Thinking outside of the One China box How to undo the Gordian knot in the Cross-Strait impasse?∗ JYRKI KALLIO AND MIKAEL MATTLIN To be presented at the Inaugural Conference of the European Association of Taiwan Studies at The London School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), 17–18 April, 2004 This paper starts from the premise that the status quo between Taiwan and mainland China is not stable, and discusses the resulting pressures for the parties to change their policies accordingly. We suggest a solution to the stalemate in the form of a “confederation with Chinese characteristics”: a confederation in form but not in name, based on the unity of Zhonghua (Chinese civilization) having a concrete form in shared organs and symbols. Emphasis is put on the choices of Taiwan, as Taiwan appears to be moving towards final separation from the mainland, which, if formalized, would lead to war. The mainland accuses Chen Shui-bian of aiming at rewriting the constitution in 2006 and declaring formal independence in 2008. The legitimacy of the Communist regime is tied to reunification, whereas it is unrealistic to expect Taiwan, a state-like democracy, to accept direct rule by mainland China. The coming few years present a window of opportunity, but also potential for disaster. The key issue to the solution is the concept of One China, which there is no consensus of. There is an urgent need to create an interpretation of the concept which would meet the concerns of both parties internally as well as internationally. The proposed solution would strike a delicate balance guaranteeing the complete self-determination of Taiwan in a de facto confederation and elevating it to an equal position with the mainland, while creating an image of a unified China through the establishment of a formal “ceiling” structure, modeled after the British Commonwealth. In the age old spirit of the Rectification of Names, the creation of a united Zhonghua could make the reality look like a victory for everyone. ∗ The political solution proposed herewith is based on the ideas presented by the two authors in a Finnish language article in Kosmopolis 33, No. 1 (2003): 39-58. An earlier, shorter version of this paper was published in Issues & Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4 (December 2003). – The authors are aware of the similarities between this paper and an International Crisis Group report, co-authored by Linda Jakobson, B.A., from Finland, Taiwan Strait IV: How an ultimate political solution might look (26 February 2004, ICG Asia Report no. 75, Beijing/Taipei/Washington/Brussels), as well as an article by the same author, “Taiwan’s Challenge to China and the World – Part II: A ‘Greater Chinese Union’ offers best political solution” (YaleGlobal, 15 March 2004). The authors wish to point out that the model proposed in this paper is based entirely on the above mentioned article in Kosmopolis, published in March 2003, while neither of Jakobson’s publications contain any references to that article. JYRKI KALLIO, M.Soc.Sc., Department of East Asian Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, is a doctoral candidate currently working on translating pre-Qin texts from Guwen guanzhi (____) into Finnish. He holds office as Counselor at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Unit for Asia and Oceania. The views expressed in this paper do not represent Finland’s official policy. He can be reached at <[email protected]>. MIKAEL MATTLIN, M.Soc.Sc., Department of Political Science, University of Helsinki, Finland, is a doctoral candidate and member of the Finnish Graduate School of East and Southeast Asian Studies. His main research interests are informal political structures and political economy in both Taiwan and mainland China, and Chinese government strategies for building knowledge-based industries. He can be reached at <[email protected]>. 1 2 The current status quo of the Taiwan question is not stable. Despite extensive economic links and interdependencies across the Taiwan Strait, there is as yet no sign of any spillover from economic integration to politics. On the contrary, Taiwan appears to be moving towards final separation from the mainland. The Chen Shui-bian (___) government has introduced several initiatives that could be interpreted as “creeping” formal independence, such as adding the word “Taiwan” to passports, introducing a referendum law (which Beijing fears will later be used for a vote on independence), and announcing that a new constitution will be drafted in coming years. On the political front, time is not working for the reunificationists. On the other hand, military1 and economic2 realities are not in favor of the separatists. Reunification is the only acceptable outcome to mainland China. Beijing resolutely maintains that, if need be, a final separation will be prevented by military means. However, it is unrealistic to expect Taiwan—a state-like democracy—to accept direct rule by mainland China. The Taiwan question differs from other cases of a divided state in that neither side has accepted the de facto division of China, nor has a clear line of separation been drawn between “West” and “East” China.”3 The current line of demarcation is defined not by trenches, but rather by different interpretations of China and of how many “Chinas” there are in existence. The traditional Chinese conception of legitimacy, power, and 1 According to most estimates, Beijing will achieve military supremacy some time between 2005 and 2007. The U.S. government has become increasingly worried that Beijing’s missile build-up is aimed at a quick military strike to bring Taiwan to its knees. See “Cross-Strait Security Issues,” chapter 8 in The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship Between the United States and China, Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission, July 2002, http://www.uscc.gov/researchreports/2000_2003/reports/ch8_02.htm (accessed March 9, 2004). 2 China has already clearly surpassed both the United States and Japan as Taiwan’s main trading partner. In 2003, Taiwan’s trade with mainland China (including Hong Kong) amounted to US$62.5 billion (23.0 percent of Taiwan’s total trade). Excluding Hong Kong, Taiwan’s trade with mainland China was approximately US$46.3 billion. In exports, the dependence on China is even clearer, with 34.5 percent of Taiwan exports destined for mainland China and Hong Kong, as against 18.0 percent destined for the United States and 8.3 percent for Japan, Taiwan’s other main trading partners. Data sources: ROC Ministry of Economic Affairs, http://www.moea.gov.tw (accessed March 8, 2004); and “Cross-Strait Trade Increases to Record US$46.3m in 2003,” Taipei Times, March 8, 2004, 10. 3 Taiwan has not given up and neither has China taken by force the islands of Jinmen (__) and Mazu (__) close to the mainland. See, for example, Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands: Together with an Implication for Outer Mongolia and Sino-Soviet Relations (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1985). 3 well-being culminates (especially from the point of the view of the PRC) in the Taiwan question. The division of the country would mean loss of the legitimacy of the ruler. In imperial China, the emperor’s true power hardly reached further than the walls of the Forbidden City.4 In such a setting, the state could remain united only if the emperor possessed a strong moral legitimacy and if power was highly ritualized.5 As Lucian W. Pye has aptly stated, China is a “civilization trying to squeeze itself into the format of a modern state.”6 This aspect of civilization comes forward in the term Zhonghua (__), used in the official names of both the Republic and the People’s Republic of China. We believe it is possible to start constructing the basis for modern Chinese unity at the level of culture, instead of unity as a state. Even Taiwan’s Vice-President Lü Hsiu-lien (___), a leading independence advocate in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, _____), which assumed power in 2000, has said that Taiwanese can accept one Zhonghua but not one Zhongguo (__). According to Lü, Taiwanese do not want to call themselves Zhongguoren (___)—a general term for Chinese, which refers in particular to citizens of the Chinese state—but see themselves as Zhonghua ernü (____),7 i.e., the sons and daughters of “Chineseness.” We believe that a confederation based on one unified Zhonghua, instead of one Zhongguo, provides a model which would give a ritual form to the unity of Chinese 4 See Ray Huang, 1587. A Year of No Significance. The Ming Dynasty in Decline (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981) for a vivid illustration of the limits of the Emperor’s actual power. 5 That is to say, the basis of unity lay in orthopraxy, not orthodoxy. See James L. Watson, “Rites or Beliefs? The Construction of a Unified China in Late Imperial China,” in China’s Quest for National Identity, ed. Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 80-103. 6 Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 235-36. 7 See Allen T. Cheng, “Being Chinese,” Asiaweek, November 2, 2001, http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/dateline/0,8782,182319,00.html (accessed March 9, 2004). The mainland Chinese leadership has also used the same term to describe all Chinese on the mainland as well as in Taiwan. See Jiang Zemin, “Quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui, kaichuang Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi shiye xin jumian” (Zai Zhongguo Gongchandang dishiliuci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao) (November 8, 2002), http://www.gmw.com.cn/gmrb/gmrbhomepage.nsf/documentview/2002-11-18-01-57983 (accessed November 22, 2003); and “Zhu Rongji shuo, zuguo de wanquan tongyi yiding nenggou zaori shixian,” Guangmingwang, March 5, 2003, http://www.gmw.com.cn/2_zhuanti/shizheng/lh/2003/lhxw/0305/0305_005.htm (accessed March 6, 2003).