EJBO Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organization Studies Vol. 16, No. 1 (2011) Wittgenstein and the Practical Turn in Business Ethics Ghislain Deslandes Introduction assumption that business ethics courses fail to be attractive precisely because this "Someone who, dreaming, says "I am discipline is disconnected from business Abstract dreaming”, even if he speaks audibly in practice (a rationale challenged by Klon- The significant influence of Ludwig doing so, is no more right than if he said oski (2003) who instead advocates courses Wittgenstein in social science in his dream "it is raining", while it was essentially based in the long-established is partly due to the central role in fact raining. Even if his dream were theories of philosophical tradition, a con- actually connected with the noise of the cept which he named ‘unapplied ethics’). played by the practical dimension, rain." Then Philips and Nielsen emphasized, which is inherent in his philosophy. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, § 676 in 1993 and 1994 respectively, the con- Nowadays, the latter is drawing tingent and situational aspects of ethical strong interest in the academic Wittgenstein is considered as the thinker decision-making in organizations. How- community, in sociology, in who, in modern times, most significantly ever, the shift from a business ethics in management science as well as in contributed to placing the practical di- practice to a business ethics as a practice mension of philosophy at the centre - an ethics by definition opposed to the business ethics, a field in which of contemporary philosophical debate prior theories, which were moralizing or experts strive to establish an (Sluga, 1998; Gay, 1996). This is why prescriptive – seem to have been based ethics opposed to any normativity, his name is so commonly found in the on more ambitious conceptual founda- directly geared to managerial literature dealing with the ‘practice turn’ tions in the text written by Clegg, Ko- practices. However, the very same which has prevailed upon social sciences rnberger and Rhodes (2007). To these scholars who investigated this in the last few decades (Reckwitz, 2002). authors, who refer to Wittgenstein’s His direct influence may be observed for Philosophical Investigations as the main “practical turn” and who do not instance in the work of Giddens and his prior philosophical source pertaining to fail to refer to Wittgenstein as a “theory of structuration” (1984) or in this research trend, the overriding objec- major philosophical source are Schatzki’s Wittgensteinian Approach to tive is to describe ethics in organizations hardly prolific about his work Human Activity and the Social (1996). as an ongoing and unfinished debate be- as a philosopher. Can the main In management science, a similar turn tween contradictory moral stances, which Wittgensteinian concepts serve was taken in the field of strategy, ini- never lead to any certainty when they are tially in the wake of the strategy process put in context. According to them, organ- as a reliable theoretical basis on research ( Jarzabkowski, 2005), as illus- izations have nothing to offer but uncer- which to ground business ethics as trated for instance by Mintzberg, then as tain, complex and ambiguous situations, a practice? To answer this question, part of a trend which chose to consider which -as evidenced by Jackall’s research we first analyse the relation strategy as no longer being a mere at- work- generate “organizational moralities” between facts and values, between tribute of organizations, but as an activ- which are merely “contextual, situational, rule and practice. We then explore ity that should be put in the context of highly specific, and, most often, unarticu- the interaction between their members lated” (1988, p. 6). With Wittgenstein- the converging elements existing ( Johnson, Langley, Melin & Whitting- ian overtones, they observe that ethical in Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a ton, 2007; Chia & MacKay, 2007; Carter, dilemmas stem less from the dearth of quest for self-knowledge, before Clegg & Kornberger, 2008). Moreover, ethical systems predating decisions than expounding the principles of what such a turn has probably affected knowl- from the surfeit of stale ethical doctrines, might constitute an approach to edge management as well as the manner which collide whenever choices need to business ethics as practice. Lastly, in which the uses of technology within be made. organizations are explored (Miettinen, The same authors go on taking the ex- we underscore the limitations of Samra-Fredericks & Yanow, 2009). ample of a pharmaceutical company com- such an interpretation as well as to The “practice turn” in business eth- mitted to ecological values as well as to the need to go deeper into these ics emerged more recently; it is a field third-world countries: should it produce tentative conclusions, both from an in which the objective is to establish an less expensive drugs so as to provide for empirical and theoretical point of ethics opposed to any normativity, to any the needs of poorer countries, while run- view. idealistic abstraction, to the universality ning the risk of failing to honour its eco- of moral concepts upon which it would logical commitments, or make good on be predicated (Colby 1999; Van de Ven such promises, by producing at a higher Keywords & Johnson, 2006). Several scholars have cost, thus making it more difficult for Business ethics as practice, Foucault, indeed been able to highlight the role poorer countries to afford the medica- Managerial Practice, Practices of played by practice in the ethical exercise tions they need? of management: in an article published At this point, let us remark that the self, Rule, Wittgenstein. in 1989, Andrews brought forward the reference to Wittgenstein, albeit recur- 48 http://ejbo.jyu.fi/ EJBO Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organization Studies Vol. 16, No. 1 (2011) rent, is somewhat rash. Then, although no one seems willing to tises have nothing to say, and they cannot characterise what they question the decisive impact of his philosophy of practice upon do say (Bouveresse, 1973). In accordance with his philosophical the philosophical foundations of this research trend (see, for project, Wittgenstein’s intent is to denounce mental confusion instance, Shoter’s work on the analysis of dynamic phenomena and, here, to fight common thinking patterns, especially in the within organizations (2005)), the reference is nonetheless too realm of morality. How does he manage to achieve this goal? allusive; it would warrant better ‘elucidation’, if we venture to use First, by drawing every possible conclusion from the dichotomy a typically Wittgensteinian term. Our aim here is to offer such between facts and values. Confusing facts and values amounts enlightenment while attempting to demonstrate how Wittgen- to deluding oneself about what our values mean to ourselves. stein’s writings – in which ethics never sets itself as a supreme As it would make no sense to condemn morally a cloudy spell judge, but rather relates to contexts – may indeed help in shap- or the apparition of the sun, telling an historic event does not ing the conceptualization of managerial ethics on the basis of entitle us to pass moral judgement on this very same event. “All practices. propositions are of equal value.” (T, § 6.4). To Wittgenstein, we For that purpose, we shall focus on three main notions con- need to make a fundamental distinction between two types of tained in Wittgensteinian ethics: first, the dichotomy between judgements: on the one hand, relative value judgements, those facts and values as expressed in the 1921 Tractatus Logico-Phil- we resort to most commonly in everyday life (e.g. “ This man osophicus and the 1929 Lecture on Ethics: if the world com- is a good cook”, “That woman is a good mother”); they are no prises all the facts, the latter being ethically neutral, then the so- more than factual determinations, which may be described by called values are just illusions. Then, the importance of action: the means of language, they have a beginning and an end; on what is of interest to Wittgenstein are the concrete activities in the other hand, absolute value judgements. The latter are of a which ethical questions are posed, those in which what is “good” different nature, a nature that cannot be defined theoretically necessarily depends upon the context. And finally, the relation but which, however, is harboured by judgements that mean between practice and the rule - a relation in which the rule seems something about the ultimate meaning of life. They never fully to aim at setting the limits of the future, before knowing the achieve this goal as the locus of ethics is always outside the space upcoming context. From this conceptual analysis, we may infer of facts: the description of facts, of contingencies, cannot pos- that although Wittgenstein renounces to offer a foundation to sibly express the slightest absolute value. Ethics is, as it were, morality, the ethical question remains fundamental to him, inso- outside of the world, beyond the words and the limits deline- far as philosophy is a self-on-self work ("Working in philosophy ated by our language ( Jimenez, 2008; Glock, 2003). This is why – like work in architecture in many respects – is really more a any discourse on values, even when it deals with “organisational working on oneself ", CV, p.16). We then bring the discussion values” is bound to be worthless to Wittgenstein. into the field of subjectivity so as to compare such arguments Despite such a negative conclusion, this first element leads us with the theories developed by Foucault, who is another anti- to the second one: if ethics cannot be spoken about, if it cannot essentialist philosopher; his ideas resurfaced in 2009 as a result be expressed in propositions, it can nonetheless be applied and of the publication of his latest lectures bearing on “practices of displayed through behaviours, actions, lifestyles which, in their the self ”.