based on results and delivery Reform Action Plan’, from revenue of campaign commitments. This would administration through planning and not be easy. Edo State was plagued budgeting, to procurement, expenditure by very high youth unemployment, and audit control systems. But while the devastated public assets and services, Governor was an enthusiastic supporter and the legacy of violence and conflict. of what became a complex of economic Per capita income stood at only $327, governance, PFM and service delivery around a quarter of the national average. reforms he would surely have known that it would be some years before ventures delivered on-the-ground results. Infrastructure Development in Edo State 1 Edo’s story perhaps has relevance for This case study is an attempt to better studied in depth along dimensions other states and other country teams. It understand the process through which common to public expenditure analyses: is not one of a reform minded Governor the Administration was able to maximize (i) integrity of project appraisal and ap- ultimately being stymied by political its delivery. This report is one product proval; (ii) efficiency of procurement and instability or hostaged by a fragmented, of several ongoing efforts by the World contract management; (iii) effectiveness incapable administration, or by the Bank to better understand how to better of implementation and monitoring; (iv) process of designing and making aid tailor its interventions to local reali- timeliness of flow of funds and pay- projects effective. It is a complicated ties with the overarching objective of ments; and (v) effectiveness of redress story: one that provides insight into improving its impact. To do this in the and community oversight. Engineering how some forms of reformist leadership case of capital spending in Edo, it was assessments were also conducted to might improve performance in Nigeria. necessary to craft a study method that determine the quality, durability, and Indeed, elections in 2012 returned suspended judgments about actual prac- usability of these assets (see figure 4.3). the Governor for a second term with tices. Thus, rather than holding these an increased majority in an election practices up to international standards, The outcome is a portrait of how both regarded as relatively free and fair. and highlighting deficits and shortcom- formal and informal institutions were Oshiomhole’s electoral success in 2012 is ings in relation to those standards, the applied to manage public finances in widely attributed to his ability to deliver study purpose was to depict how the light of the operational constraints tangible results, particularly his efforts State administration had responded found in Edo’s political economy. The to ramp up capital spending, especially to the political priorities of the new results show how the behavior of these around roads and civil infrastructure, Governor by adapting to the constraints institutions impacted the speed, cost, classrooms and clinics. Indications are it faced and creating new ways to deliver completion, and quality of road as- that annual spending on roads tripled through infrastructure spending. sets ultimately delivered. At the same in the first year of office, and had time, the approach clearly reveals a quadrupled again three years later, to This prompted use of a research meth- dynamic process in which Edo officials about NGN40.86 billion in 2012. odology that emphasized understanding continually adapt on the basis of les- of capabilities as well as deficits, which sons learned – about both the benefits That the Governor seized on capital surely exist, in the existing system.2 This and risks of the approaches taken. spending to consolidate his power is not resulted in a mixed methods approach unusual: governments in contexts the that blended instruments of public In September 2013, following extensive international community describes as economics and applied ethnography review at the technical, working level, “fragile and conflicted” typically focus – dubbed by the team, a ‘fiscal ethnog- the study findings were tabled as part of on the most discretionary resources to raphy’. The aim was to understand the high-level consultations between officials deliver assets that have high public vis- modalities that were created to govern from Edo State and the World Bank.3 ibility and thus political value. Capital the interaction among different actors, The case shows how this Administration spending is often also a good way to buy including state executives and adminis- has brought together a complex set the allegiance of powerful political forces trators; private sector consultants, con- of systems, procedures, norms, and in the contractor community. But as tractors, and banks; and different leaders capabilities to raise and invest finances often, these efforts only see money disap- and groups in communities affected to deliver quality public infrastructure. pearing into the sand. Yet in Edo, a cred- by road projects. The case is based on a The evidence presented here shows that ible engineering evaluation conducted study of all 43 road construction con- the Oshiomhole Administration has as part of this study showed that 85% tracts executed between 2008 and 2013.