Negotiating Nonproliferation: International Law and Delegation EVIEW R in the Iranian Nuclear Crisis Aslı Ü. Bâli ABSTRacT CLA LAW CLA LAW U The Iranian nuclear crisis reflects international worries about Iran’s intentions in developing a nuclear energy program with potential military applications. This Article suggests that strengthening existing international institutions to more effectively provide ongoing verification of the civilian character of the Iranian program offers a diplomatic avenue of resolving this crisis. The nonproliferation regime includes safeguards to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear materials from civilian applications to weapons programs. The question of how to strengthen these safeguards to ensure that Iranian nuclear activities are verifiably proliferation resistant is at the heart of resolving the current crisis. This Article shows that there is an identifiable compromise position that would address the concerns of the international community while enabling Iran to claim what it views as its right to nuclear energy. Yet despite this available avenue of compromise, missed negotiating opportunities have prolonged the crisis. Drawing on recent scholarship in the areas of negotiation theory and international delegations, this Article suggests an alternative approach to overcoming the conflict. By structuring negotiations around persuasive information, adopting an iterative and reciprocal negotiating structure, and strengthening the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (the IAEA), the parties could address many of the challenges that undermined previous rounds of negotiations. Further, a delegation to the IAEA of greater authority over implementing safeguards in Iran will set an important precedent for strengthening the verification and monitoring capacities of the organization, enabling it to facilitate resolution in the instant case and to better address any future crises involving potential proliferators. AUTHOR Aslı Ü. Bâli is an Assistant Professor at UCLA School of Law, and holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University, a J.D. from Yale Law School, M.Phil., Cambridge University, and a B.A., Williams College. For helpful conversations and comments, I thank Antony Anghie, Laura Gómez, Allison Hoffman, David Kaye, Benedict Kingsbury, Russell Korobkin, Maximo Langer, Odette Lienau, Jennifer Mnookin, Aziz Rana, Kal Raustiala, Joanna Schwartz, Seana Shiffrin, Richard Steinberg, Ed Swaine, and Annecoos Wiersema, as well as participants at the American Society of International Law Mid-Year Research Forum, the Utah International Law Colloquium, and the Wharton-Colorado University International Law Workshop. This article benefited from excellent research assistance 61 UCLA L. REV. 232 (2014) from Natalia De La Parra, Mack Eason, Shane Howarter, Yaqin Liu and Terry Stedman. This article was finished in March 2011. Subsequent developments have been included, as far as possible, until December 2013. TaBLE OF CONTENTS Introduction.............................................................................................................234 I. The Iranian Nuclear Program .....................................................................238 A. Understanding the Problem: International Law and Iran’s Nuclear Record ..........................................................................................240 1. Iran’s NPT and Safeguards Obligations ...........................................240 2. The State of Iran’s Nuclear Program.................................................245 B. Elements of a Solution: Meeting Minimum International and Iranian Requirements .........................................................................249 1. Uranium Enrichment .......................................................................250 2. Additional Protocol Plus ..................................................................252 3. Sanctions Relief ................................................................................254 II. Missed Opportunities ....................................................................................258 A. 2003 ...........................................................................................................259 B. 2005 ...........................................................................................................262 C. 2006 ...........................................................................................................264 D. 2009–13 .....................................................................................................268 III. Reaching Negotiated Resolution: Understanding Past Failures and Overcoming Obstacles ..........................................................276 A. Sources of Failure In Past Negotiations.....................................................277 1. Principal-Agent Problems ................................................................277 2. Domestic Factors: Negotiating a Two-Level Game and Managing Veto Players ..............................................................279 3. Hard Bargaining ...............................................................................283 a. Devaluation of Attainable Terms ............................................284 b. Demonstrating Patience ..........................................................287 c. Unilateral Actions to Shift Negotiations ................................289 B. Structuring Negotiations for Success ........................................................291 1. Adjusting the Principal-Agent Dynamic Step By Step: Defining the Goalposts and Providing Requisite Authority ...........................292 2. Addressing Domestic Factors by Structuring Step-By-Step Negotiations and Managing Veto Players ........................................295 3. Persuasive Information at Each Step: Enhancing the Role of the IAEA .....................................................................................300 IV. Capturing the Benefits of Delegation .....................................................305 A. Lending Credibility ...................................................................................307 B. Harm to IAEA Credibility Related to the Iranian Crisis .........................313 C. Balancing IAEA Authority and Accountability .......................................318 Conclusion ................................................................................................................323 233 234 61 UCLA L. REV. 232 (2014) INTRODUCTION Scarcely a day passes without one or two news articles appearing in the pa- pers on attempts to halt advances in Iran’s nuclear program.1 These articles cover efforts to levy fresh sanctions against Iran;2 they relay news of discussions among Iran’s primary interlocutors on the nuclear question—the five permanent mem- bers of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC or the Council) plus Ger- many (collectively, the so-called P5+1)—about diplomatic overtures.3 Or the stories discuss the ebb and flow of new intelligence on Iran’s program4 or the calls for airstrikes or other military action to delay and disrupt the progress of Iranian nuclear research.5 On occasion, the stories focus on negotiations be- tween Iranian officials and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or the Agency) over a new protocol for conducting expansive inspections of the country’s declared nuclear facilities and other locations of interest to the Agency.6 This high-profile media attention reflects many analysts’ view that Iran’s policies generally, and its nuclear program in particular, threaten the interests and securi- 7 ty of the United States and Israel. 1. See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon, Accord Reached With Iran to Halt Nuclear Program, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/world/middleeast/talks-with-iran-on-nuclear- deal-hang-in-balance.html; Iran Nuclear Talks Halted Amid Row Over US Sanctions, BBC (Dec. 13, 2013, 2:45 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25370806. 2. See, e.g., Rick Gladstone, United States Announces New Iran Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/world/middleeast/united-states-announces-new-iran-sanctions.html; Michael Pearson, New Sanctions Could ‘Shatter Western Unity’ on Iran, Senator Says, CNN (Dec. 12, 2013, 2:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/12/politics/iran-u-s-sanctions. 3. See, e.g., Adrian Croft, Iran Nuclear Talks Show Progress, Western Diplomat Says, REUTERS (Feb. 28, 2013, 6:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/28/us-iran-nuclear-talks-idUSBRE 91R1IO20130228; Laura Rozen, P5+1 Turns Focus to Implementing Iran Nuclear Deal, BACK CHANNEL (Dec. 5, 2013), http://backchannel.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/12/7173/p51- turns-focus-to-implementing-iran-nuclear-deal. 4. See, e.g., Laura Rozen, US Intelligence: Iran Decision on Nuclear Weapon Matter of ‘Political Will,’ BACK CHANNEL (Mar. 12, 2013), http://backchannel.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/03/4708/us-iran- nuclear-weapons-decision-matter-of-political-will. 5. See, e.g., Isabel Kershner, Israeli Official Hints Pentagon Plans May Make Lone Strike on Iran Unnecessary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/27/world/middleeast/ defense-official-hints-that-israel-is-stepping-back-from-plans-to-unilaterally-attack-iran.html. 6. See Alan Cowell, U.N. Nuclear Inspectors Invited to Iranian Facility, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/29/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-inspections.html. 7. See, e.g., Jodi Rudoren