MALEBRANCHE’S THEODICY FOR NATURAL EVILS A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY by Ziqian Zhang August 2021 Examining Committee Members: Dr. Colin Chamberlain, Advisory Chair, Philosophy Department Dr. Kristin Gjesdal, Philosophy Department Dr. David Wolfsdorf, Philosophy Department Dr. Samuel Newlands, External Member, University of Notre Dame ABSTRACT My dissertation examines Malebranche’s theodicy for natural evils (i.e., Malebranche’s reconciliation of the existence of God with the existence of natural evils). In Chapter 1, entitled “The Conceptual Possibility of Natural Evils,” I explain how Malebranche conceives of certain natural things (e.g., pains, deformities/monstrosities, and disasters) as natural evils. Chapter 1 is preliminary: it clarifies Malebranche’s conception of natural evils as certain deviations from the biological forms that agree with the dictates of God’s Reason or wisdom. In Chapter 2, entitled “The Physical Possibility of Natural Evils,” I explain how Malebranche’s God produces natural evils in the physical world. Similar to Chapter 1, Chapter 2 is preliminary: it clarifies the causal involvement of Malebranche’s God in His production of natural evils, and it therefore specifies His activities that are to be reconciled with His absolute perfection. In Chapter 3, entitled “The Theological Possibility of Natural Evils,” I reconstruct Malebranche’s theodicy for natural evils by explaining how Malebranche’s God – who is by definition absolutely perfect – performs the aforespecified activities that result in natural evils. On my reconstruction, Malebranche’s God is determined by His absolute perfection – His Reason or wisdom, more precisely – to bring about natural evils, so natural evils do not pose any threat to His absolute perfection, and, accordingly, the existence of God is reconciled with the existence of natural evils. In light of this examination of Malebranche’s theodicy for natural evils, I make clear Malebranche’s contribution to the early modern development of rationalism: Malebranche articulates the central role of God’s Reason or wisdom in determining the purposes and causal histories of natural things, which amounts to the rationalization of the normative and descriptive dimensions of nature, respectively. ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Dr. Colin Chamberlain, my dissertation director, as well as to the other members of my dissertation committee at Temple University, Dr. Kristin Gjesdal and Dr. David Wolfsdorf. They helped me complete this dissertation with their continuous support, encouragement, and guidance. Their critical feedback and invaluable advice were absolutely crucial throughout the writing process. I am ineffably indebted to all of them. I would also like to thank Dr. Samuel Newlands for accepting to become the external examiner. I sincerely thank all the members of my dissertation committee again with all my heart. On a more personal note, I am eternally grateful to my parents for their unconditional love and patience. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iii INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................v CHAPTER 1. THE CONCEPTUAL POSSIBILITY OF NATURAL EVILS .....................................1 2. THE PHYSICAL POSSIBILITY OF NATURAL EVILS ..........................................37 3. THE THEOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF NATURAL EVILS .................................92 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................128 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................133 iv INTRODUCTION We live in an imperfect world. Evils such as pains, deformities, and disasters surround us. While the existence of evils is fairly consistent with atheists’ worldview, it poses a major problem for traditional theists, who believe in God as an absolutely perfect being. The problem is often formulated as follows: (a) if God exists, then there exists an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient being, which necessarily eliminates the existence of evils; (b) evils exist; (c) hence, God does not exist.1 How can God co-exist with evils? This challenge is known as the problem of evil.2 A theodicy solves this problem by reconciling God with evils.3 The early modern period (c. 1600-c. 1800) was the golden age of theodicies, and some notable early modern theodicians were Descartes, Arnauld, Malebranche, and Leibniz. While these early modern theodicians sought to reconcile God with evils, their theodicies differed because they grappled with three different types of evils: (a) metaphysical evils; (b) natural evils; (c) moral evils. Metaphysical evils are creaturely imperfections (i.e., the imperfections creatures possess in virtue of not being God): 1 Given that traditional theists conceive of God’s absolute perfection as multifaceted, this common formulation is not the only possible one. For example, one may insist that because there are evils, there is not any being that governs the world wisely, but God – by the definition of traditional theism as an absolutely perfect being – governs the world in a way that expresses His infinite wisdom, so the God of traditional theism does not exist. As we will see in ch. 3, this is the formulation Malebranche tackles in his defense of traditional theism. I will henceforth refer to traditional theism simply as “theism,” and the God of traditional theism simply as “God,” unless necessary for disambiguation. 2 More precisely, this challenge is the logical problem of evil, as opposed to the evidential problem of evil: the logical problem of evil takes the existence of evils to render the existence of God logically impossible, whereas the evidential problem of evil takes the existence of evils to render the existence of God improbable. 3 The English word “theodicy” or the French word “théodicée” is derived from the Greek words theos (“God”) and dikē (“justice”), which denote the justification of God (vis-à-vis the existence of evils). v plants’ inability to move themselves, animals’ inability to think, humans’ inability to read minds, etc.4 Natural evils are untoward effects that result from the operation of nature: pains, deformities (“monstrosities”5), disasters, etc. Moral evils are culpable wrongdoings: adulteries, blasphemies, murders, etc. This was the standard taxonomy of evils in the early modern period, as adopted by Leibniz, King, and Clarke.6 In response to 4 Although it is indisputable that all creatures are imperfect, it is still disputable whether all creaturely imperfections are evils. For example, most Scholastic philosophers do not consider all creaturely imperfections to be evils. Aquinas affirms that if all creaturely imperfections were evils, “anything would be evil, from that it does not have the good of another thing, seeing that a human would be evil, because he does not have the velocity of a roe, or the fortitude of a lion” (ST Ia, q. 48, a. 3). Similarly, Suárez affirms that if all creaturely imperfections were evils, “every creature would be evil, for the reason that it would not have the perfection of the Creator” (DM XI.i.3). What grounds their position is the Scholastic distinction between (a) inappropriate creaturely imperfections (i.e., privations as evil imperfections) and (b) appropriate creaturely imperfections (i.e., mere limitations as non-evil imperfections). Given this distinction, for example, one’s inability to walk may be an evil, but one’s inability to fly may not be an evil, even though both are creaturely imperfections. In the early modern period, nonetheless, many philosophers defend the opposite position. In his reply to Bourguet, for example, Leibniz maintains that all creaturely imperfections are evils (i.e., metaphysical evils): “concerning the metaphysical evil, you say, I do not consider it an evil; but, Sir, if you admit Metaphysical good, the privation [i.e., negation] of this good will be a metaphysical evil” (G III 574). It is important to note that Leibniz identifies privation with negation. As Leibniz clarifies, “the privative [privativum] is, what one calls negation” (G VII 195). Accordingly, Leibniz’s idea is that because one considers the affirmation or presence of divine perfections to be a metaphysical good, one must consider the negation or absence of divine perfections (i.e., a creaturely imperfection) to be a metaphysical evil, which implies that all creaturely imperfections are (metaphysical) evils. But not every early modern philosopher defends Leibniz’s position. For example, Descartes draws the Scholastic distinction between (a) privations as inappropriate imperfections and (b) mere limitations as appropriate imperfections. As Descartes points out, “error is not a pure negation [i.e., a mere limitation], but a privation, or the lack of some knowledge that should be in me” (AT VII 55). Hence, for Descartes, only some creaturely imperfections are (metaphysical) evils. But what I attempt to present here is Leibniz’s standard interpretation of metaphysical evils, which prevails in the early modern period.