INTERNATIONAL STUDIES INTERDISCIPLINARY POLITICAL AND CULTURAL JOURNAL, Vol. 18, No. 2/2016 10.1515/ ipcj-2016-0008 Jacek Reginia-Zacharski UKRAINIAN ISSUES IN GEOPOLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES ABSTRACT: Ukrainian lands in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have been in proximity of great geopolitical changes several times. During that time the Ukrainian nation – due to various factors – encountered a number of “windows of opportunity” for achieving the realization of dreams about independence and national sovereignty. The author identified in the period considered four “general moments,” of which two have been completed successfully. The first of these oc- curred in 1990–1991, when for the first time in modern history, Ukrainians man- aged to achieve a lasting and relatively stable independence. The second of the “moments” – still unresolved – are events that began in the late autumn of 2013. The process, called “Revolution of Dignity”, represents a new quality in the history of the Ukrainian nation, therefore, that the Ukrainians have to defend the status quo (independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, etc.) but not to seek to achieve an independent being. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the ability of Ukrainians to achieve and maintain independence is largely a function of the rela- tive power of the Russian state as measured with respect to the shape and quality of international relations. KEYWORDS: Ukraine, geopolitics, geostrategy, Russia, Maidan, war, security complex Ukraine’s geopolitical importance in the modern scientific re- flection and views, which can be described as “colloquial,” seems to be pretty obvious (Moczulski, 2010: 312). The country, located in the basin of the Dnieper River, with wide access to the Black Sea, an important human and economic potential, and above all, being a special keystone between “East” and “West,” has been pre- destined to play an important geopolitical role (Al-Rodhan, 2009: 18–19). Perhaps these factors decided about quite evident in the past century phenomenon, the essence of which may be the formu- lated as the assertion that Ukrainian lands and affairs were gener- [5] 6 Jacek Reginia-Zacharski ally regarded as the object of the game between the global powers (Moczulski 1999: 707–708). Ukrainian efforts to conclude aspira- tions for subjectivity were relatively rare and only rather briefly had a chance of appearing in world politics. These unique situations were associated with deep turbulence in the international configu- ration/model of the distribution of power, which could occur as a result of the struggle/war on an enormous scale. In the twenti- eth century this “window of opportunity” appeared mainly during and after the First World War. During another collective conflict – the Second World War, the Ukrainian lands in effect only slightly marked the occurrence of opportunities for their own independent existence. It was primarily due to the fact that the Soviet Union achieved the status of a superpower. This justifies a conclusion that the great military conflicts created a chance for Ukraine only when they led to a significant weakening (or temporarily collapse) the pos- sibility of Russia’s geopolitical influence. The turn of the 80’s and 90’s of the twentieth century is an emphatic confirmation of this observation. The disintegration of the Soviet (Russian) empire and related geopolitical impotence was not the result of an open armed struggle, however, it led to the effective use of the arising opportuni- ties for the implementation of political, national and state identity Ukraine (D. Arel, B. A. Ruble, 2006: 227–229). It is worth highlight- ing that all three cited attempts (after all, even during the Second World War Ukrainian nationalist elites made some effort to achieve a state or quasi-state identity) were calculated to achieve the effect of the entrance to the geopolitical game on the principles of being an independent and sovereign player. The nature of the events which took place in Ukraine in the 2013 and 2014 was definitely different. First of all, the Ukraini- an state was sovereign, so in terms of international law and or- der one cannot talk about “the struggle for independence,” but rather about its defense. In addition, it should it should be noted that the geopolitical processes, particularly related to the flows of power in the world, the quality of particular centers and the di- rections of the change were very dynamic and turbulent in that time (Al-Rodhan, 2009: 93–94). It would be a truism to say that the world at the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century is far different from the world at the end of the previous century (Brzeziński, 2007: kindle edition), however, it is necessary to capture these differences, particularly in the context of Ukrai- nian lands. The main factor influencing was the realization of the postulate of subjectivity of Ukraine (perhaps the first time from the Ukrainian Issues in Geopolitical Thought of the Twentieth… 7 settlement of Pereyaslav). It is reasonable, therefore, to emphasize that the turn of the century was marked by a more effective coming out of the Russian State from a period of time referred to as “the Troubles” (Smuta), which was characterized, on the one hand, by internal weakness, but mainly in the field of deep impotence of the international game. “Putin’s” Russia is a country that dynamically and successfully has returned to the group of major players in the world, both in the individual as well as collective formulas (even in a heavily promoted, but still a bit “spectral” concept of BRIC or BRICS). It can be assumed that the process of coming out from the geopolitical collapse of the Russian Federation has intensified in response to the “color revolutions” in the former Soviet Union – “Rose” in Georgia (2003), “Orange” in Ukraine (2004–2005), and “Tulip” in Kyrgyzstan (2005). The first two especially proved to be dangerous from the perspective of the Kremlin, as they led to a pro- found geopolitical reorientation of foreign policy regarding Georgia and Ukraine (Olchawa, 2009: 117). The Russian Federation took a strongly negative position against these changes. Of course one cannot recognize that, until 2003, the Russian Federation favorably looked at emancipation trends in the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The lack of decisive action and rather modest tools held by the Kremlin were results of self-conscious of relatively weakness rather. On the other hand, Georgian and Ukrainian aspirations were considered in Russia as formulated within acceptable limits. The situation was changed in 1999–2004 due to the admission countries from Central Europe to NATO and the European Union (Wilson, 2005: 21). As a result, the “strategic culture” of the West came into direct contact with the boundar- ies of the area defined by the Russian Federation in the mid-90s of the twentieth century as strategically important “near abroad” (Cordesman, Al-Rodhan, 2006: 112) (Shoemaker, 2014: 90). It was a significant fact that since 2001 the United States – properly seen as the main actor in organizing the security architecture of the transatlantic space – were involved initially in wars in Afghanistan (since 2001) and Iraq (since 2003). Since 2009, the foreign policy of the United States, through the announcement of the “reset” in rela- tions with the Russian Federation and “Asiatic Pivot,” transferred the center of gravity from European theater to Asian issues. It has opened a lot of space for the activity of Russian politics. In fact, this period can be moved to the mid-2008, when the US Congress was dominated since 2007 by Democrats (110 seats), and was strongly supported by the growing chances of Barack Obama to became the 8 Jacek Reginia-Zacharski next President of the United States. Those factors allowed Russian strategists to assume a possibility of deep revalue in the foreign policy of the United States in the close future (Olchawa, 2009: 183). Necessary tools for the new and active policy of the Russian Fed- eration were secured due to the high prices of energy and lucrative arms contracts. It is also worth noting that in the first case, Russia led a fairly open policy calculated to monopolize certain markets, or at least their domination. It was possible according to an aggressive policy in the energetic markets, as well as events in the world (the “Arab spring,” the war in Syria, and so on.) That situation is still maintained, ensuring the Federation has effective tools for activities designed to rebuild their geopolitical zone of influence. It seems that the process was started about 1999 (although, as mentioned, some attempts were made earlier – but were not successfully completed due to the relative weakness). Since 2008, the “gathering of the Russian lands” entered into a much more intensive phase (Al-Rod- han, 2009: 111). The Caucasian war of the 2008, however, made it clear that the use of armed force for the realization of geopolitical objectives in specific regions does not entail unacceptable political costs. Far more – the full geopolitical success was reached by Mos- cow politicians only after some time. Replacing the cadres of Geor- gia led the state – as it seems – to resignation from pro-Western course. The ongoing game in 2013–2014 towards the geopolitical future of Ukraine is another piece of Russian actions that result is to be the redefinition of geopolitical space in the Eurasian region. The uniqueness of the recent situation in Ukraine in compari- son with previous (twentieth-century) openings of “windows of op- portunity” should not obscure the existence of a certain continu- ity in geopolitical trends. Even more, the current situation should be seen as firmly rooted in the contexts of the past and referring to them (Burdzy, 1995: 39).