ASIA PROGRAM Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, D.C. 20004-3027 www.wilsoncenter.org ISBN: 978-1-938027-82-6 Cover Image: Asianet-Pakistan/Shutterstock.com Copyright 2018, All Rights Reserved THE WILSON CENTER, chartered by Congress as the official memorial to President Woodrow Wilson, is the nation’s key nonpartisan policy forum for tackling global issues through independent research and open dialogue to inform actionable ideas for Congress, the Administration, and the broader policy community. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to the Center. Please visit us online at www.wilsoncenter.org. Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO BOARD OF TRUSTEES Chairman: Frederic V. Malek, Founder and Chairman, Thayer Lodging Group, a Brookfield Property Public members: Jon Parrish Peede, Acting Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities; Don J. Wright, Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; David Ferriero, Archivist of the United States; Carla D. Hayden, Librarian of Congress; Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary, U.S. Department of State; Elisabeth DeVos, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education; David J. Skorton, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution. Designated appointee of the president from within the federal government: Vacant Private Citizen Members: Peter J. Beshar, Executive Vice President & General Counsel, Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc.; Thelma Duggin, President, AnBryce Foundation; Barry S. Jackson, Managing Director, The Lindsey Group and Strategic Advisor, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck; David Jacobson, Former U.S. Ambassador to Canada and Vice Chair, BMO Financial Group; Nathalie Rayes, Vice President of Public Affairs, Grupo Salinas; Earl W. Stafford, Chief Executive Officer, The Wentworth Group, LLC; Jane Watson Stetson, Philanthropist; Louis Susman, Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE 1 AUTHOR’S NOTE 3 AUTHOR’S BIOGRAPHY 11 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 15 METHODOLOGY 16 BACKGROUND OF THE U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP 20 THE PAKISTAN ARMY COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 24 STUDY OBSERVATIONS 1. THE STAFF COLLEGE EXPERIENCE: DEMOGRAPHY, RELIGIOSITY, CULTURAL FACTORS, EVALUATION SYSTEM, AND CURRICULUM 33 2. PERCEPTIONS OF EXTERNAL THREATS AND FRIENDSHIPS 52 3. PERCEPTIONS OF INTERNAL THREATS AND FRIENDSHIPS 67 4. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE STATE AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 79 5. ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR ISSUES 90 STUDY FINDINGS 97 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 111 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 119 ENDNOTES 125 ANNEX A. STUDY SAMPLE 139 ANNEX B. STUDY DATA INPUTS (Omitted) 140 ANNEX C. STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE 141 ANNEX D. PAKISTANI STUDENT BRANCH ORIGIN 146 ANNEX E. DIRECTING STAFF PROMOTION RATE 148 ANNEX F. CURRICULUM EXTRACTS 149 ANNEX G. GUEST SPEAKER PRESENTATIONS 152 ANNEX H. SEMINARS AND MAJOR EXERCISES 158 ANNEX I. PAKISTAN ARMY GENERATIONS 163 David O. Smith PREFACE The Pakistani Army has long been a challenging yet critical partner for the U.S. government. On the one hand, Washington views it as the architect of policies that are deeply problematic for the United States. These policies include the development and production of nuclear weapons, and the provision of safe havens for terrorists that target American soldiers across the border in Afghanistan. Despite Washington’s efforts to get Pakistan to alter these policies, they have remained in place for several decades. At the same time, the Pakistani Army is a key U.S. interlocutor. This is due to the Army’s strong influence on Pakistani politics, and to its powerful role managing policy toward America. According to the U.S. government’s calculus, Washington cannot afford not to work with such a powerful player in a nation critical to American interests. Accordingly, while the United States supports civilian institutions in Pakistan—particularly through development assistance programs and its engagement with the Pakistani civilian leadership—military-to- military ties play a major role in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. For these reasons, it is helpful to know what members of the Pakistani Army think. For example, what are their values; what are their attitudes toward the United States and other key countries; how do they perceive internal and external threats; what are their thoughts on Pakistan’s political situation; what do they think about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program; and how do these perspectives differ, if at all, within the Army and over time. Given the sensitivity of many of these issues, getting answers to these questions is not easy. To that end, this new study by David O. Smith represents an invaluable addition to the literature. It offers a revealing window into the thinking of three groups of Pakistani Army officers—senior officers (brigadier and major generals); senior mid-level officers (lieutenant colonels and colonels); and junior mid-level officers (captains and majors)—who served at the Pakistan Army Command and Staff College in the city of Quetta between 1977 and 2014. The study is based on the experiences and observations of American military officers—including Smith himself—who attended the facility as students over that 37-year period. In 2016, U.S. officials decided to withdraw American military officers from the Staff College due to security concerns. As Smith explains in his Author’s Note, his decision to publish this study was made only after he concluded in late 1 The Quetta Experience 2017 that the U.S. government is unlikely to send any more officers to the facility in the future. While the study is now several years old, Smith rightly points out that its findings and conclusions remain relevant and timely. The Pakistan Army’s “attitudes and values have changed very little in the 37 years of this study,” he writes, “and there is no reason to expect they will change appreciably in the future, and certainly not in the next decade.” The Wilson Center’s Asia Program is delighted to publish Smith’s study. We hope it will serve as a useful resource for those interested in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, Pakistan, broader South Asia, and international relations on the whole. Michael Kugelman Deputy Director, Asia Program, and Senior Associate for South Asia Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Washington, DC July 2018 2 David O. Smith AUTHOR’S NOTE The field research for this study began in early 2013 and ended in early 2014. The study itself was completed in the summer of 2014. There was no expectation at that time that it would ever be published. Although it contained no classified information, it was based primarily on interviews with U.S. Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) that attended the Pakistan Army Command and Staff College in Quetta between 1977 and 2014. Therefore, it was the sourcing of the study rather than its content or judgments that was deemed by the author and the study’s sponsor, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, to be sensitive. Thus, a decision was taken not to publish the study and to restrict its circulation. Copies were provided only to agencies and offices of the Washington Interagency policy and intelligence communities, to the regional combatant commands in Tampa and Honolulu, and to a handful of South Asia specialists in the Washington-based think tank community that were enjoined not to disseminate the findings to outsiders. This was done solely from an abundance of caution that the findings and conclusions, many of them critical of practices at the Staff College, and by implication of the Pakistan Army, might make an already difficult and challenging year at Quetta even more so for future U.S. students. This concern was obviated in the spring of 2016 when the U.S. ambassador in Pakistan, concerned about the safety and security of the two American students in Quetta, directed the embassy’s Regional Security Office to perform a site security survey at the college. When the Pakistani government refused permission for the survey to be conducted, the Ambassador ordered the students withdrawn from the course and returned to the United States.1 During a visit to Islamabad in November 2017, I asked the ambassador if American students might ever return to Quetta. He replied that according to information he had been given, the U.S. Army FAO Proponent Office did not plan to send another student to Quetta, finding it cheaper to train future South Asia FAOs by funding short duration regional assignments than paying for a full year of study at the Command and Staff College. With no American student likely to attend the college in the future, there was no longer any reason not to make the study available to a wider audience. The study is now four years old. Two questions naturally arise. Are the study’s findings and conclusions no longer valid? And should the study be completely rewritten to bring it up to date to address significant events that occurred both in Pakistan and the United States in the intervening years? The short answer to both questions is “No.” After carefully reviewing my findings and conclusions, 3 The Quetta Experience I believe the study remains as valid today as when it was originally written. As I stated four year ago in the study’s last sentence, “The final point is simply this: the [Pakistan] Army’s attitudes and values have changed very little in the 37 years of this study, and there is no reason to expect they will change appreciably in the future, and certainly not in the next decade.” However, I appreciate the fact that several significant events have indeed occurred in the last four years. These should be acknowledged, and, where appropriate, commented upon. U.S.