Toward a consensus on the nature of contemporary insurgency: an analysis of counterinsurgency in the War on Terror 2001-2010 Erich Julian Elze A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy UNSW Australia School of International Studies Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences July 2013 1 “What is more important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some stirred-up Moslems [sic] or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war (Brzezinski 1998)?” Zbigniew Brzezinski served as the National Security Advisor to United States President Jimmy Carter. 2 Abstract “Following the terrorist attacks of September 2001, US President George W. Bush announced a War on Terror to promulgate democracy and ameliorate the conditions that spawn terrorism in the Middle East. COIN thus attained a newfound strategic influence since the initiation of regime changes in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003. This study establishes a conceptual framework for judging COIN utilising the Hybrid War and Insurgent Archipelago models. The Hybrid War model best encapsulates the multi- modal nature of contemporary insurgency which has co-manifested with criminality, nationalism and politicised Islam. This thesis contends that the lack of understanding of the enemy has been of central importance in preventing victory. A case study methodology is utilised to evaluate and compare COIN conducted during the Iraq troop surge and in Afghanistan’s Kunar province. This thesis determines that the positive narrative concerning those COIN campaigns exceeds the actual correlation between COIN and reductions in violence and insurgency. A clear consensus on the nature of contemporary insurgency and its remedies must be established to avoid future failures in COIN.” 3 Acknowledgements I wish to thank my master Associate Professor Andrew Tan for his patience and skill in imparting the nuances of strategic thought and professional writing. Without him this work would still be a dream. To my father, your wild son hopes he has made you proud. To my dearest friend Paul 'Sully' O'Sullivan, thank-you for walking with me on this long journey. 4 Contents Page Abstract 3 Acknowledgments 4 Contents 5 Abbreviations 15 Chapter One Introduction 21 Rationale, Research Aims, Hypothesis 21 Methodology 25 Strategy and Force Planning Framework 27 Theoretical Models 28 The Utility of Case Studies 30 Sources 36 5 Contribution to the Field 38 Chapter Two Theoretical Concepts and Models 40 The Western Concept of War 41 Conventional Warfare 43 Technology and the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' 44 Unconventional Warfare 46 Guerrilla Warfare 48 People's War 49 Unconventional Warfare Theory and Practice 51 People's War and its Adaptations 51 The Urban Guerrilla 53 Classical Counterinsurgency 55 6 The Authoritarian/Punishment Model of COIN 56 The 'Carrot and Stick' COIN Model 58 The Political COIN Model, Winning 'Hearts and Minds' 60 Vietnam Syndrome and the American Way of War 62 The American Way of War 64 Contemporary Insurgency and the Search for its Remedy 66 The Argument for Insurgency without Precedent 67 Reinventing the Wheel - COIN as the Solution 69 Conceptual Models 73 The Nature and Development of Strategy 73 The Hybrid War Model 78 The Insurgent Archipelago Model 80 7 Chapter Three Counterinsurgency in Iraq - The Troop Surge 2006-2008 84 Iraq Historical Overview 85 The Religion of Islam 85 Iraq under Saddam Hussein 87 Operation Iraqi Freedom 89 Justifications for War in Iraq 89 Invasion and Occupation 91 Descent into Chaos 93 Strategic Malaise 94 Hybrid War: Insurgency, Sectarian Violence and Criminality 99 The Growth of the Insurgency and Iraqi Sectarianism 99 Al-Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda in Iraq 102 8 The Politics of Sectarianism 104 National and Regional Politics, By Other Means 106 The Iraq Troop Surge - The Strategic Calculus 109 Iraq's Cycle of Violence 109 A Dysfunctional Command Structure 111 Focussing on Baghdad 112 The Surge Takes Shape 114 The Hybrid War Model 116 Accidental Guerrilla Syndrome 118 The Sunni Awakening in Anbar 119 The Path to COIN in Anbar 120 Risha's Awakening Movement 124 The Awakening - Costs and Census Data 126 9 Accounts from the Field 127 Strategic Impact 131 The Troop Surge in Baghdad 133 Joint Security Stations 136 The Iraqi Government as a Sectarian Actor 138 Prime Minister al-Maliki 141 Factors Leading to Declining Violence in Baghdad 143 Consequences of Ethnic Cleansing 143 Events Between and Within Shiite Militias 144 Leveraging the Iraqi Government 145 Strategic Impacts 147 The Weakening of the Central Government 150 Conclusion 151 10 Assessment - Deficiencies, Risks and Alternatives 159 Chapter Four Afghanistan Case Study - The War on Terror and COIN in Afghanistan 164 Pawn of Empire 166 The Soviet Union and Afghanistan 171 Pakistan and the Mujahideen 178 Strategic Consequences of the Soviet-Afghan War 181 The Emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan 184 The War on Terror - Operation Enduring Freedom 188 The Bonn Agreement and the UN in Afghanistan 192 Afghanistan's Elections 197 Motivators of Violence in Afghanistan 200 The Afghan Insurgency and ISAF's Expansion 2003-2010 205 11 The post-2001 Hybrid War in Afghanistan 213 Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency 213 The neo-Taliban 216 COIN in Afghanistan's Regional Command - East 223 US Tactical COIN in Kunar Province 227 General McChrystal and Population-Centric COIN 233 Failed Governance in Afghanistan 245 President Obama's Inheritance of the War in Afghanistan 252 The Resurgence of COIN Doctrine within the Obama Administration 255 Strategic Impacts 264 Conclusion 273 Chapter Five Case Study Comparison and Conclusions 280 12 Research Frameworks 281 Strategy Development and the Nature of War 281 Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 282 The Hybrid War Model 284 The Insurgent Archipelago Model 285 Summary of Case Study Findings 286 Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Iraq Troop Surge 286 Operation Enduring Freedom, COIN and 'Nation-Building' 288 Comparison of OEF and OIF 292 Strategic Assessment 301 Concluding Remarks 302 References Primary Sources 305 13 Secondary Sources 326 14 Abbreviations 4GW Fourth-Generation Warfare ABP Afghan Border Police AEI American Enterprise Institute AGS Accidental Guerrilla Syndrome ANA Afghan National Army ANP Afghan National Police ANSF Afghan National Security Forces AQ Al-Qaeda AQI Al-Qaeda in Iraq AUP Afghan Uniformed Police AWW American Way of War BCT Brigade Combat Team 15 CENTCOM United States Central Command CERP Commander's Emergency Response Program CIA Central Intelligence Agency CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CJTF Combined Joint Task Force COIN Counterinsurgency COP Combat Outpost CPA Coalition Provisional Authority CTF Combined Task Force CTPT Counterterrorism Pursuit Team CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration DoD United States Department of Defence 16 DRA Democratic Republic of Afghanistan FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan) FOB Forward Operating Base FM Field Manual GWOT Global War on Terror HIG Hizb-i-Islami ICG International Crisis Group ID Infantry Division ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISF Iraqi Security Forces ISI Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan) JAM Jaysh Al-Mahdi JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 17 JSAT Joint Strategic Assessment Team JSOC Joint Special Operations Command JP Joint Publication LCOSF Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces MNF-I Multi National Force-Iraq N2KL Nangahar, Nuristan, Kunar and Laghman Provinces NA Northern Alliance NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NTM-A NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan NWFP North West Frontier Province (Pakistan) OEF Operation Enduring Freedom OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom PDPA People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan 18 PMC Private Military Company POTD Propaganda of the Deed PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team RC Regional Command RMA Revolution in Military Affairs SCIRI Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq SOF Special Operations Forces SOI Sons of Iraq TF Task Force TNSM Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan TWJ Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad UK United Kingdom 19 UN United Nations UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNSC United Nations Security Council US United States USAF United States Air Force USAID United States Agency for International Development USMC United States Marine Corps USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 20 Chapter One Introduction Rationale, Research Aims, Hypothesis The Bush Administration’s conventional military invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) were conducted in an attempt to remove terrorist safe havens, to prevent such groups acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and to reshape the Middle East by promulgating democracy (Chernus 2006, 4-6; Ricks 2009, 164; Braude 2003, xii). The morality and correctness of the Bush Administration’s response to the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent military operations are beyond the scope of this research. This thesis will examine the contemporary manifestations of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. Insurgency is defined as organised violent rebellions enacted in attempts to destabilise, remove or compromise the existing political control of a region (ICG 2008, 6; Kilcullen 2004, 15). Insurgencies arise when a government fails to address social irritants such as corruption, poverty and lawlessness that often result from failed governance (Metz 2004, 26).