REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE EVENTS IN SOUTHERN KYRGYZSTAN IN JUNE 2010 i ii Executive Summary 1. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in southern Kyrgyzstan was established after the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, H.E. Ms. Roza Otunbayeva asked Dr. Kimmo Kiljunen, Special Representative for Central Asia, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to coordinate the preparation process to establish it. After broad consultation with numerous international bodies, including the UN, the OSCE, the EU, the CIS and the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the terms of reference were established and endorsed. The KIC was mandated to investigate the facts and circumstances relevant to incidents that took place in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, qualify the violations and crimes under international law, determine responsibilities and make recommendations, particularly on accountability measures, so as to ensure the non-repetition of the violations and to contribute towards peace, stability and reconciliation. 2. The present report is based upon extensive interviews and analysis conducted by the KIC in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere. In excess of 750 witnesses, 700 documents and many thousands of photographs and video extracts were considered by the KIC. The KIC has been able to establish a detailed and accurate narrative of the June events in Osh and Jalalabad. The events must be viewed in the context of the historical and political background of the region, particularly the relationship between the communities of ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks. In this regard the KIC notes the under-representation of ethnic Uzbeks in public life and the rising force of ethno-nationalism in the politics of Kyrgyzstan. The KIC notes further the power vacuum and consequent political rivalries, fragile state institutions and the weak rule of law in southern Kyrgyzstan in the wake of the 7 April overthrow of the Bakiyev government. 3. The events resulted in significant loss of life and injury, of which the majority of victims were ethnic Uzbeks. In total about 470 people died. It is expected that this figure will grow but not substantially. About 1,900 people received medical assistance at hospitals. Many thousands of people were displaced. About 111,000 people were displaced to Uzbekistan and a further 300,000 were internally displaced. There was also significant property damage, again to a disproportionately high number of ethnic Uzbek owned properties. In total about 2,800 properties were damaged. The KIC notes that ethnic Kyrgyz also suffered very significant losses, in terms of life, health and property. The KIC has found that both communities suffered loss. ii 4. The seizure, distribution and use of weapons during the events is a particularly disturbing feature of the events. In many instances crowds of attackers seized firearms and ammunition from the military and police in circumstances largely unopposed by troops or officers. Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) were also surrendered. The KIC notes, with some concern, that some 80 weapons and about 19,000 rounds of ammunition have not been recovered. The authorities of Kyrgyzstan have failed to carry out appropriate criminal and disciplinary investigations into the loss of weapons. 5. Further to the narrative of facts and circumstances, the KIC has qualified the violations under international law. It is the view of the KIC that the violence of June does not qualify as either war crimes or genocide. However, if the evidence of some acts committed during certain attacks against the mahallas in Osh on 11, 12 and 13 June was proven beyond reasonable doubt in a court of law, those acts would amount to crimes against humanity. These are murder, rape, other forms of sexual violence, physical violence (as an other inhumane act) and persecution against an identifiable group on ethnic grounds. The KIC is of the view that no acts of violence committed in Jalalabad would qualify as crimes against humanity. There were many other criminal acts committed in both Osh and Jalalabad during the events that fall under the Criminal Code of Kyrgyzstan. 6. Sexual and gender based violence committed during the events remains underreported and largely unacknowledged by the authorities. While the KIC has corroborated around twenty rapes and other incidents of sexual violence, the true figure is certain to be considerably higher. Women have continued to suffer sexual and gender based violence in the aftermath of the events. In the rare cases where victims have chosen to file claims for rape the response of the authorities has been inadequate if not obstructive. 7. The KIC was not mandated to conduct a criminal investigation, which remains the responsibility of the authorities of Kyrgyzstan. Neither is it a prosecuting authority or tribunal. The KIC is not in a position to identify named individuals as being responsible for the crimes that have been documented. This results in part from the limitation of its mandate, but other factors are also relevant, including: the short timeframe for its work; the limited investigative capacities available to it; and its inability to require individuals to testify. It is essential, both in fulfilment of domestic and international legal obligations and in order that justice be done and community wounds healed, that every effort be made by the authorities of Kyrgyzstan to establish individual criminal responsibility. ii 8. In addition to the documented international and domestic criminal acts, the KIC has found that there have been and still are serious violations of international human rights law committed by the State in the aftermath of the events. There is a consistent and reliable body of material which tends to show that acts of torture were committed in detention centres by the authorities of Kyrgyzstan in the aftermath of the June events. Of particular concern to the KIC is that such acts of torture are ongoing and that the response of the authorities to allegations of torture has been grossly inadequate. 9. Criminal investigations and trials which have resulted from the June events have been marked by breaches of the ICCPR fair trial rights. Large scale sweep operations conducted in Uzbek mahallas on 21 to 23 June and the smaller scale search operations which then followed have involved ill-treatment and arbitrary arrest and detention. There has been selective prosecution targeting the ethnic Uzbek minority. Defence lawyers representing ethnic Uzbek defendants have been subject to improper interference and intimidation. 10. The KIC has examined the institutional and political responsibility of various actors and institutions. The Provisional Government, which had assumed power two months before the events, either failed to recognize or underestimated the deterioration in inter-ethnic relations in southern Kyrgyzstan. Arguments advanced by President Otunbayeva that the eruption of violence was of such magnitude that it made it difficult for the Provisional Government to contain do not absolve the government of its basic responsibility to protect the population. The KIC finds that the violence of June was reasonably foreseeable and that the Provisional Government should have developed a contingency plan that would, in the event that it occurred, have contained it. Particularly, the Provisional Government had the responsibility to ensure that the security forces were adequately trained and appropriately equipped to deal with situations of civil unrest. 11. The KIC considers the actions of other actors to have been inadequate. General Ismail Isakov, the Special Representative of the Provisional Government for Southern Kyrgyzstan took effective command over the operational headquarters and security forces in Osh city and province. His failure to deploy the security forces with clear orders and rules of engagement providing for the use of non-lethal force on 11 June or subsequent days constitutes a serious omission. The Commandant of Osh city and province, Bakyt Alymbekov, unlawfully abdicated control over law enforcement in favour of General Isakov and failed in his duty to ensure that human rights were respected during the restoration of order. The Commandant of Jalalabad, Kubatbek Baybolov, failed to take all measures within his power to end the violence in Jalalabad. He is now the Prosecutor General and has failed to ensure that the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed during the events and aftermath iii have been conducted in accordance with the domestic and international legal obligations of Kyrgyzstan. The nationalist rhetoric of the Mayor of Osh, Melis Myrzakmatov, was not conducive to the calming of inter-ethnic tensions. 12. The role of the security forces in the events was significant. The military personnel under the command of the Provisional Government numbered 2,000. The KIC is of the opinion that had those troops been properly instructed and deployed, it would have been possible to prevent or stop the violence and to block the access to Osh city by the attackers who moved from rural areas. The failure of members of the security forces to protect their equipment raises questions of complicity in the events, either directly or indirectly. Further, some members of the military were involved in some of the attacks on the mahallas. 13. In accordance with its mandate the KIC has made recommendations as to conflict prevention and reconciliation, accountability and impunity. 14. As to conflict