Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance Workshop Proceedings and Key Takeaways project director Clark A. Murdock principal authors Clark A. Murdock Jessica M. Yeats contributing authors Linton F. Brooks M. Elaine Bunn Franklin C. Miller James L. Schoff project staff Tara Murphy L. Christian Pearson John K. Warden November 2009 About CSIS In an era of ever-changing global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decisionmakers. CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to the simple but urgent goal of finding ways for America to survive as a nation and prosper as a people. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent public policy institutions. Today, CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, DC. More than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focus their expertise on defense and security; on the world’s regions and the unique challenges inherent to them; and on the issues that know no boundary in an increasingly connected world. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2009 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data CIP Information available on request. ISBN 978-0-89206-598-1 Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006 Tel: (202) 775-3119 Fax: (202) 775-3199 Web: www.csis.org Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. 1 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 7 II. EXTENDED DETERRENCE & ASSURANCE AT THE CONCEPTUAL LEVEL ............................................... 10 III. DETERRING POTENTIAL AGGRESSORS OF U.S. ALLIES: REQUIREMENTS & KEY FACTORS ...................................................................................................... 16 IV. ASSURING ALLIES: REQUIREMENTS & KEY FACTORS ....................................................................... 23 V. EUROPE ............................................................................................................................................. 34 VI. NORTHEAST ASIA ............................................................................................................................. 44 VII. MIDDLE EAST ................................................................................................................................... 55 VIII. LONG TERM TRENDS AND CHALLENGES .......................................................................................... 66 APPENDIX A: ON SELF RESOLVE .............................................................................................................. 69 APPENDIX B: PROTECTED COUNTRIES ...................................................................................................... 71 APPENDIX C: WORKSHOP BRIEFS ............................................................................................................. 72 APPENDIX D: WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS ............................................................................................... 105 APPENDIX E: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................... 106 Blank EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The emerging North Korean and Iranian nuclear capabilities, coupled with ongoing Chinese and Russian strategic modernization programs, have brought increased attention from both practitioners and strategists to extended deterrence (the so-called ‘U.S. nuclear umbrella’) and the role it plays in assurance (the ability of the United States to convince its allies that it is committed to protecting their security). Despite a decade-long reassessment of deterrence in the policy community, there is still not a consensus among policy experts on the precise meaning of deterrence and associated concepts. Nevertheless, by analyzing the differences with which each critical ‘audience’ perceives and interprets U.S. force posture, the following report demonstrates that the nuclear posture requirements for deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance are largely additive and cumulative, despite some fungibility between them. Extended Deterrence and Assurance at the Conceptual Level To be able to extend deterrence requires that we can deter our allies’ adversaries; assurance requires that allies believe that we can and will do so. The credibility of deterrence and extended deterrence is a function of the perceptual lens of potential aggressors against the United States or its allies (the deterree), whereas the credibility of assurance is a function of the lens through which the state under the umbrella (the assuree) perceives and interprets U.S. capabilities and actions vis-à-vis the deteree. If the deterrent is not credible, assurance will not work, but a credible deterrent does not guarantee successful assurance. While neither extended deterrence nor assurance is a ‘lesser-included case’ of the other, the credibility of both relationships is highly symbiotic. Moreover, from a practical perspective, the United States cannot ‘target’ the perception of a single adversary or ally without simultaneously shaping the perceptions of other audiences. The credibility of extended deterrence and assurance are in the eyes of three beholders: (1) U.S. allies and security partners; (2) potential aggressors against the United States or its allies; (3) the American public, the U.S. Congress, the military, and U.S. government officials. The perceptions of the ‘third audience’ are critically important to the credibility of both extended deterrence and assurance. U.S. policymakers must remember that they are speaking to all three audiences at the same time. Since there is no agreed-upon, direct way to assess the impacts of changes in the U.S. nuclear posture upon the effectiveness of deterrence or assurance, this report takes a credibility-centric approach. Although still subjective, the impact of changes in the U.S. nuclear posture on the credibility of its deterrence and assurance commitments can be assessed: analyzing adversaries to determine what shapes their behavior, engaging allies to understand what affects their trust, and asking ourselves if we really mean what we say and if our actions will live up to our words. The credibility of deterrence and extended deterrence depends on a spectrum of factors affecting adversary perceptions of U.S. capabilities and intentions. To some extent, intent and capability are fungible. Overwhelming capabilities can compensate for perceived weakness in the deterrer’s resolve, and strong resolve can substitute for a lack of capability (e.g., ‘asymmetries of stakes’ can flip the deterrence calculus in favor of the regional aggressor, depending on the action to be deterred). Perceived U.S. interests in what is to be defended and the ‘balance of stakes’ vis-à-vis the potential aggressor are 1│NUCLEAR POSTURE IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND ASSURANCE particularly important to adversary perceptions of U.S. intent to defend against aggression on allied territory. Within this typology, a number of capabilities blur the distinction between ‘intent’ and ‘capability.’ Effective defenses, for example, enhance deterrence credibility by demonstrating invulnerability to reprisal, thus rendering irrelevant otherwise salient questions about whether the United States has the resolve, for example, to trade Atlanta for Riyadh. Linton Brooks suggests the following approach, which this report uses, for assessing the capability implications of extended deterrence: [The] inherent force structure needs [of extended deterrence] are…U.S. strategic forces that are perceived as second to none…flexible…reliable and effective…and by effective defenses…[But the] force structure bottom line [is]: except for these inherent features, [the] U.S. should wean allies from the belief that a specific force structure is required for extended deterrence. Assurance requires the state under the umbrella to be sufficiently convinced of U.S. extended deterrence commitments so it can (a) resist intimidation and (b) refrain from seeking its own nuclear capabilities (if it has the ability to do so). Accordingly, three principal factors explain why the requirements for assuring an ally can be distinct from (and, in some cases, greater than) the requirements for deterring the ally’s potential aggressors. First, the degree to which assurance is affected by the elements of extended deterrence is a function of how the ally perceives and interprets U.S. words and actions vis-à-vis the deteree. Because allies’ defense planners may rely on less credible and/or open-source intelligence and have more limited analytic resources for assessing the implications of nuclear posture changes, certain allies can be particularly