Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War

Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War

AND THE VIETNAM WAR SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRACY SWEDISH West European leaders had good reasons to oppose US Vietnam war policy. It threatened to alter the global balance of power while igniting unrest at home. Such turbulence led to a radicalized political atmosphere domestically. In this new environment, the “New Left” established a SOCIAL powerful foothold among the “68-generation”. In many West European countries the new radical left rejected the older Socialist and Communist parties in favor of more radical political alternatives. In Sweden the Social Democratic government struggled to maintain a DEMOCRACY workable relationship with Washington while at the same time placating domestic anti-war opinion – thus preventing this issue from being hijacked by the far left. How did the Swedish Social Democrats resolve this dilemma? AND THE Although this is the most written-about episode in Swedish postwar diplomacy, this is the first book to scrutinize the impact of Sweden,s Vietnam War policy on its domestic politics. VIETNAM WAR CARL-GUSTAF SCOTT CARL-GUSTAF Södertörns högskola | www.sh.se/publications | [email protected] CARL-GUSTAF SCOTT CARL-GUSTAF Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE VIETNAM WAR CARL-GUSTAF SCOTT CARL-GUSTAF Södertörns högskola (Södertörn University) Library SE-141 89 Huddinge www.sh.se/publications © Carl-Gustaf Scott Cover: Jonathan Robson Graphic form: Per Lindblom & Jonathan Robson Printed by Elanders, Stockholm 2017 Södertörn Academic Studies 64 ISSN 1650-433X ISBN 978-91-87843-35-8 (print) ISBN 978-91-87843-36-5 (digital) This book is dedicated to Frank and “Farmor” and to the two fellowships that made all of this possible Contents Abbreviations 9 Preface 11 CHAPTER 1 Swedish Social Democracy and the Vietnam War: Domestic Foreign Policy? 17 CHAPTER 2 The Emergence of the Vietnam Issue in Swedish Politics, 1964–1967 49 CHAPTER 3 The Social Democrats Seize the Initiative: The Swedish Committee for Vietnam and Palme at Sergels torg, 1968 91 CHAPTER 4 The Deserter Question 1967–1973: A Case Study in Domestic Foreign Policy 133 CHAPTER 5 Swedish Diplomatic Recognition and Humanitarian Aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 1969–1970: A Case Study in Domestic Foreign Policy 171 CHAPTER 6 Dénouement 1970–1974: Conflict and Stalemate on Both Fronts 217 CHAPTER 7 Swedish Vietnam Policy Reconsidered 261 Bibliography 287 Abbreviations ADC American Deserters Committee CUF Centerpartiets ungdomsförbund = the Center Party Youth organisation DFFG De förenade FNL-Grupperna = the United NLF Groups (was an umbrella group for the Maoist oriented FNL-groups) DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam FPU Folkpartiets ungdomsförbund = the Liberal Youth of Sweden GVN Government of [South] Vietnam KFML Kommunistiska Förbundet Marxist-Leninisterna = the Communist League of Marxist-Leninists (Maoist defectors from SKP broke away from the party and established the KFML in 1967) KFML(r) Kommunistiska Förbundet Marxist-Leninisterna Revolutionärerna = the Communist League of Revolutionary Marxist-Leninists (in 1970, the KFML(r) split away from the KFML on the grounds that the latter party was not revolutionary) KMA Kampanjen mot Atomvapen (the Campaign against Nuclear Weapons) LO Landsorganisationen = Swedish Trade Union Confederation (the central organization for all Social Democratic-oriented trade unions) NLF National Liberation Front PRR Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (the political wing of the Communist-controlled NLF) SAP Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti = Social Democratic Labor Party of Sweden SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands = Social Democratic Labor Party of [West] Germany SFIF Solidaritetsfronten för Indokinas folk = the Solidarity Front for the People of Indochina (the KFML(r)’s Vietnam group) 9 SKfV Svenska Kommittén för Vietnam = the Swedish Committee for Vietnam (was the main organization of the pacifist and parliamen- tary oriented anti-war movement) SKP Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti (SKP) = the Swedish Communist Party (In 1967, the SKP changed its name to VPK) SKSF Sveriges Kristna Socialdemokraters Förbund (SKSF) = the Swedish Association of Christian Social Democrats SSKF Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Kvinnoförbund = the Association of Social Democratic Women SSSF Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Studentförbund = the Association of Social Democratic Students SSU Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Ungdomsförbund = the Association of Social Democratic Youth SVK Svenska Vietnamkommittén = the Swedish Vietnam Committee (was the principal organization of the parliamentary oriented anti- war movement until it was replaced by the SKfV in late 1967) VPK Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna (VPK) = the Left Communist Party (In 1967 the SKP changed its name to VPK) 10 Preface This book analyzes the Vietnam War’s gravely destabilizing impact on trans-Atlantic relations. West European leaders had good reason to oppose U.S. Vietnam policy, as it threatened to alter fundamentally the global ba- lance of power, while simultaneously igniting social unrest at home. Such turbulence was heightened by the emerging détente, which undermined the earlier Cold War consensus, leading to a radicalized political atmosphere domestically. In this new environment the “New Left” was able to establish a powerful foothold among the so-called “68-generation;” and in many West European countries the latter rejected the older Socialist and Com- munist parties in favor of more radical political alternatives. All of this created a difficult situation for Social Democratic governments who strug- gled to maintain a workable relationship with Washington, while at the same time placating domestic anti-war opinion – lest this issue be hijacked by the far left. This study explores how the Swedish Social Democrats tried to resolve this dilemma by adopting a vocal stance against the war as a means to divert radical energies away from the domestic status quo. This is not to suggest that the Swedish Social Democrats’ outspoken opposition to the war was completely insincere, but only that the party leadership’s handling of this question was consistently informed by domestic political calculations. This is the first work on this topic to assert the primacy of domestic politics. In light of the tensions that this policy caused with Washington, it is per- haps not surprising that this is the most written about episode in Swedish postwar diplomacy. The vast majority of these studies have, however, been produced either by political scientists, journalists, politicians, or retired diplomats; this is thus the first major scholarly historical work on the topic. It is also one of the only studies based on archival research on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition, very little on this subject has so far been written in English – this despite the fact that Sweden is widely recognized to have been 11 SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE VIETNAM WAR the principal West European critic of the American war effort. Conse- quently, a major function of this work is also to introduce this topic to non- Swedish speakers. Another important way that this book distinguishes itself from its fore- runners lies in the desire to look beyond Sweden, and to locate the Swedish Social Democrats’ vocal opposition to the American war effort in the broader framework of West European discontent about U.S. policy. Previous studies have generally examined the Swedish position in isolation, and by so doing have in effect made it appear unique, and by extension also independent from larger pan-European trends. This study, in contrast, insists that the Swedish Social Democrats’ approach to this issue can only be understood in the con- text of widespread West European dissatisfaction about the war. Chapter 1 is chiefly intended to introduce the reader to the historio- graphical debate, and political controversy that has surrounded the Swedish Social Democratic government’s handling of the Vietnam issue. Above all, this chapter outlines the various party tactical considerations that informed the Social Democratic hierarchy’s approach to this question; and it finds that these calculations were far more complex than the party’s international and domestic critics claimed at the time. Rather than being mostly directed at the radical youth vote, this policy was primarily meant for internal Social Democratic consumption. In hindsight, the government’s approach to the Vietnam War appears to have been a success in the short term, in that it held the party together in the face of radicalized political atmosphere of the 1960s – and this without fatally damaging either the party’s immediate electoral prospects, or the country’s core national interests. Chapter 2 analyzes the gradual emergence of the Vietnam War as a major issue in Swedish politics, starting in 1964–1965. It shows that the advent of this question was very much tied to the growing importance of the youth vote, which by 1968 was expected to count for as much as 20 % of the entire electorate. However, the emergence of this issue was also very much tied to the political revitalization of the Swedish Communist Party. As the latter party de-Stalinized itself in early 1960s, it came to pose a real threat to the Swedish Social Democrats for the first time since the late 1940s. From the point of view of the Social Democratic establishment, the domestic political situation was further complicated by the sudden appear- ance of the Maoist anti-war movement which, like the Communists, sought to use

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