Cognitive Akrasia in Moral Psychology and Normative Motivation By ©2013 Brandon Scott Gillette Submitted to the graduate degree program in Philosophy and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ________________________________ Chairperson Dr. Dale Dorsey ________________________________ Dr. John Bricke ________________________________ Dr. Ben Eggleston ________________________________ Dr. Mabel Rice ________________________________ Dr. Sarah Robins ________________________________ Dr. Tom Tuozzo Date Defended: 20 November 2013 The Dissertation Committee for Brandon Scott Gillette certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: Cognitive Akrasia in Moral Psychology and Normative Motivation ________________________________ Chairperson Dr. Dale Dorsey Date approved: 20 November 2013 ii ABSTRACT A number of persistent questions surround akrasia. Is akrasia (acting intentionally against one’s own better judgment) possible? If it is, how best to explain akrasia in a way consistent with acceptable theories of normative motivation? I argue that akrasia is possible—in fact, akrasia is actual. Research in psychology and information science, suitably interpreted, contains an empirically informed account of akrasia that is consistent with the traditional philosophical concept of akrasia as notably explored by Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Hume, Hare, and Davidson. My account of akrasia appeals to our best current research in order to develop an account of how someone could have knowledge of the good without attending to that knowledge, or could make normative judgments that motivate, but that do not include all of the factors at play in a more complete normative judgment (i.e. better judgment) that would motivate the agent differently. Adopting this empirically informed account of akrasia requires abandoning positions that are incompatible with its existence. One such view is the view that normative judgments are necessarily connected to motivation (often called normative judgment internalism, or NJI). Drawing on works by Sarah Stroud and Ralph Wedgwood, I demonstrate that NJI can be amended to allow akrasia, long thought to be a straightforward counterexample to NJI, while preserving what is plausible about NJI. My account of akrasia is termed ‘cognitive akrasia’ because I appeal to cognitive states as playing a central role in identifying and understanding akrasia. Preserving an amended NJI by means of a strongly cognitive understanding of akrasia means arguing against an opponent of NJI, which is normative judgment externalism (NJE). The most common form of NJE is iii Humean in character, and explains akrasia in terms of desiderative or other affective states. That is, one is akratic when one judges that A is better than B but has less desire to do A than B. My response to NJE as a view that explains akrasia is also empirically informed. I make use of clinical research into addiction and addiction treatment, because addiction has long been a fruitful source of examples of akrasia. Many addicts judge it better not to be addicts and yet occasionally or repeatedly fail to reform their addictive behavior. In this analysis, I provide a plausible family of everyday accounts of persons changing their behavior without changing their desires. I also point out that recent research indicates that specifically cognitive bias modification provides better clinical outcomes among addicts than approaches that attempt to change the addicts’ desires. One important consequence of cognitive akrasia, then, is that it represents support for theories that hold that motivation can be a product of cognitive and not only affective states. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS No dissertation represents the work of only a single individual, and this one is no exception. I would here like to recognize the contributions of a number of individuals. First, I owe special thanks to my dissertation advisor, Dale Dorsey, who I pounced on for this project when he had only recently arrived at the University of Kansas. I’m sure he didn’t quite know that he was preparing to advise a student who wished to defend, among other crazy assertions, that cognitive states alone could provide motivation. Dale was flexible, patient, and above all committed to making sure that my project was the best that it could be. He was always had concrete and useful suggestions for my writing, and saved me a great deal of time in suggesting the most efficient way of communicating my ideas. I would further like to thank the other members of my committee. Ben Eggleston, for all kinds of advice while department chair, and for being an outstanding example of what a prepared, professional professor should be. Jack Bricke, for an extremely productive independent study on Davidson, a brilliant Hume seminar, and very thoughtful commentary on my project over the years. Tom Tuozzo, for a great Aristotle seminar during which I first entertained notions of working on akrasia. Sarah Robins, for jumping on board only weeks after arriving at the University of Kansas, and providing excellent feedback on further research directions. Finally, I would like to thank Mabel Rice for taking time out of a very busy schedule to serve on both my Comprehensive Oral Exam board and also my defense committee. Also, I want to thank Dr. Rice for providing a home for me outside of the philosophy department in the Language Acquisition Studies Lab, where I had a great time and learned a great deal. My thanks also to our administrative staff: to Cindi Hodges, with my apologies for all of the bizarre paperwork that my work in the LAS Lab and the College of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science necessitated, and to Morgan Swartzlander, who was extremely helpful in v guiding me through all of the administrative necessities of the dissertation and graduation process. My thanks also to my fellow grad students, for being willing to have ideas bounced off of them and for always being encouraging and supportive. Thanks especially to long-time officemates Clark Sexton and Doug Fishel. I’d like to name every teacher and professor I’ve ever had, as they have all had a hand in my academic career, but there are too many to list. Any of them that still remember me over the years know who they are. I would like to thank my family, especially my mother and father, for never even questioning why I wanted to get a PhD in philosophy. My wife, Joanna, deserves the most heartfelt thanks of all, as nothing would have been possible for me without her constant support and confidence. BSG vi CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 2 CHAPTER 1: WHAT COUNTS AS AKRASIA?.............................................................. 10 Traits of Akratic Action ................................................................................................ 11 Examples of Akratic Action ......................................................................................... 20 Identifying akrasia ........................................................................................................ 27 The Passions: ................................................................................................................ 29 Akrasia Zoo ................................................................................................................... 34 CHAPTER 2: AN EMPIRICALLY INFORMED ACCOUNT OF AKRASIA ................ 37 Two Prominent Challenges to the Intelligibility of Akrasia ......................................... 39 An Empirically Informed Account of Akrasia .............................................................. 52 An Observed Case......................................................................................................... 71 CHAPTER 3: ACCOUNTING FOR AKRASIA IN VIEWS OF NORMATIVE MOTIVATION ........................................................................................................................................... 81 Strong Normative Judgment Internalism ...................................................................... 81 Modifying Normative Judgment Internalism ................................................................ 86 Strong Normative Judgment Externalism ................................................................... 101 Weak Normative Judgment Internalism and the HTM ............................................... 106 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 111 CHAPTER 4: ON NOT BEING AKRATIC .................................................................... 113 Akrasia and Addiction ................................................................................................ 113 Cognitive Bias in Addiction........................................................................................ 120 Treating Akratic Addiction ......................................................................................... 128 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 144 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 146 vii “At dawn of day, when you dislike being called, have this thought ready: “I am called to man’s labour; why then do I make a difficulty