Policy Briefing August 2017 Still in ruins: Reviving the stalled reconstruction of Gaza Sultan Barakat and Firas Masri Still in ruins: Reviving the stalled reconstruction of Gaza Sultan Barakat and Firas Masri The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment and the analysis and recommendations are not determined by any donation. Copyright © 2017 Brookings Institution BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 U.S.A. www.brookings.edu BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER Saha 43, Building 63, West Bay, Doha, Qatar www.brookings.edu/doha Still in ruins: Reviving the stalled reconstruction of Gaza Sultan Barakat and Firas Masri1 INTRODUCTION Israelis and Palestinians seems out of reach, the humanitarian problems posed by the Three years have passed since the conclusion substandard living conditions in Gaza require of the latest military assault on the Gaza Strip. the attention of international actors associated Most of the Palestinian enclave still lies in ruin. with the peace process. If the living conditions Many Gazans continue to lack permanent in Gaza do not improve in the near future, the housing, living in shelters and other forms of region will inevitably experience another round temporary accommodation. An absence of of conflict, more violent than the last. basic infrastructure—electricity, clean water, sewage treatment, and waste management— This policy briefing examines the organization has blighted the daily lives of Gaza’s 1.9 of the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism million citizens.2 While the reconstruction (GRM)—the temporary tripartite agreement process trudges along, a lack of employment between the Palestinian Authority (PA), the opportunities has left 42 percent of the total Israeli government, and the United Nations labor force unemployed, rising to 60 percent that has governed the reconstruction of Gaza among Gaza’s youth.3 Gaza can barely sustain since the 2014 war. It will describe the failures the lives of its current inhabitants. With an of the GRM, arguing that it has not advanced annual population growth of 2.4 percent, the reconstruction of Gaza as originally the situation in the Palestinian enclave is intended. Instead, the GRM has not only becoming increasingly grim as humanitarian hindered progress on reconstruction, but it has and reconstruction efforts fail to expand.4 also institutionalized the Israeli blockade. Meanwhile, the enduring Israeli siege and naval The authors will conclude with recommendations blockade of Gaza exacerbates these problems, on how to dismantle and replace the GRM, closing Gaza off to the outside world. The while accounting for political shifts in the conditions in Gaza amount to those of an Israeli-Palestinian conflict and changes in global outdoor prison; a collective punishment attitudes toward post-conflict reconstruction that adds to the despair and frustration that projects. The briefing will also suggest ways to arises from the enduring Israeli occupation improve the quality of life for Gaza’s people. and the need for a political settlement to After all, despite the absence of a political the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While a final solution to the conflict at large, the international status agreement for peace between the community should not lose sight of resolving 1 Sultan Barakat is the former director of research at the Brookings Doha Center. He is a professor at the University of York and Director of the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies at the Doha Institute. Firas Masri is a research assistant at the Brookings Doha Center. The authors wish to thank those who provided their helpful feedback and insights for this paper. The authors also acknowledge the assistance and support of the Brookings Doha Center staff, especially Fatema Alhashemi and Sumaya Attia. 2 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “The Gaza Strip: The Humanitarian Impact of the Blockade,” November 14, 2016, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-strip-humanitarian-impact-blockade-november-2016. 3 Ibid. 4 Central Intelligence Agency, “Gaza Strip,” World Factbook, July 25, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/gz.html. 1 the humanitarian crisis that continues to affect or humanitarian convoys crossing into Gaza the civilian population caught in the middle of from two entry points: Kerem Shalom in the an intractable political conflict. south for commercial goods and Erez in the north for people (see Figure I).5 Egyptian IMPEDIMENTS TO RECONSTRUCTION authorities control access via the Rafah border crossing, which was only opened for 32 days in Several factors account for the slow 2015, 44 days in 2016, and 10 non-consecutive reconstruction of Gaza. The first is restricted days in 2017 (as of May).6 Due to these access into and out of the territory, enforced restrictions, humanitarian and construction by both Israeli and Egyptian authorities. The supplies have not been arriving in the quantities Coordination of Government Activities in essential to effectively rebuild Gaza and bolster the Territories (COGAT), a unit of the Israeli potential for economic growth that exists in Ministry of Defense, approves any construction the territory. Figure I: Map of Gaza with Crossing Points No Zo E ne n 1 try .5 nm Israeli forces Erez y Crossing b d e rc o Beit Lahiya f 2 1 Beit Hanoun n 0 e 2 r Jabalia , e it b m m e Gaza li v o City g N e in c h n s Si fi Nahal Oz s e (Closed since 2010) il m l Karni a c (Closed since 2011) ti u a n 6 L E B A N O N Deir al BalahInternational Border Green Line N Z o o E n n e t 1 ry n I S R A E L m Khan Yunis Gaza - West Bank Safe Passage closed 2001 N N A A E G Y P T D E R N O Rafah J No-Go Zone (300 metres) A R R West E Airport R A E Bank V closed in 2000 and E I S Risk zone R later destroyed Sufa T Rafah I (Closed since 2011) D Built-up Area Crossing E M Safe Passage Refugee Camps (Non-functional) A E S Concrete Wall D A Kerem Shalom E Wired Fence Crossing Gaza D Strip Observation tower I S R A E L Source: UNOCHA 5 UNOCHA, “The Gaza Strip.” 6 UNOCHA, “Gaza Crossings’ Operation Status: Monthly Update-April 2017,” May 17, 2017, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza- crossings-operations-status-monthly-update-april-2017. 2 Still in ruins: Reviving the stalled reconstruction of Gaza The ongoing political rifts between Hamas— Funding issues have also impeded the de facto government in Gaza—on one reconstruction. Despite the high-level of hand, and the Fatah-led PA, Egypt, and enthusiasm expressed during the Cairo Israel on the other, only exacerbates the Conference in October 2014, where many of problem. Both Egypt and Israel do not trust the numerous pledges were made to rebuild Hamas and continue to consider it a security Gaza, much of the donations remain unfulfilled. threat. Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el- Of the $5.4 billion pledged at the conference, Sissi hinted that he would regularly open over half was committed to reconstruction the Rafah border crossing if the PA were to projects in Gaza—but only 51 percent had been provide security in Gaza instead of Hamas.7 disbursed as of December 31, 2016.9 The Arab This would not only allow for an increase States—Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, in the amount of construction materials and the United Arab Emirates—made some coming into Gaza, but it would also bring of the largest pledges during the conference; these goods at a cheaper cost—due to the however, the bloc is also behind the bulk of lower tax duties placed on goods entering unfulfilled payments—87 percent of unfulfilled through Rafah, as opposed to the Israeli pledges are from the Gulf, and 78 percent of the border crossings.8 Gulf’s pledges remain unfulfilled (see Table I).10 Table I: Disbursement Status by Donor of Pledged Support to Gaza (USD Million) Pledged Support Disbursement of Support Disbursement Ratio Donor to Gaza to Gaza as of Dec 2016 of Support to Gaza Bahrain 6.5 5.15 79% Kuwait 200 48.93 24% Qatar 1,000 216.06 22% Saudi Arabia 500 90.41 18% United Arab Emirates 200 59.08 30% GCC Total 1,906.5 419.63 22% Worldwide Total 3,499 1796 51% Source: World Bank, 2016 7 Initially, the aim was to replace the Hamas security forces at the border, but it seems that Egypt was eventually willing to accept Hamas security at the border with PA support/collaboration. Rasha Abou Jalal, “Egypt Announces Deal to Open Rafah Crossing, But When Will It Actually Open?” al-Monitor, November 26, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/11/egypt-pa-deal-rafah-crossing-open- hamas-opposition.html. 8 Quartet official, interview with authors, Doha, Qatar, February 23, 2016. 9 Michael R. Gordon, “Conference Pledges $5.4 Billion to Rebuild Gaza Strip,” New York Times, October 12, 2014, https://www.nytimes. com/2014/10/13/world/middleeast/us-pledges-212-million-in-new-aid-for-gaza.html; The World Bank, “Reconstructing Gaza—Donor Pledges,” December 31, 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/rebuilding-gaza-donor-pledges#4.